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This dissertation examines how John Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge might be used to 
consider the aims of contemporary educational technologies. While significant scholarship exists 
examining the historical and philosophical importance of Dewey’s contributions to American 
progressive education, much less scholarship has focused on examining the relationship between 
Dewey’s theory of knowledge and his thoughts regarding the purposes and aims of educational 
technologies.  I argue that because many of Dewey’s ideas were heavily influenced by the 
material and social changes of the industrial revolution, his theories about knowledge, 
technology, and education offer a unique perspective when considering the educational 
significance of digital technologies.  
This dissertation is guided by two central questions: (1) What is the relationship between 
Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge, his philosophy of technology, and his philosophy of 
education? (2) How might Dewey’s ideas about the relationship between knowledge, technology, 
and education help educators, students, and policy makers think about the aims and uses of 
digital technologies in contemporary educational contexts?   
I begin by examining Dewey’s pragmatically instrumental account of knowledge.  I then 
examine pragmatic instrumentalism as it relates to the field of philosophy of technology.  I 
demonstrate that pragmatic instrumentalism is a non-deterministic yet value-laden approach to 
technology and represents a distinct philosophical approach to technological change.   I go on to 
demonstrate how the relationship between Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge and his philosophy 
of technology shaped his philosophy of education.  I argue that Dewey’s philosophy of education 
is comprised of three sets of interlocking arguments: developmental arguments, technological 






instrumental understanding of knowledge, technology, and education in which the process of 
growth is shaped by the relationship between the experiences of learner, the social and 
technological contexts of the learning environment, and the ongoing development of intellectual 
habits of active inquiry.  
I conclude my dissertation by applying Dewey’s ideas about knowledge, technology, and 
education to a consideration of some contemporary educational contexts.  I argue that if the aim 
of education is the cultivation of educative experiences that lead to growth, then a pragmatically 
instrumental approach to educational technology suggests that educators, students, and policy 
makers accept responsibility for the uses of ICTs by rejecting technological determinism and a 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Beginning in the mid 1990s with Larry Hickman’s (1992) publication of John Dewey’s 
Pragmatic Technology there has been a renewed interest in John Dewey’s ideas about 
technology.  While there has long been an abundance of scholarship about how the scientific 
revolution, psychology, and Darwinian evolution influenced Dewey’s thoughts on the 
instrumental nature of knowledge, much less scholarship has focused on how the rapid 
transformations of the industrial revolution also influenced his instrumentalist approach (Godfry-
Smith, 2002; Lutz, 1985; Menand, 2001; Murphy, 1990; Philips, 1971; Rorty, 1982; Ryan, 1995; 
Shook, 2000; Westbrook, 1991; White, 1943).  Even fewer scholars have examined in depth how 
Dewey’s ideas about technology influenced his philosophy of education.  Because Dewey is such 
a key theorist in the development of American education, and because contemporary educational 
practices are again experiencing technological changes analogous to the industrial revolution of 
Dewey’s era, considering anew how Dewey understood the relationship between technology, 
knowledge, and education might suggest valuable new approaches to how we think about 
educational technologies in the 21st century.    
Like the industrial revolution of the early 20th century in which many of the aims and 
institutional structures of contemporary public education were first formed, the digital revolution 
of the early 21st century is inviting a widespread reassessment of some of the basic structures and 
beliefs regarding American public schools.  The assumption that schools can rely on a “two 
lives” strategy in which students conduct their digital lives outside of school then unplug to 
engage in academic life within schools is proving challenging (Ohler, 2011).  Advances in online 
technologies are changing how students access and experience information and pushing the walls 






American education has faced a similar period of technological disruption.  As I discuss 
in greater detail in chapter four, the modern American public school system first came into being 
during an era of rapid technological advancement. Both organizationally and pedagogically, the 
industrial revolution and the Progressive Era of the late 19th and early 20th century dramatically 
reshaped the educational landscape in America.  By creating an expansive middle class, coupled 
with rapid urbanization, an influx in immigration, and changes in child labor laws, the industrial 
revolution resulted in expanded access to higher education, a broad reorganization of the general 
curriculum, and the creation of the American high school (Cremin, 1961; Krug, 1964; 
Lagemann, 2000; Westbrook, 1992).  
Pedagogically, educators of the Progressive Era openly questioned and reformed 
educational norms that stretched as far back as antiquity.  Responding to the growing labor needs 
of an ever-expanding industrial world, heated debates arose over the ultimate aims of a public 
education.  Should, as some argued, schools focus more on training students in vocational arts, or 
should schools continue to educate students in the belief that most will attend college?  Both 
perspectives were argued amid and because of the changing social, material, and technological 
realities of the industrial revolution (Callahan, 1962; Kleibard, 1999; Labaree, 1997; Rury, 2016; 
Tyack & Cuban, 1995).   
Tyack (1974) has famously argued that certain norms of schooling, a “grammar,” 
emerged out of the industrial era and have persisted to this day in guiding the organization of 
schooling (Tyack & Tobin, 1994). As digital technologies become more and more common, 
many contemporary theorists argue that this grammar is becoming increasingly antiquated. 
Technological enthusiasts argue that the unique nature of digital technology requires a new 






digital world. Technological skeptics argue that digital technologies are “shallowing” 
educational practices by habituating students to the consumption of contextless information and 
the breakup of civic community. Both positons, however, generally recognize that the digital 
revolution is challenging educators, students, and policy makers to confront some basic and 
fundamental beliefs about the nature and function of American public education (Carr, 2011; 
Collins & Halverson, 2009).   
I would like to suggest that Dewey, and the renewed interest in his ideas about 
technology, might help inform this debate.  Dewey is important both as a central historical figure 
during a formative time in American education, and he is important as a philosopher whose ideas 
remain relevant to contemporary discussion about knowledge and education.   
It is my intent in this dissertation to show how Dewey’s thoughts on technology relate to 
his philosophy of knowledge and his philosophy of education.  Furthermore, I will show how the 
relationship between Dewey’s thoughts on technology, knowledge, and education might be used 
to consider contemporary approaches to modern educational digital technologies.  In both 
capacities, I hope to add new insights into Dewey’s ideas as they are relevant to the scholarly 
work on the Progressive Era in education, as well as new insights into how Dewey’s ideas about 
the relationship between knowledge, technology, and education might serve as a distinct 
philosophical position challenging the binary choice between technological enthusiasm and 
technological skepticism.   
This dissertation, therefore, hopes to answer the following two questions: 
1. What is the relationship between Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge, his philosophy of 






2.  How might Dewey’s ideas about the relationship between knowledge, technology, 
and education help educators, students, and policy makers think about the use of 
digital technologies in contemporary educational contexts?   
Through careful analysis of these three branches of Dewey’s thinking, I ultimately argue 
that as a distinct position across the fields of philosophy of knowledge, philosophy of technology, 
and philosophy of education, Dewey suggests that if educators, students, and policy makers 
desire to cultivate growth and free inquiry they must ultimately accept responsibility for the uses 
of educational technologies. Accepting responsibility entails rejecting fixed educational 
standards and technological determinism.  
Methodology 
This is a work of educational philosophy and as such relies heavily on the methods 
common to the discipline of philosophy.  While there is no one clear method of philosophical 
analysis, a long tradition of philosophical thought suggests a general approach.  According to the 
American Philosophical Association, 
Research in philosophy also often takes the form of efforts to refine analyses, develop 
and advance or criticize interpretations, explore alternative perspectives and new ways of 
thinking, suggest and apply modified or novel modes of assessment, and, in general to 
promote new understanding. A special case of this type of research is conceptual and 
methodological critique, involving the scrutiny of the basic concepts and methodologies 
of other disciplines, scientific as well as humanistic. Other cases involve interpretive and 
evaluative inquiry contributing to the enhancement of our comprehension of ourselves 
and our world. All of these forms of endeavor contribute importantly to the philosophical 






Another account is provided by The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online in 
which philosophical analysis is considered “a method of inquiry in which one seeks to assess 
complex systems of thought by ‘analysing’[sic] them into simpler elements whose relationships 
are thereby brought into focus” (Thomas, 1998, par. 1). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 
argues that “philosophical analysis is best understood by analogy with analysis in chemistry, as 
being a process of investigation into the structure, functioning, and connections of a particular 
matter under scrutiny” (Grayling, 1995, p. 27).  Dewey, himself, considered the method of 
philosophy to be part criticism, part interpretation: 
Philosophy thus has a double task: that of criticizing existing aims with respect to the 
existing state of science, pointing out values which have become obsolete with the 
command of new resources, showing what values are merely sentimental because there 
are no means for their realization; and also that of interpreting the results of specialized 
science in their bearing on future social endeavor. (DE, p. 329) 
The foundation of my analysis comes from a close reading of Dewey’s major works. In 
general, it is common for Dewey scholars to access Dewey’s major works through the thirty-
seven volume The Collected Works of John Dewey, edited by Boydston & Hickman (1996) and 
published by the Southern Illinois University Press.  The Collected Works breaks Dewey’s 
writings into his Early Works (EW,1882-1898), Middle Works (MW, 1899-1924), and Later 
Works (LW, 1925-1953) (Sharpe, Simon & Levine, 1991).  While I do at times use some of the 
Collected Works throughout this dissertation, I primarily rely on the major works as they are 
published individually.  Throughout this dissertation I signify their use through abbreviations. I 
list these works and their abbreviations here in order of their original publication dates: The 






1910), Schools of Tomorrow (ST, 1915) Democracy and Education (DE, 1916), Reconstruction 
in Philosophy (RP, 1920), Human Nature and Conduct (HNC, 1922), Experience and Nature 
(EN, 1925), The Public and its Problems (PP, 1927), The Quest for Certainty (QC, 1929), 
Individualism Old and New (ION, 1930), Art as Experience (AE, 1934), Liberalism and Social 
Action (LSA, 1935), Logic the Theory of Inquiry (LTI, 1938), Experience and Education (EE, 
1938), Freedom and Culture (FC, 1939), and The Problems of Men (PM, 1946).   
When necessary I also consulted essays, magazine articles, introductions, and other 
ancillary writings of Dewey’s.  In general, consultation of these writings occurred because of 
references made in the secondary literature or through a cross-referenced search of a particular 
concept or specific terminology as provided by the Index for the Collected Works of John Dewey 
edited by Anne S. Sharpe, Harriet Furst Simon, & Barbara Levine (1991).   
While these works comprise the core of my analysis, they are by no means the only 
works consulted.  I have also relied on numerous secondary sources which are documented and 
discussed in detail throughout this dissertation.     
Overview of the Chapters 
 Each chapter in this dissertation is meant to serve as a methodical and systematic 
explanation and analysis of some of the main arguments and debates surrounding Dewey’s 
philosophy of knowledge, his philosophy of technology, and his philosophy of education.  In the 
final chapter I attempt to demonstrate some of the ways my analysis might be used to consider 
contemporary educational technologies.  
 In chapter two, I explain Dewey’s arguments defining pragmatic instrumentalism.  While 
much of Dewey’s work in the philosophy of knowledge came late in his career, it is a topic he 






Dewey’s attempt to overcome deep divisions within the Western philosophic tradition stretching 
as far back as antiquity.  I conclude by providing a specific definition of pragmatic 
instrumentalism and demonstrating how Dewey defended his PI against criticism.  
 Chapter three lays out some of the broad contours of the field of philosophy of 
technology.  Using Mitcham’s (1992) distinction between an engineering philosophy of 
technology (EPT) and a humanities philosophy of technology (HPT) as a starting place, I explain 
how Dewey’s PI has been interpreted as a distinct middle ground between these two divisions.   I 
trace Dewey’s philosophy of technology through his specific understanding of the history of 
science and his arguments characterizing the industrial revolution as confirmation of the 
instrumental value of the scientific method.  I conclude that PI is a distinct position within the 
field of philosophy of technology, one that is characterized by its non-deterministic yet value-
laden orientation toward technological development.    
 Chapter four argues that Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge and his philosophy of 
technology directly inform his philosophy of education vis-à-vis his ideas about education 
through occupations.  By contextualizing Dewey within the historical debates marked by the 
Committee of Ten and the Cardinal Principles Committee, I argue that Dewey’s education 
through occupations is a distinct philosophical approach to education that emphasizes scientific 
methodology and technological tools as critical elements for the cultivation of growth.  I further 
argue that growth can be characterized as the cultivation of habits of active inquiry.   
 Chapter five explores how Dewey’s PI, as the basis of his philosophy of knowledge, 
technology, and education might be used to consider a broad approach to contemporary digital 
technologies.  I argue that a PI approach to information and communication technologies (ICTs) 






technologies are changing our relationship to the gathering and communication of information. I 
then argue that a PI approach suggests that educators, students, and policy makers accept 
responsibility for ICT technology by rejecting technological determinism and recognizing that 
ICTs also express values.   
Limitations 
 This is an interdisciplinary dissertation and as such it must walk a fine line between too 
narrow and too broad of a focus.  Much of the literature examining Dewey’s philosophy of 
knowledge and his philosophy of technology is generally confined to the discipline of 
philosophy and assumes a familiarity with the language and topics common to the fields of 
epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of technology. I have tried to make these 
concepts palatable to specialists and non-specialists alike, as one of the indirect goals of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate how philosophical analysis remains relevant to contemporary 
educational concerns.  By so doing, invariably, I leave myself open to criticisms that my analysis 
is either too granular and hence unclear, or it is too broad and in need of deeper explanation.  I 
welcome both criticisms as an act of philosophical investigation itself.  Creating a “dialogue 
across difference” is one of the main tasks of philosophy, and any critique that sharpens my 
linguistic and argumentative focus while also expanding the pool of scholars and educators 
engaging in the debate is, in my mind, a healthy act of philosophical discourse (Burbules & Rice, 
1991, p. 393) 
 A word about Dewey. It is almost mandatory to mention that Dewey’s language can, at 
times, be difficult. I liken reading Dewey to wandering through a dense forest on the edge of the 
plains—you eventually arrive at a wide-open space, even if you cannot always see it.  






prescribing a particular course of action.  Some may find this frustrating or consider it an 
argumentative weakness.  I do not. That this dissertation does not conclude with particular policy 
recommendations nor specific curricular or teaching protocols is a reflection of my own 
pragmatic sensibility.   
 Finally, any dissertation that attempts to write about modern technology runs the risk of 
becoming irrelevant the moment it is written.  Moore’s (1965) law stating that computer power 
will double every two year has, for the most part, proven accurate.  The examples I provide 
throughout this dissertation are invariably going to seem antiquated in a short amount of time.  
This is unavoidable. I hope my general conclusions about a pragmatically instrumental approach 








Chapter 2 Pragmatic Instrumentalism 
The purpose of this chapter is to thoroughly explain what Dewey means by pragmatic 
instrumentalism (PI).  There are two important prongs to Dewey’s theory of pragmatic 
instrumentalism. The first prong is made up of a set premises defining human experience as a 
fully interactive and continuous process. The second prong is a set of arguments that 
conceptualizes inquiry as an adaptive response to problematic situations arising out of empirical 
contexts.  
It is important to note upfront that Dewey does not believe these two prongs occur in 
isolation.  The actual nature of human experience and the process of inquiry are mutually 
interpenetrative and continually interweaving; they are not two different sets of phenomenon, 
just different manifestations of one organic process.  While for my purposes it is important to 
consider the criteria of experience and the process of inquiry in isolation, I will eventually bring 
these arguments back together as comprising the total meaning of pragmatic instrumentalism 
(PI).  I will ultimately argue, as does Dewey, that in all instances, be it the adaptive efficiencies 
of habit or the experimental processes and methods of active inquiry, our experiences determine 
the value of and possible solutions to the problems at hand.  
To make my argument I will first explain how Dewey situates his theory of knowledge 
within a broader context of philosophical concerns, specifically how and why he argues against 
the dualistic and foundationalist traditions of Western philosophy.  Second, I will explain how 
Dewey defines experience as one characterized by continuity and interaction. Third, I will 
explain Dewey’s understanding of inquiry, which he sees as the purposeful adaptation between 
the human organism and the precariousness of empirical existence.  Fourth, I will explain how 






knowledge.  Fifth, I will address how Dewey countered some of the most common criticisms of 
PI, specifically the claims of scientific realism and critical theory.  
The Heritage of Philosophical Fallacies 
In order to understand the arguments Dewey puts forth conceptualizing the nature of 
human experience and inquiry, it is important to first understand the philosophical tradition to 
which Dewey was responding.  In order to do so I will examine the two central philosophical 
problems Dewey discusses across his writings and which, he argues, represent two enduring 
fallacies of “selective emphasis” common to the Western philosophical tradition—dualism and 
foundationalism (EN, p. 11).  Dualism, broadly understood, is the “theory that mind and matter 
are two distinct things” (Nagel, 1995, p. 206).  Foundationalism is the “theory that knowledge of 
the world rests on a foundation of indubitable beliefs from which further propositions can be 
inferred to produce a superstructure of known truths” (Jones, 1995, p. 289).  In presenting these 
problems it is important to note that Dewey’s intent was not to condemn the past as woefully 
ignorant, but to illustrate why these fallacies could no longer serve the purposes of contemporary 
society:  
It is, accordingly, relevant to the theme of needed reconstruction to say that the adverse 
criticisms of philosophies of the past are not directed at these systems with respect to 
their connection with intellectual and moral issues of their own time and place, but with 
respect to their relevancy in a much changed human situation.  The very thing that makes 
the great systems objects of esteem and admiration in their own socio-cultural contexts 
are in large measure the very grounds that deprive them of the “actuality” in a world 






revolution,” the “industrial revolution” and the “political revolution” of the last few 
hundred years. (RP, pp. iv-v)  
A further caveat. This chapter examines these two fallacies only as philosophic postulates 
against which Dewey’s pragmatic instrumentalism is believed a response.  Each one of these 
fallacies has a long and rich philosophic history and to attempt a thorough summary of the 
philosophers and contexts of each fallacy would be impractical.  In subsequent chapters, 
however, I will examine at greater length how Dewey responds to these fallacies across his 
specific interpretations of science, technology, and education.  The focus of this chapter is 
simply to explicate the argument for pragmatic instrumentalism and how Dewey conceptualized 
PI as a response to the fallacies of dualism and foundationalism.  It is therefore only necessary to 
understand the postulates in this context.   
The Fallacies of Dualism and Foundationalism 
“I cannot stress too heavily,” writes Mortin G. White (1943) in The Origin of Dewey’s 
Instrumentalism, “the concept of dualism in Dewey’s development.  No position, large or small, 
that Dewey attacked was not charged at some point with being dualistic” (p. 150).   
Throughout his entire career, Dewey argued that the conceptual divisions common to the 
Western philosophical tradition, such as those concerning the difference between mind and body, 
fact and value, theory and practice, were not substantive divisions but reflected instead an 
inability of philosophy to look outside itself. “Quarrels among conflicting types of philosophy 
are thus family quarrels. They go on within the limits of a too domestic circle, and can be settled 
only by venturing further afield, and out of doors” (EN, p. 47).  This “circle,” Dewey argued, had 
long been dominated by attempts to define “pure” reality as either solely intellectual or solely 






Some theories ascribe the ultimate test of knowledge to impressions passively received, 
forced on us whether we will or no. Others ascribe the guarantee of knowledge to synthetic 
activity of the intellect. Idealistic theories hold that mind and object known are ultimately 
one; realistic doctrines reduce knowledge to awareness of what exists independently, and 
so on. But they all make one common assumption. They all hold that the operation of 
inquiry excludes any element of practical activity that enters into construction of the object 
known. (QC, p. 22)   
In both cases, according to Dewey, be it from an idealist or materialist perspective, 
foundationalism and dualism conceptualize knowledge as an object separate from human 
practical experience: the foundation of knowledge is either found in the functions of the mind or 
in the “essences” of the material world and the objects of investigation. According to Rorty 
(1982), 
Those who want truth to have an essence want knowledge, or rationality, or inquiry, or 
the relation between thought and its object, to have an essence. Further, they want to be 
able to use their knowledge of such essences to criticize views they take to be false, and 
to point to the direction of progress toward the discovery of more truths. (p. 162)  
For Dewey, because philosophers had become so focused on reconciling the problems created by 
foundationalism and dualism, philosophy itself had turned away from considering the problems 
of everyday human life. Philosophy had become the search for Truth rather than an activity of 
human adaptation to solve the problems of living.  
Modern philosophy…has tried to combine acceptance of the conclusions of scientific 
inquiry as to the natural world with acceptance of doctrines about the nature of mind and 






inquiry. Between the two there is an incoherent incompatibility. Hence the best efforts of 
philosophy have been frustrated by artificiality and by controversial conflicts. (QC, p. 49)   
Specifically, argued Dewey, the “incompatibility” arose because of the tendency in the 
philosophic tradition to valorize either the theoretical idea or the material object over and above 
the experiencing of the object.  By assuming that “the results of reflection as having, in and of 
themselves, a reality superior to that of the material of any other mode of experience” (EN, p. 
19),  
The whole classical tradition down to our day has continued to hold a slighting view of 
experience as such, and to hold up as the proper goal and ideal of true knowledge realities 
which even if they are located in empirical things cannot be known by empirical 
methods. (QC, p. 27) 
The truth is, Dewey argued, most of our life is not cognitive at all.  It is instead composed 
of experiences that are immediate and involve the human agent as an organism within and of 
nature.  Most experiences are visceral and pre-reflective responses to environmental stimulation. 
These experiences, although unarticulated and precognitive, bind us to nature as participants in 
the natural process.  To assert that the cognitive or material object, the one formed through 
inquiry, has a primary and superior reality over experience of the object, Dewey argued, is a 
fallacy.  That is, according to Dewey, it is a wrong to assume that the totality of reality is 
singularly bound to the cognitively formed objects of rational and scientific knowledge simply 
because we prefer the conceptual cleanliness of the idea of experience over the messy and 






The Nature of Human Experience 
According to Dewey, experience “includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, 
love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted on, the ways in which they do and 
suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine--in short, processes of experiencing” (Italics 
Dewey, EN, p. 8,).  To borrow from William James, experience is a “double-barreled” word, it 
describes both an object and a process (James, 1904, p. 480). We can strive for an experience 
and we can have an experience.  Experience involves the human organism in a multitude of 
idiosyncratic impulses, and it provides the sensory data of basic existence.  We feel, fear, love, 
and grow in and through our experiences.  
According to Dewey, the human organism exists in a world that fluctuates between 
periods of existential “stability” and “precariousness” (QC, p. 235). Existential stability occurs 
when the organism, human or otherwise, is in synch with his environment; existential 
precariousness whenever the organism and environment are out of balance.  Dewey 
conceptualizes the relationship of the world and the human organism as one of endless 
interaction and adaptation along a wide spectrum of wants and needs.  This conception, Dewey 
argues, stands in contrast to more classical notions of nature:  
The change in the conception of nature is expressed in summary form in the idea that the 
universe is now conceived as open and in process while classical Greece thought of it as 
finite in the sense in which finite means finished, complete and perfect. (LTI, p. 93)  
Continuity and Interaction 
According to Dewey, the nature of the world and the nature of the human organism is one 
that exists within an ever-shifting empirical landscape of other people and things. Experience is 






interaction” (EE, p. 44). We live among others, we share resources, we communicate, we fight 
and die, all in the company of other people, environments, and organic processes. We are not, 
ever, apart from nature.  
The thing essential to bear in mind is that living as an empirical affair is not something 
which goes on below the skin-surface of an organism: it is always an inclusive affair 
involving connection, interaction of what is within the organic body and what lies outside 
in space and time…. (EN, p. 282) 
These interactions occur individually and collectively, internally and externally, physically and 
intellectually.   
Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity that involves an 
environment.  It is a transaction extending beyond the spatial limits of the organism.  An 
organism does not live in an environment; it lives by means of an environment. (LTI, p. 
25)  
Not only does every experience exist because of and within an ecosystem of interactions, 
but it also exists along a continuum of development. Experience is a process whereby the past 
affects the present which affects the future.  Experience is a growing and developmental process.  
It is an ever-becoming.  Dewey calls this process “the continuity of experience” (EE, p. 35).  The 
nature of empirical “continuity” is one in which all experience affects and modifies the 
conditions of all future experiences.  “Every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one 
who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of 
subsequent experiences” (EE, p. 35). Unlike Aristotelian teleological thinking in which the “arc” 






experience is an endless process that has no end other than to continue for as long as the 
organism lives.  
The process of living is continuous; it possesses continuity because it is an everlastingly 
renewed process of acting on the environment and being acted on by it together with 
institution of relations between what is done and what is undergone.   Hence experience 
is necessarily cumulative and its subject matter gains expressiveness because of 
cumulative continuity.  The world we have experienced becomes an integral part of the 
self that acts and is acted on in further experience.  In their physical occurrence, things 
and events experienced pass and are gone. But something of their meaning and value is 
retained as an integral part of the self. (AE, p. 108) 
The principles of interaction and continuity are mutually reinforcing “criteria of 
experience” (EE, p. 33).  That is, to even have an experience or to be experiencing one must be 
fully embedded in a social situation that is, itself, the product of a continuous process of previous 
experiences and interactions.  Experience, in its totality, is not a fixed point in time but a process 
of organic intermingling in which organisms, the environment, and the conditions created by past 
empirical conditions come together, temporarily, along a continuous path of development.  
The Nature of Inquiry 
Most of the time, experience is a reasonably smooth affair. We are well adapted to our 
environments and act according to behaviors that have proven effective in navigating the daily 
business of living.  We enact habits.  Dewey defines a habit as “an acquired predisposition to 
ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these 
express a way of behaving” (HNC, p.42).  Habits are efficient behavioral adaptations that have 






predictable way.  They are “… a form of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an 
ability to use natural conditions as means to ends” (DE, p. 46).  
Most of our lives are conducted through habits.  We drive our cars, cook our meals, and 
take our walks in patterns that have become routine because they work across a range of 
situations. Habits are useful because they work.   They are methods of conduct, “energy 
organized in certain channels” (HNC, p.76).  Their usefulness is tied to their consequential 
success. Importantly, however, habits have no predetermined ends other than the successful 
usefulness of the habit to the situation within in which it operates.  Habits are, therefore, a semi-
permanent method of effective adaptation whose value is judged according to a habit’s ability to 
secure ends, whatever those ends may be.  
When, however, our habitual ways of dealing with the world break down, or we 
encounter precarious situations within which habitual processes are no longer successful, we 
enter the processes of inquiry.  Dewey defines inquiry as, “the controlled or directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent 
distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” 
(LTI, p. 105).  In other words, inquiry is a problem-solving process arising from specific 
empirical situations whereby we employ thinking to manipulate the problematic elements of a 
situation towards desired ends.  This method, according to Dewey, is experimental and scientific.  
It is an active process of testing hypothesis against consequences to solve existential problems. 
What is to be investigated and what knowledge is produced is dependent on the nature and 
significance of the problem. “To discover the meaning of the idea ask for its consequences” (RP, 
p. 94).  Dewey calls these consequences the “end-in-view.” An “end-in-view” is “an aim, 






Inquiry can arise from a large spectrum of problematic situations ranging from the very 
mundane needs of physical satiation to the more complex needs of group cohesion.  Each 
situation, as a totality of continuity and interaction, gives specific context and form to a problem 
by bringing into observable relief the relationship between the situational problem and the social 
and interactive needs of our existential selves.  That is, inquiry is a process that both solves and 
creates the problem; it is the process whereby we understand the meaning of a problem.  
By saying inquiry “creates” a problem, Dewey is claiming that prior to engaging the 
process of inquiry, of thinking, specific problems do not exist. A problem is created by our 
awareness of a problem.  We judge what is or is not problematic, and that judgement generates 
the problem. The empirical situations and objects exist, but they are not problematic, per-se, nor 
are we attentive to them other than in a non-cognitive way.   
The indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subject to 
inquiry. The indeterminate situation comes into existence from existential causes, just as 
does, say, the organic imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in 
the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary condition of the 
cognitive operations of inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive. The first result of 
inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged to be problematic. To see that a situation 
requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry. (LTI, p. 107) 
This is not some obscure point.  For Dewey, inquiry is an active choice of attention and 
definition.  Dewey calls this activating force an “impulsion”:  
I say “impulsion” rather than “impulse.” An impulse is specialized and particular; it is, 






adaptation with the environment. “Impulsion” designates a movement outward and 
forward of the whole organism to which special impulses are auxiliary. (AE, p. 60)  
It is tempting to brush aside the specificity of this terminology as unnecessarily pedantic.  
In truth, it is illustrative of an important set of assumptions Dewey argues for across his writing.  
Dewey wanted clearly to distinguish between organic processes which are purely mechanical and 
unthinking from those that are purposeful and intentional. For Dewey, inquiry is more than just 
an adaptive response (although it is that), it is also a reflective process whereby we return to 
question the conditions of the problem by bringing to conscious attention our own role in the 
creation and selection of the problem.  How we come to view a problem as a problem is as 
important to inquiry as the solution of the problem itself.  Inquiry, therefore, is both a process of 
actively attaining desired ends and a conscious awareness of the how and why we seek to attain 
those ends.   
Philosophically speaking this is the great difference involved in the change from 
knowledge and philosophy as contemplative to operative. The change does not mean the 
lowering in dignity of philosophy from a lofty plane to one of gross utilitarianism. It 
signifies that the prime function of philosophy is that of rationalizing the possibilities of 
experience, especially collective human experience. (PR, p. 70) 
Inquiry as Deliberate and Reflective  
As a deliberative process, inquiry “is the force that stops the mindless ongoing of an 
impulse or habit” (HNC, p. 197).  When a situation becomes problematic and our habitual ways 
for dealing with the situation no longer work, we deliberate on a course of action that will solve 







The office of deliberation is not to supply an inducement to act by figuring out where the 
most advantage is to be procured. It is to resolve entanglements in existing activity, 
restore continuity, recover harmony, utilize loose impulse and re-direct habit. (HNC, p. 
199)   
To deliberate is to focus on the means for problem-solving by hypothesizing and experimenting 
based on the possible ends of so doing.  It is an “outlooking,” an active discovering, a purposeful 
attention to details of the situation and the effects certain paths of behavior might have on future 
consequences:  
In short, the thing actually at stake in any serious deliberation is not a difference of 
quantity, but what kind of person one is to become, what sort of self is in the making, 
what kind of a world is making. (HNC, p. 217) 
As stated above, inquiry is also concerned with the totality of the problem and how the 
conditions that give rise to the problem affect the process itself.  Inquiry is also reflective.  
Dewey defines reflection as the “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or 
supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further 
conclusions to which it tends” (Italics Dewey, HWT, p. 6).  As thinking creatures involved in 
inquiry we not only deliberate on the means to solve a particular problem, we also reflect on the 
conditions of the problem as they arise from the developmental continuum of our own lives and 
the cultures in which we live. Reflection in an instrumental sense is a phase of inquiry in which 
the awareness of the consequences of knowledge affects the value of the knowledge itself: 
“Reflection is the instrumentality of securing freer and more enduring goods…”(EE, p. 406).  
Reflection is a purposeful consideration of the relations between the means and consequences of 






that arises organically out of the human condition, out of experience as an ordering of 
experience, a process through which experience and the objects of experience are given meaning.  
“Thinking is an ordering of subject-matter with reference to discovering what it signifies or 
indicates” (HWT, p. 188).   
The product of inquiry is knowledge. “Knowledge, as an abstract term, is a name for the 
product of competent inquires” (LTI, p.8).  But, because inquiry is an ongoing process, an 
endless interaction of organism and environment, “product” does not imply permanence.  
Knowledge is not a fixed-end: “Knowledge is an affair of making sure, not of grasping 
antecedently given sureties” (Italics Dewey, EN, p. 154).  It is an instrument, not a thing.  
Knowledge, Dewey argues, is a temporary hypothesis assigned to objects and situations based on 
the needs of inquiry. “Knowledge is an act which confers upon non-cognitive material traits 
which did not belong to it” (Italics Dewey, EN, p. 381). It is a navigational and adaptive tool that 
helps individuals and groups purposively interact with and give meaning to the empirical world. 
Knowledge, like the growth of a plant and the movement of the earth, is a mode of 
interaction; but it is a mode which renders other modes luminous, important, valuable, 
capable of direction, causes being translated into means and effects into consequences. 
(EN, p. 435) 
Freedom and the Great Community 
Ultimately, Dewey argues, the virtue of instrumental knowledge is its ability to liberate 
the human organism from the immediacies of mere circumstance and chance.  In a pragmatically 
instrumental sense, knowledge is a tool to enrich experience by giving us command over our 
circumstances.  Because PI does not argue for any fixed-end such as Truth, but rather considers 






existential contexts, the method of PI is a method of living in a fully conscious and emancipated 
way.   
Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained power of thought, in 
ability to “turn things over,” to look at matters deliberately, to judge whether the amount 
and kind of evidence requisite for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where an how to 
seek such evidence. If a man’s actions are not guided by thoughtful conclusions, then 
they are guided by inconsiderate impulse, unbalanced appetite, caprice, or circumstances 
of the moment. To cultivate unhindered, unreflective, external activity is to foster 
enslavement, for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense, and circumstance. 
(Italics Dewey, HWT, pp. 66-67) 
It is critical to remember, however, that Dewey conceptualizes the intellectual basis of 
freedom as always existing within a socially interactive context.  The degree of one’s freedom is 
intimately bound to the social conditions within which one conducts inquiry.  Freedom of 
thought is not freedom from others, it is the freedom to create and understand meaning with 
others.  If, argues Dewey, human beings are to truly empower the adaptive functions of 
knowledge then the degree to which they create institutions that allow individuals and groups to 
practice habits of active inquiry directly affects the measure of meaning and freedom individuals 
and communities experience in their lives. 
Government, business, art, religion all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That 
purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect 
to race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their 
value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his 






resolving that supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be 
the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member in society. (RP, p. 
107) 
According to Dewey, when individuals and societies, collectively, employ knowledge in 
a pragmatically instrumental sense they are purposefully adopting habits and methods of 
intelligence that secure greater significance and meaning to experience. Inquiry is only effective 
in the degree to which it exists within a community devoted to its practice. One central pillar of 
that devotion is a fidelity to open communication among the community of inquirers.  According 
to Rorty (1982), this “is the doctrine that there are no constrains on inquiry save conversational 
ones—no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of 
language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers” (p. 
165).  The power of inquiry to enrich personal experience is directly proportional to the 
collective and cooperative contexts within which inquiry takes place.  
The business of inquiry is with the ways in which specific constituents of human nature, 
native or already modified interact with specified definite constituents of a given culture; 
conflicts and agreements between human nature on one side and social customs and rules 
on the other being products of specifiable modes of interaction. (Italics Dewey, FC, p. 
32) 
For Dewey, then, the more openly inquiry can operate within a culture the more 
meaningful will be the experiences of individuals within that culture. The culture itself will be 
more than just an expedient association of individuals, it will be a purposeful community 
organized according to an “order of energies transmuted into one of meaning which are 






combined action” (PP, p. 153).  It will be a culture, in other words, that embraces democratic 
liberalism. 
Intelligence after millions of years of errancy has found itself a method [PI], and it will 
not be lost forever in the blackness of night. The business of liberalism is to bend every 
energy and exhibit every courage so that these precious goods may not even be 
temporarily lost but be intensified and expanded here and now. (LSA, p. 93) 
Critiques and Responses 
 Two general critiques have long dominated the debate over Dewey’s instrumentalist 
account of knowledge: realism and critical theory.  
Realism  
 The realist critique, offered most clearly by Karl Popper (2014), is that instrumentalism 
fundamentally denies reality.  That is, because instrumentalism considers knowledge as an 
activity whose value is judged by the consequences of action, instrumentalist knowledge 
preferences application of knowledge over and above its truth. 
 For instrumental purposes of practical application a theory may continue to be used even  
after its refutation, within the limits of its applicability:  an astronomer who believes that  
Newton’s theory has turned out to be false will not hesitate to apply its formalism within  
the limits of its applicability. (p. 151) 
According to Popper (2014), because an instrumentalist account of knowledge is more 
concerned with the consequences of the knowledge than it is with whether the knowledge is right 
or wrong, instrumentalist knowledge is immune to any counterfactuals because what is right is 






Since “right” here means “applicable,” this assertion merely amounts to saying, 
“Classical mechanics is applicable where its concepts can be applied”- which is not 
saying much. But be this as it may, the point is that by neglecting falsification, and 
stressing application, instrumentalism proves to be as obscurantist philosophy as 
essentialism. For it is only in searching for refutations that science can hope to learn and 
to advance. It is only in considering how its various theories stand up to tests that it can 
distinguish between better and worse theories and so find a criterion of progress. (p. 152) 
Popper’s (2014) arguments come out of a class of philosophical arguments often referred 
to as realism. These arguments generally involve assertions that what we perceive, more or less, 
reflects the real world, and that science is the process of uncovering truths about that world. 
According to Ian Hacking (1984), there are two types of realism: realism about entities and 
realism about theories.    
Realism about theories say we try to form true theories about the world, about the inner 
constitution of matter and about the out reaches of space. This realism gets its bite from 
optimism; we think we can do well in this project, and have already had partial success.  
Realism about entities - and I include processes, states, waves, currents, interactions, 
fields, black holes and the like among entities - asserts the existence of at least some of 
the entities that are the stock in trade of physics. (p. 72) 
Realism about entities and realism about theories assume there are truths about both the 
observable and unobservable world.  A realism about entities assumes that my perception of a 
tree is an accurate reflection of reality; realism about theories assumes that the theory of gravity, 
for example, is an accurate reflection of real processes and forces that we cannot directly 






Similar to Hacking’s distinction between realism about entities and realism about theories 
is Devitt (1991) and Godfry-Smith’s (2002) distinction between “common-sense realism” and 
“scientific-realism” (p. S3).  “Common-sense” realism involves “a commitment to the objective, 
mind-independent existence of familiar middle-sized objects like stones, trees, and cats” and is 
“applied to macroscopic aspects of the world’s structure that are encountered in everyday life, as 
opposed to unobservable aspects of the world described by scientific theories” (Godfry-Smith, 
2002, p. S3). “Scientific realism” is the argument that the theories of science, as followed by the 
scientific method, basically explain relations and realities of the material (seen or unseen) world, 
and that the goal of science is to reveal the “objective” world as clearly and as truthfully as 
possible.  Scientific realists argue that theories reveal the objective world because the theories 
correspond to our observations of the world, are predictive of future events, and can be falsified 
(Cherryholmes, 1992; Musgrave, 1998; Popper, 2014). 
The importance of both sets of distinctions as formulated by Hacking (1984), Devitt 
(1991), Godfry-Smith (2002), and Popper (2014) help illustrate how Dewey’s PI does or does 
not respond to realist critiques.  Insofar as Dewey’s PI is an instrumental account of knowledge 
about what is seen there is indeed reason to argue that Dewey is not a realist. That is, according 
Godfry-Smith (2002), if common-sense realism is understood as meaning that the objects of 
perception are independent of our minds, Dewey would indeed reject the common-sense 
argument--but not because he rejects the idea of independent reality. Instead, argues Godfry-
Smith (2002), Dewey rejects the arguments for common-sense realism because it denies the 
interactive and transformational nature of the human mind on the objects and environments it 






For Dewey, the role or function of mind is precisely to be a factor in the transformation 
and modification of the contents of the agent’s environment. Insofar as the contents of the 
world make their own way independently of the activities of thought, thought has failed. 
(p. S4)   
Dewey’s PI assumes that to think is to manipulate and to be a purposeful agent affecting 
the relational scheme of every situation thinking enters.  Much like Bohr’s uncertainty principle 
in which the act of observation changes what is observed, to think in a pragmatically 
instrumental sense is to alter reality in so far as we always encounter reality through our 
experiences.  Thus, argues Godfry-Smith (2002), Dewey’s rejection of common-sense realism is 
not a rejection of common-sense reality but a rejection of the epistemological premise that 
objects are ever mind-independent whenever they are an object of thought.   
As fully contextualized creatures, argues Dewey, what we do affects the experience of 
material objects around us.  And what we do is driven by either purposeful intelligence or habit.  
Thus, our interactions with the natural world are always transformational; we are always 
affecting the world of perception.  Dewey’s PI is the claim that even in relation to everyday 
objects our behavior, habits, and purposes affect the actual realities of how and why we 
experience the objects themselves.  Thus, any claim that objects exist independent of our mind is, 
according to Dewey, to assert that our minds and the objects of the world exist in two separate 
spheres of existence, rather than in an interactive relation.    
When Dewey makes these claims about how thought changes the world, he does not 
mean it in anything like the sense of recent anti-realism. When Dewey says these things, 






the causal role of behavior. Thought changes the world, but only via its effects on action. 
(Godfry-Smith, 2002, p. S4) 
Similarly, to argue against mind-independence is not to argue that theories are less true 
than experience, nor to place means over and above ends. Dewey is not arguing that that abstract 
thought, generalizations, or universals are any less capable of being true just because they exist 
outside the immediate circle of my perceptions and experiences.  Nor is he arguing that the truth 
or falsity of a claim is to be solely measured against how best the knowledge achieves a practical 
end.  That is, PI is not a claim that reality is solely in the eye of the beholder. What Dewey is 
arguing is that scientific theories and our abstract notions of truth are not fixed-ends, they are 
working hypothesis until they are proven wrong.  A PI conception of truth argues that a theory is 
true when it has been confirmed, is presently correct, and appears to explain a certain 
phenomenon or process. The truth or falsity of a knowledge claim, according to Dewey, is that 
truth and reality is probabilistic not absolute.  “In short, one doesn't, as an instrumentalist, accept 
arbitrarily on credit; he accepts on probation, hypothetically, just as one accepts his own 
hypotheses when they first occur to him” (Dewey, 1912, p. 78).   
PI, therefore, is not attempting to be a metaphysical description of Truth; it is a 
description of meaning.  It is a description of the relationship between knowledge and reality and 
how it affects organic, human beings existing in the world. PI does not ask the inquirer to reject 
quantum mechanics because he cannot see or observe the electron; it simply insists that the 
reality of the electron, as presently understood, and as a general theory, is true insofar as it is 
confirmed in the actual conditions and experiences of humankind.  PI is the claim that mankind’s 
knowledge is a function of his organic and developmental existence and that questions about 






confirmation of fact (QC, p.187).   There is no one Truth, there are truths who meanings change 
depending on the empirical contexts and persons involved in inquiry.  PI is an assertion about 
mankind’s relationship to his empirical existence and how and why he comes to consider truths 
meaningful.  
Critical/Political Critiques 
The second set of criticisms most commonly advanced against Dewey’s instrumentalism 
are those that contend that PI is reductive and naïve.   
Reductive arguments follow lines set out by Max Horkheimer (1947) and Herbert 
Marcuse (2010), two founders of the “Frankfurt School” (Joas, 1992).  Both Horkheimer (1947) 
and Marcus (2010) argue that instrumentalism, to a greater or lesser degree, reduce reason to a 
method whose only values are those that reflect scientific rationalism and bureaucratic 
efficiencies. As Shalin (1992) argues, these thinkers “dismissed pragmatism as instrumental 
reason run amok, a technocratic decisionism severed from substantive-rational moorings” 
(p.237). Horkheimer (1947) and Marcus (2010) argue that reductive instrumentalist claims 
express and reproduce the values of the status quo, values that are inherently defined by the 
bureaucratic and technocratic norms of a complex industrial and capitalistic society.  
Pragmatism, in trying to turn experimental physics into a prototype of all science and to 
model all spheres of intellectual life after the techniques of the laboratory, is the 
counterpart of modern industrialism, for which the factory is the prototype of modern 
industrialism, and which models all branches of culture after production on the conveyor 
belt, or after the rationalized front office. (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 50) 
If, according to Horkheimer (1947) and Marcus (2010), instrumentalism is only a formal 






to uncover how institutional forces affect intellectual and moral norms becomes impossible.  You 
cannot, according to Marcuse (2010), employ the same reason that is an expression of the system 
to investigate and critique the system.  “Though the inquiry is seen in its organic and ‘cultural’ 
conditions, its structure will not be altered by these conditions.  In fact, it ‘produces’ the world 
which stands in question for logic” (Marcuse, 2010, p. 264).  Thus, critical theorists argue, when 
reason is reduced to instrumentation it invariably becomes subsumed under the imperatives of 
technocratic regimentation and is no longer capable of social criticism. “Whereas reason had 
once aimed to overshoot existing structures, thus allowing us to imagine a better possible world, 
pragmatism can only evaluate existing reality according to its capacities for efficiency, 
expediency, and predictability” (Kadlec, 2006, p. 528).  Instead, critical theorists argue, reason 
should be used to critique the status quo, it must be partial: “critical thought becomes the 
precondition for human freedom. Rather than proclaiming a positivist notion of neutrality, 
critical theory openly takes sides in the interest of struggling for a better world” (Giroux, 1997, 
p. 44). The criticism against Dewey, then, is that his instrumentalism reduces reason to a method 
of confirmation, one in which the scientific method merely moves the pieces around the board of 
human behavior but does little to change the formal structures of industrial domination.  
This line of argument leads to the other main criticism against instrumentalism—PI is 
socially and politically naïve.   
While Dewey criticized capitalism, big business, and totalitarian ideologies, he failed to 
theorize comprehensively enough the systematic thwarting of democratic participation by 
modern social organizations and interorganizational environments. Because of his limited 
understanding of the complex connections between liberal democracy and the productive 






with the forces that make nonparticipatory institutions so hard to overcome, even when 
they are not propped up by brute coercion. (Antonio, 1992, p. 292) 
Walter Lippman (1922/1925), Reinhold Niebuhr (1932), and Lewis Mumford (1926) each 
accused Dewey of promoting a naïve liberalism in which it was assumed that the deliberative 
processes of democracy could actually overcome the pernicious effects of big business and the 
corrosive effects of industrial capitalism.  
In Public Opinion and The Phantom Public, Lippman (1922/1925) argued against any 
philosophy that put too much faith in the ability of the masses to govern themselves because the 
societies in which they existed had become so complex that an informed public opinion was 
impossible.  According to Whipple (2005),  
Lippmann contended that the masses were naturally and structurally unable to form 
intelligent, democratic publics. Lippmann thus advocated for the masses a basically 
passive role in the democratic process as spectators rather than participants, whose sole 
responsibility is to choose between one of two parties with few general differences. Thus, 
the crisis of democracy results, Lippmann argued, not from too little, but from too much 
democracy. The solution for this crisis, he argued, was to redistribute intelligence and the 
critical agency of political decision making away from the masses and toward a 
centralized body of intelligent elites. Lippmann was a forceful and important forerunner 
of democratic elitism. (p. 160) 
Although Lippman (1922/11925) shared Dewey’s interest in utilizing the methods of 
social science to inform public opinion, he was deeply pessimistic about the masses ability to 
process such information.  As a “democratic realist,” Lippman (1922/1925) insisted that the 






in it (Westbrook, 1991, p. 300).  According to Lippmann (1922/1925), the primacy of self-
determination and self-government were unrealistic goals for the vast majority of citizens.  
Instead, he advocated a “democratic elite” in which experts would ensure that public affairs 
operated for the betterment of all.  His critique of Dewey’s PI was an argument against any 
instrumentalism that retained a naïve belief in the public’s ability to accurately form opinions 
within a highly complex industrial and technocratic society (DeCesare, 2012; Marres, 2005; 
Whipple, 2005).    
In Man and Immoral Society, Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) argued that Dewey’s PI, in so far 
as it endorsed an individual’s ability to choose desirable democratic ends, ignored the inherently 
selfish and self-seeking nature of individual human beings; it was not that society was too 
complex but that men were inherently selfish and immoral. “Men will never be wholly 
reasonable” he argued,  
and the proportion of reason to impulse becomes increasingly negative when we proceed 
from the life of individuals to that of social groups, among whom a common mind and 
purpose is always more or less inchoate and transitory, and who depend therefore on a 
common impulse to bind them. (p. 35) 
Dewey, argued Niebuhr (1932), suffered from the delusion that the individual intellect could 
triumph over the obstacles of ignorance. According to Ryan (1995), because Niebuhr (1932) 
suffered from a “bleakly Protestant vision of fallen humanity” his faith in individuals to make 
reasonable decisions about self-government was lacking (p. 102). Instead, Niebuhr’s (1932) 
critique of Dewey emerged out of a broader belief in the need for a strong centralized state to 






 Finally, Lewis Mumford (1926) in The Golden Day, considered Dewey’s pragmatism a 
form of “acquiescence.” According to Westbrook (1991), Mumford (1926) argued that Dewey,  
had succumbed to a fixation with facts at the expense of values, actualities at the expense 
of desires, means at the expense of ends, technique at the expense of moral imagination, 
invention at the expense of art, practicality at the expense of vision. (p. 382) 
 Dewey had, according to Mumford (1926), given into a crass utilitarianism by advocating a 
valueless rationality.  As Festenstein argues (1997), “Dewey’s failure to articulate any scheme of 
values had allowed his conception of science as a generalizable mode of critical inquiry to be 
used as a technocratic ideology of scientific expertise” (p.19). That is, much like the arguments 
of the Frankfurt School, Mumford (1926) argued that Dewey’s instrumentalism emphasized 
means and technique over and above ends and value.   
Unlike the realist argument that criticized PI as being inherently subjectivist by valorizing 
consequences above truth, political theorists like Lippman (1922), Niebuhr (1932), and Mumford 
(1926) accused Dewey of a covert idealism in which instrumentalism as a force of individual and 
collective reason was imbued with powers that functioned more like articles of faith than of 
reality.  A modern analog to the charge that Dewey is a closet idealist focuses on how Dewey 
grounds his critique of dualism and foundationalism. Specifically, Gale (2010) and Shook (2000) 
accuse Dewey of arguing for an empirical foundation to all knowledge, which, like idealistic first 
premises, require a fundamental belief in an empirical unity.  Gale (2010) refers to this as 
Dewey’s “Humpty Dumpty intuition”: 
The key to understanding the secret mystical philosophy of John Dewey is to take to 
heart the plight of poor Humpty Dumpty, who, it will be recalled, could not be 






was shattered into many separate, distinct pieces.  Reality, for Dewey, is Humpty 
Dumpty write large; for if we ever permit it to fall apart into numerously distinct 
individuals, not all the king’s philosophers can put it back together again into relational 
complexes, be they casual, spatiotemporal, or of any other kind. (p. 60). 
In other words, argues Gale (2010), Dewey’s anti-dualistic philosophy argues for a foundational 
unity of knowledge (i.e., Humpty Dumpty before the fall) called “experience” from which all 
difference ultimately derives. Shook (2000), like Gale (2010), argues that Dewey’s anti-dualistic 
arguments rely on the premise in which “Universal Mind was replaced in Dewey’s philosophy 
not by nature, but by experienced nature” (p. 19).   That is, argue Shook (2000) and Gale (2010), 
while Dewey’s critique of dualism is an attempt to “overcome the Tradition,” he ultimately 
commits himself to idealistic premises (Gale, 2010, p. 159). As Rorty (1982) argues, “Dewey, 
like Marx, wants Hegel without the Absolute Spirit” (pp. 46-47).   
Against the claims of reductivism, Dewey’s defense is evident across his writings.  It is 
widely accepted that Horkheimer’s (1947) reading of Dewey suffers from a basic 
misunderstanding of Dewey’s PI, especially the argument that Dewey’s pragmatism is a form of 
logical positivism.    Even Marcuse (2010), who was highly sympathetic to Horkheimer’s (1947) 
overall critique, did not consider Dewey a logical positivist.  As discussed above, Dewey was not 
attempting to reduce all experience down to scientific and measurable truths. Instrumentalism is 
not an account of experience, it is an account of knowledge.  As an account of knowledge it is 
just as much premised on an aesthetic account of experience as it is a scientific one.  That is, 
experiencing is the foundation of existence, and it is only when experience becomes problematic 
that the instrumental goods of knowledge become necessary.  Furthermore, Dewey clearly 






Only the psychology that has separated things which in reality belong together holds that 
scientists and philosophers think while poets and painters follow their feelings. In both, 
and to the same extent in the degree in which they are of comparable rank, there is 
emotionalized thinking, and there are feelings whose substance consist of appreciated 
meanings or ideas. (AE, p. 76) 
 To the charge that Dewey was naive about the powers of instrumental liberalism to 
overcome complex institutional and political processes, it is true that Dewey had a more 
optimistic belief in the power of individuals and groups to make deliberative decisions within a 
free and open democracy. This does not mean, however, that Dewey was ignorant of the 
pernicious capacities of market capitalism and technocracy to infect the conditions of 
maintaining a free and open democracy.  In many ways, Dewey’s prolific career expresses a 
wide interest in exploring the limits of this belief.  As will be shown throughout this dissertation, 
Dewey openly endorsed applying the findings of social science to inform and shape the empirical 
realities of individuals and institutions.  What Dewey clearly did not argue was that markets, 
technologies, or science themselves were deterministic and therefore impervious to conscious 
change.  This is not to say that he argued for an understanding of these mechanisms as valueless, 
simply that he argued the power of these mechanisms resides in the uses to which they are put 
and are not intrinsic to the mechanisms themselves.  He did not believe that there were social 
“forces” that worked over and above the experiences of human beings.  These were, in his mind, 
reifications of adaptive behaviors.  While industrialization might make commodification and 
exploitation easier, that is not the same thing as saying commodification and exploitation are 






Thus, to the degree that Dewey maintained a faith in the individual and the group to 
control their tools and organizations, Dewey clearly does not agree with Lippman (1922), 
Niebuhr (1932), or Mumford (1926).  Dewey did agree that social and institutional conditions of 
an industrial society could and had actively influence the conditions of inquiry, but he argued 
that the process of inquiry, as a basic organic process of adaptation, can secure freedom if a 
community of inquirers desires and cultivates habits of active inquiry.   
Against the charge that he is a closet idealist, one can argue that Dewey is not, ultimately, 
interested in establishing experience as an entity from which all truths must ultimately derive but 
in describing the relationship between knowledge and experience.  While the charges that he is a 
closet idealist are potent, given his early affinity for Hegelianism, they also reflect the very type 
of analytical cul-de-sac Dewey was attempting to expose.  While his anti-dualistic/anti-
foundationalist critique might bear similarities to Hegelian idealism, he was not looking to build 
an epistemological system around any logical foundation of first principles.  That is, PI is not an 
attempt to argue from or for specific conclusions or propositional certainties, rather it is an 
attempt to elaborate a naturalistic and methodological strategy and disposition towards 
knowledge. Dewey never argues for experience to be considered ultimate, in the sense of 
Absolute Spirit or the Good; experience is, instead, a term meant to designate the organic nature 
of existence as ever changing and complex. He is not trying to advance experience as a thing; he 
is simply insisting that experiencing is as valuable and important to an understanding of 
knowledge as are the conclusions of reason.   
Conclusion 
I have chosen the term “pragmatic instrumentalism,” which Dewey uses in The Quest for 






PI is Dewey’s philosophical contention that knowledge is the instrumental product of a specific 
conception of inquiry which occurs because of the specific way humans adapt to and give 
meaning to precarious existence.  Dewey himself defines pragmatic instrumentalism as a way “to 
conceive of both knowledge and practice as a means of making goods--excellencies of all kinds--
secure in experienced existence" (Italics Dewey’s, QC, p. 37).   
Dewey and others have employed similar terms to describe this same position—e.g., 
“empirical naturalism” (EN, p. 1a), “experimental empiricism” (DE, p. 156), “productive 
pragmatism” (Hickman, 2001, p. 155), “pragmatic technology” (Hickman, 1992, p. 1).  I am 
using the term pragmatic instrumentalism because it captures, I think, the historical context of 
Dewey’s overall philosophic program, and the specific arguments he puts forth regarding the 
production of knowledge as an instrumental good beyond “mere instrumentality” (RP, p. 98).  I 
am arguing, as I believe Dewey does, that PI is the best term to describe two key elements of this 
philosophical outlook: first, the nondualist/anti-foundationalist claim that practice and theory, 
mind and matter, ideas and experiences are not distinct and insuperable entities, but symbiotic 
and natural stages in the process of inquiry.   Knowledge is neither an ideal/rational substance 
existent unto itself, nor is it solely derivative of our sensory perceptions, it is a “mode of 
practical action and is the way of interaction by which other natural interactions become subject 
to direction” (QC, p. 107).  
Second, is the emancipatory claim.  PI is the belief that human intelligence is a reflective 
and deliberative process whereby human beings purposively control and form meaning both 
individually and collectively.  As such, it is a means whereby the human organism makes itself 
aware of its own intentions and enables itself to move collectively and intentionally towards 






continue inquiry.   As an account of knowledge as a human instrument, PI argues that all 
knowledge is ultimately the result of a purposeful, deliberate, experimental, and reflective 
processes of inquiry in which the human organism adapts to, manipulates, and reflects on his 
relationship to organic experience by being aware of the consequences of the process of thinking 
itself.   
The instrumental theory only attempts to state with some scrupulousness where the value 
is found and to prevent its being sought in the wrong place. It says that knowing begins 
with specific observations that define the problem and ends with specific observations 
that test a hypothesis for its solutions. But that the idea, the meaning, which the original 
observation suggest and the final ones test, itself requires careful scrutiny and prolonged 
development…. (RP, p. 85) 
PI argues, therefore, that the total act of inquiry and the production of knowledge arises 
out of a specific existential context, is a purposeful act of solving problems according to 
experimental method and processes, and is a process that continually adjusts the basis of its 
conclusions according to the consequences of the knowledge produced.  That is, knowledge is 
only fully instrumental when the process by which it is produced is itself demystified and open to 
continual reexamination based on the consequences of the act of inquiry.  Dewey called this the 
“pragmatic rule”: “in order to discover the meaning of the idea ask for its consequences” (RP, p. 
94).  Dewey also referred to this as the “double movement of all reflection”:  
All knowledge, all science, thus aims to grasp the meaning of objects and events, and this 
process always consists in taking them out of their apparent brute isolation as events, and 






accounts for, explains, interprets them; i.e., renders them significant. (Italics Dewey, 
HWT, p. 118) 
Thus, PI is not a method of discovery and spectatorship, it is a method of continual 
investigation and participation in the formation of empirical meaning.  The former, the spectator, 
conducts inquiry “…like a man in a prison cell watching the rain out the window; it is all the 
same to him;” the latter, the pragmatic instrumentalist, conducts inquiry “…like a man who has 








Chapter 3 Pragmatic Instrumentalism as a Philosophy of Technology 
This chapter will argue that Dewey’s pragmatic instrumentalism can be interpreted as a 
distinct and consistent position within the field of philosophy of technology.  First, I will 
introduce the guiding premise underlying many of the interpretations of PI as a philosophy of 
technology. Second, I will demonstrate how this premise is related to Dewey’s thinking about 
science and industrial change. Third, I will summarize some of the basic divisions within the 
field of philosophy of technology. Fourth, I will explain how Dewey’s PI as a philosophy of 
technology developed out of and interacts these divisions.  Fifth, I will argue that the 
significance of Dewey’s PI as a philosophy of technology is that it argues for technology as both 
non-deterministic and value-laden.   
Toward a Deweyan Philosophy of Technology 
In one of his last books, The Problems of Men, Dewey (1946) made explicit his belief 
that instrumentalism, experimentalism, and technology were all ways to describe the same 
process of active inquiry: “It is probably that I might have avoided a considerable amount of 
misunderstanding if I had systematically used ‘technology’ instead of ‘instrumentalism’ in 
connection with the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge” 
(1946, p. 291).  This interlocking of terms is more than just a rhetorical choice; it is a 
philosophical claim that philosopher Don Idhe (1993) argues makes Dewey “the first to model 
philosophy itself upon a technological mode of inquiry” (Italics Idhe, p. 42).   
Philosopher Larry Hickman (1992/2001), the director of the Center for Dewey Studies at 
Southern Illinois University and author of two highly influential works on the subject John 
Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology and Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture, argues that 






“productive pragmatism,” interchangeably) is an account of technology that can be understood as 
“the sum of concrete activities and products of men and women who engage in inquiry in its 
manifold forms: in the sciences, in the fine and useful arts, in business, in engineering, and the 
arts we call political” (Hickman, 1992, p. 202). According to Hickman (1992), “technology may 
thus be thought of as a family of methods and tools that evolves in response to the needs and 
goals that it is called upon to serve, and in response to the uses to which it is put” (p. 61).  
 Long before Hickman (1992), Sydney Hook (1927) made a similar argument in his book 
The Metaphysics of Pragmatism.  Understanding Deweyan pragmatism, he argues, “…must start 
with a consideration of ‘the instrument’ and follow its lead into the subject matter which is, so to 
speak, instrumentalized” (p. 6).  According to Hook (1927) “this emphasis on ‘the instrument’ is 
not an evasion of a metaphysics but a challenge to one” (p. 6).  Hook (1927), like Hickman 
(1992) after him, argued for an interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatic instrumentalism that clearly 
considered thinking itself to be an instrument:  
thought or inference steps in as an instrument and pieces stray hints together, 
manipulating things, mentally reconstructing the situation in order to discover what is 
partially beyond and temporally remote. Therefore, what is true of all instruments is true 
of thought as an instrument. (Hook, 1927, p. 28)   
Hickman (1992) argues that a pragmatic account of technology considers inquiry itself to 
be a technology because inquiry “…is the means of effective control of an environment that is 
not what we wish it to be” (p. 41). As a specific theory of inquiry, PI “discloses its technological 
character” because it asserts that “every reflective experience is instrumental to further 
production of meanings, that is, it is technological” (pp. 40-41).  Hickman (1992) argues that 






that are inter-organic—a hammer from a ‘therfore,’ for example—such a distinction is not 
appropriate for Dewey’s technologized theory of inquiry” (p.36). Thus, when Dewey (1927) 
writes, 
…“instruments” denote objects having a definite existential status and office, and that 
“action” does not cease to be continuous with the energies of nature when it is expressed 
in the behavior and habits of a living organism.  There is then no difficulty in making it 
clear that thought, which in science deals with the objects which have the status of 
instruments, is itself a further tool of a distinctive type, and yet like other instruments, 
one set to operate in a common world of existences (p. 4), 
he is fundamentally arguing, according to Hickman (1992), that “controlled thinking is 
technological insofar as it utilizes tools and instruments: some of those tools are conceptual, 
some physical, some, the hardware that extends our limbs and senses” (p. 36).  To argue thusly is 
to assert that “the theory of knowledge is the theory of the instrument” (Hook, 1927, p. 46).   
Dewey’s Interpretation of Technological Change 
Much of Dewey’s belief in the technological nature of inquiry comes out of his particular 
understanding of the history of science. His understanding is one that contrasts the 
experimentalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and the technological advancements 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century against the “fixed-end” teleology of the classical world.   
For Dewey “the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was the precursor of the 
industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth” (PP, p. 175).  Dewey argued that the 
methods of science as developed out of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, coupled with 






and technology that dominated Western culture after Aristotle, but they also marked a significant 
turning point in man’s entire approach to nature, himself, and the process of intelligent inquiry.  
While a complete treatment of Dewey’s thinking on this matter would be well outside the 
purview of this dissertation, how Dewey articulated the difference between the scientific ethos of 
the ancient world and the modern world greatly affected how he conceptualized the 
technological advancements of the industrial revolution.   His understanding of that difference, in 
turn, affected how he and others interpret his pragmatic instrumentalism as a philosophy of 
technology.  It is thus important to highlight the central arguments Dewey puts forth about the 
history of science and the impact of the industrial revolution in order to comprehensively 
approach Dewey as a philosopher of technology.   
Old and New Science 
Dewey argued that the classical, Aristotelian notion of philosophic inquiry, in so far as it 
represented as the first incarnation of scientific inquiry, rested on the idea of the universe as a 
closed system. “The world in which philosophers once put their trust was a closed world, a world 
consisting internally of a limited number of fixed forms, and having definite boundaries 
externally” (RP, p. 31).  Within this world of fixed-ends, “there are only a limited number of 
species, kinds or sorts. And the world is essentially a world which falls into sorts; it is pre-
arranged into distinct classes” (RP, p. 34). According to Westbrook (1991), Dewey argued that, 
Greek philosophy thus had the salutary effect of eliminating myths and superstitions and 
setting up the ideals of science and a life of reason (for some), but it did so without 






That is, according to Dewey, a classical science of fixed ends, while laudable as a rational 
method breaking away from primitive religious metaphysics, was still a “glorification of being 
over becoming and of knowledge over justified belief” (Murphy, 1990, p. 63).  
The implications of a closed system metaphysics, Dewey argued, regulated knowledge to 
observing, documenting, and contemplating.  Dewey referred to this as the “spectator” 
conception of knowledge or the “correspondence theory of truth” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 21).  
Spectatorship conceptualizes science and inquiry as solely designed to “get a better view of 
something already there, like making a journey to a museum to inspect the objects found in it” 
(LTI, p. 88).  In classical science, because objects were considered predetermined and static, the 
goal of inquiry was to discover the “essence” of the substance under consideration.  Discovering 
an object’s “essence” was the way to reveal the underlying structure of the universe.  Thus, 
argued Dewey, in a classical, Aristotelian science, “definition and taxonomic classification are 
necessary forms of knowledge because they are expressions of necessary forms of being” (LTI, 
p. 87).  
Furthermore, argued Dewey, classical science believed discovering “essence” relied on 
understanding a teleological order.  According to the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
teleology comes from the Greek word “telos” and is a causative theory that “attempts to account 
for things and features that appeal to their contribution to optimal states” (Bogen, 1995, p. 868). 
Classical teleology argued that all objects, intrinsically, tend towards predetermined ends, 
towards a full expression of their essential nature. An example of classical teleological thinking 
is Aristotle’s argument that an acorn is destined to become an oak tree.  According to Aristotle, 
all matter, be it an acorn or a human, tends towards a fixed point where, assuming full 






Dewey, this belief undergirds both the idea of species and of physical movement: “because the 
teleological principle that knowable change tends towards a limited fixed end, all motion was 
thought to tend naturally to come to a state of rest. This notion controlled science till, say, 
Galileo” (Italics Dewey, LTI, p. 90).   
As noted in the previous chapter, classical science thus fostered a duality between “pure” 
knowledge and contingent knowledge.  “Pure” scientific knowledge was the discovery of forms, 
essences, and qualitative stability.  “In Greek science, Nature was a qualitative, a bounded and 
closed, whole. To know any special subject was to know it as a whole in its proper place in the 
comprehensively inclusive whole, Nature” (LTI, 93). According to Dewey, the implication of 
such a premise is that rational abstraction is considered more real than experience because 
experience changes, is impermanent, and is highly contextual (see chapter two).  Thus, in 
antiquity, science was closely aligned to contemplative deductive knowledge (“pure”) as the best 
method to uncover and promulgate unassailable facts.  
Pure knowing is pure beholding, viewing, noting. It is complete in itself. It looks for 
nothing beyond itself; it lacks nothing and hence has no aim or purpose. It is most 
emphatically its own excuse for being. Indeed, pure contemplative knowing is so much 
the most truly self-enclosed and self-sufficient thing in the universe that it is the Highest 
and indeed the only attribute that can be ascribed to God, the Highest Being in the scale 
of Being. Man himself is divine in the rare moments when he attains to purely self-
sufficient theoretical insight. (RP, p. 63)  
The Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century 
Beginning with the Renaissance and into the Enlightenment period of the seventeenth 






more with the relational changes between objects than with establishing a fixed and unalterable 
whole.   
The work of Galileo was not a development, but a revolution.  It marked a change from 
the qualitative to the quantitative or metric; from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, 
from intrinsic forms to relations; from esthetic harmonies to mathematical formulae; from 
contemplative enjoyment to active manipulation and control; from rest to change; from 
eternal objects to temporal sequence. (QC, pp. 94-95) 
It was, quite literally, a Copernican revolution, one that shifted scientific thinking towards 
understanding the universe mechanistically and experimentally.  
By the end of Newton’s lifetime, the picture of the universe (in its physical aspects) as a 
vast mechanism akin to clock-work was well on its way to general acceptance among 
intelligentia. The creator was revealed to have been a mechanic and a mathematician, 
who absented Himself from active participation after having set the cosmic machinery in 
motion. (Philips, 1992, p. 37)  
Philosophically, the “Cogito Ergo Sum” (I think therefore I am) of Descartes expressed both a 
personal liberation of mind from organized religion and a growing belief that the mysteries of the 
universe were fully discoverable and rational; they follow a mechanistic order all their own in 
which the substances of mind are separated from the substance of body. Thus, according to Rorty 
(1982),  
Galileo and his followers discovered, and subsequent centuries have amply confirmed, 
that you get much better predictions by thinking of things as masses of particles blindly 
bumping each other than by thinking of them as Aristotle thought of them—animistically, 






Unlike the classical logic of Aristotle, scientific thinking in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries also marked a rise (but not a perfecting) of experimental science.  For 
Dewey, this is a critical development.  The rise of experimental science, he argued, represented a 
more purposeful form of inquiry in which the knowledge gained becomes part of a wider process 
of inquiry, one that brings together “the conjoint process of analysis and synthesis” (HWT, p. 
152).  For Dewey, this development was well illustrated by the paradigm shift created by 
Darwin’s Origin of Species.   
In “The influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,” Dewey (1910) argued that “prior to 
Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, and politics, had been arrested,” 
beset, Dewey felt, with an antiquated inability to rid itself entirely of Aristotelian fixed-ends (p. 
8).  Although the scientific revolution “emancipated, once and for all, genetic and experimental 
ideas” it took Darwin’s theory of natural selection to “foreswear inquiry after absolute origins 
and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate 
them” (p. 13).  What Darwin unlocked for science and for Dewey was the argument that science 
could broadly apply a “newly gained naturalism” to the pursuit of knowledge, and it could do so 
according to and because of evolutionary theories and the development of experimental methods 
(White, 1943, p. 121; Hook, 1927).   
Dewey’s history of the development of an experimental scientific method relies on a 
belief that the scientific revolution introduced experimentalism, but it was not until the 
development of evolutionary theory that experimentalism, as a method of naturalistic inquiry, 
truly takes hold in the general sciences. Prior to this development, science still struggled with a 
more empirically based epistemology (empiricism) in which Enlightenment dualities of the 






continuity of existence without denying the qualitative distinctiveness of its various forms” 
(Westbrook, 1991, p. 335).  Fundamentally, Dewey argued, the scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century introduced--but did not fully adopt--a structure to thinking 
(the scientific method) that relied more on the values of experimentation than solely on the 
findings of perceptual experience and rational logic.   
The Industrial Revolution  
While Darwinian evolutionary theory greatly impacted Dewey’s turn to experimental 
naturalism, an equally potent influence was the rapid industrialization and technological change 
occurring within Dewey’s lifetime.  In the course of his life (1850-1952) Dewey witnessed the 
invention of the telephone, phonograph, radio, light bulb, television, refrigerator, automobile, 
airplane, and nuclear bomb.  He lived before and after the invention of antibiotics, the theory of 
evolution, germ theory, psychology and quantum physics (Hickman, 1992). “One can hardly 
believe” he wrote in 1899,  
…there has been a revolution in history so rapid, so extensive, so complete. Through it 
the face of the art is making over, even as to its physical forms; political boundaries are 
wiped out and moved about, as if they were indeed only lines on a paper map; population 
is hurriedly gathered into cities from the ends of the earth; habits of living are altered 
with startling abruptness and thoroughness; the search for truths of nature is infinitely 
stimulated and facilitated, and their application to life made not only practicable, but 
commercially necessary. Even our moral and religious ideas and interest, the most 







These profound changes had equally profound effects on his philosophical outlook.  One 
such effect was Dewey’s belief that there was a direct connection between technological 
advances in the instruments of science and the powers of inquiry: “the combined effect of 
science and technology has released more productive energies in a bare hundred years than 
stands to the credit of prior human history in its entirety” (LSA, p. 76).  Science itself, he argued, 
“is marked by the adoption and invention of material devices and related techniques:--of 
complex and refined forms of apparatus and definite related techniques of using apparatus” (LTI, 
p. 391).  According to Hickman (1992),  
Dewey thought that the experimental tools and methods produced by seventeenth-century 
sciences and further developed during the first industrial revolution did not so much 
constitute a radical break in the progress of inquiry as they did a giant step forward for 
inquiry. (p. 10)   
For Dewey, the collusion of science and technology was the clear extension of an 
instrumental account of knowledge.  Like pragmatic instrumentalism itself, the merging of new 
experimental methods in science and the rapid acceleration of new tools and technologies during 
the industrial revolution channeled the scientific the method toward “an affair of making sure, 
not of grasping antecedently given sureties” (EN, p. 154).  That is, when the aims of the 
scientific revolution were brought together with the rapid advancements in technological 
instruments, Dewey claimed, an instrumental account of knowledge was made more manifest; 
knowledge, because of science and technology, could finally move away from the 
“contemplative to [the] operative” (RP, p. 70): 
When the appliances of a technology that had grown more deliberate were adopted in 






and their functions were treated as models to follow in interpreting physical phenomenon, 
science ceased to be identified with appreciative contemplation of noble and ideal 
objects, was freed from subjection to esthetic perfections, and became an affair of time 
and history intelligently managed. (EN, p. 150)   
Furthermore, Dewey argued that the advances in science and technology clearly 
demonstrated that the material and intellectual tools of experimental science could and had 
advanced the cause of human purpose and culture.  However, while Dewey believed such 
advances validated a PI account of knowledge, such change had been underutilized in 
considerations of social and philosophical philosophy.  He argued that in the same way that the 
dualities of philosophy grew out of antiquated premises of mind and body, so too outdated 
philosophical positions of the pre-industrial age affected an understanding of industry and 
science itself.   “It is evident” Dewey wrote, “… that the rapid industrialization of our 
civilization took us unawares. Being mentally and morally unprepared, our older creeds have 
become ingrowing; the more we depart for them in fact, the more loudly we proclaim them” 
(ION, p. 8).  Dewey argued that modern culture was, to borrow Lincoln’s phrase, a “house 
divided against itself” (ION, p. 8). The division was between the new methods of science and 
technology and the inability of culture to use those methods to solve social and political 
problems.  
As discussed in chapter two, Dewey’s PI is part of a larger project of philosophical 
reconstruction.  This is also true of Dewey’s technological theory. Dewey argues that science and 
technology are not just a “body of conclusions” but “an attitude embodied in habitual will to 
employ certain methods of observation, reflection, and test rather than others” (FC, p. 112).   He 






there was a change in disposition and a development of new habits of thinking based on 
epistemologies that reflected the actualities of scientific and technological discovery.  Science, 
he argued, “was a constituent of culture” and culture itself needed to adopt a “scientific attitude” 
and bring that to bear on its communal problems (FC, p. 112). Ultimately, Dewey argued, “the 
measure of civilization is the degree in which the method of cooperative intelligence replaces the 
method of brute conflict” (LSA, p. 82).   Industry, he argued,  
… is not a materialistic or merely utilitarian affair.  It is a matter of intelligence. Its 
record is the record of how man learned to think, to think to some effect, to transform the 
conditions of life so that life itself became a different thing.  It is an ethical record as 
well; the account of the conditions which men have patiently wrought out to serve their 
ends. (SS, p. 153)   
Culturally and philosophically, Dewey argued that the problems associated with 
industrialization could be accounted for based more on the misuse of science and technology 
than on the science and technology itself.  It was Dewey’s belief that this misuse was driven by 
misguided and habitual fidelities to pre-industrial and pre-scientific philosophies.  It was, he 
argued, a conflict “…between institutions and habits originating in the pre-scientific and pre-
technological age and the new forces generated by science and technology” (LSA, p. 77). The 
technological and scientific gains made in his lifetime, he argued, exposed the world as an 
opportunity for investigating and solving problems, not, as the Ancients had argued, as just a 
museum to be documented:  
Every gain in natural science makes possible new aims. That is, the discovery of how 






start on selecting and combining the conditions, the means, to command their happening. 
(HNC, p. 235).  
Thus, argued Dewey, “the specific problem of philosophical reconstruction at the present 
time” was the inability of philosophy to recognize and apply the epistemological shift brought 
about by technology and science to the needs and purposes of existential, communal existence: 
“while we have been reasonably successful in obtaining command of nature by means of science, 
our science is not yet such that this command is systematically and preeminently applied to the 
relief of the human estate” (RP, p. 25).  If science, and by extension technology, “were treated as 
what it is, the method of intelligence itself in action, then the method of science would be 
incarnate in every branch of study and every detail of learning” (LSA, p. 53).  
It is this optimism in the ability of human purpose and control to bring science and 
technology to bear on the “relief to the human estate” that distinguishes Dewey’s PI as more than 
just a theory of knowledge, but also as a philosophy of technology distinct from other positions 
within the field.  
Philosophy of Technology 
The argument that PI is a distinct philosophical position about technology has grown out 
of the literature associated with the field of philosophy of technology. I will focus primarily on 
two specific accounts of the field: Carl Mitcham’s (1994) classic work Think Through 
Technology: The path between engineering and philosophy, and Andrew Feenberg’s (1999) 
Questioning Technology.  Each work provides a manageable foundation for considering the field.   
A full explication of all the philosophical positions within this field would be neither 
prudent nor manageable for the purposes of this dissertation.  However, a complete 






the major players and theories.  Thus, the following should not be taken as a comprehensive 
history of the field, but as a broad conceptual map through which the philosophical significance 
of Dewey’s thinking can become more articulated.   
Another important caveat. I use the words “field” and “discipline” to delineate this 
branch of research, but these two terms are openly disputed.  Philosophy of technology has long 
struggled to step out of the shadow of the more recognized literature associated with the 
philosophy of science.   Because many of the concerns of philosophy of science touch on many 
of the same philosophical problems as technology, the confusion is understandable.   According 
to Ihde (2004),  
Philosophy of technology has not, to date, generated recognizable and sustained internal 
arguments. For example, were one to draw from earlier Kuhnian language, a “normal 
science” or discipline, is one which follows a “paradigm” or has a recognizable set of 
issues and problems which it addresses. From such a perspective, philosophy of technology 
remains more “pre-paradigmatic” than its family cousins, either the earlier arrived 
philosophy of science, or its chronological peer, science studies. (p. 125) 
For this reason, there is still a significant argument over whether philosophy of technology 
should or should not be considered a sub-discipline of philosophy of science and subsumed 
under disciplinary disputes therein. For the purposes of this study, these matters are best left to 
the side. Regardless of whether it deserves the distinction as a discipline or a field there 
continues to be a healthy literature devoted to articulating philosophical problems dealing with 
and defining “technology.” It is out of this literature that almost all of the work on Dewey’s 






EPT and HPT 
The most well-regarded account of the history of the philosophy of technology is Carl 
Mitcham’s (1994) work Thinking Through Technology. The central argument of the book is that 
two distinct approaches dominate how we think about technology: an engineering philosophy of 
technology (EPT) and a humanities philosophy of technology (HPT).  An engineering 
philosophy of technology (EPT) starts from an “analysis of technology from within, and [is] 
oriented toward an understanding of the technological way of being-in-the-world as paradigmatic 
of other kinds of thought and action…”(p. 39).  This perspective,  
begins with the justification of technology or an analysis of the nature of the technology 
itself…it then proceed[s] to find that nature manifested throughout human affairs and, 
indeed, even seeks to explain both the nonhuman and the human worlds in technological 
terms. (p. 62) 
 As a result, argues Mitcham, EPT tends to be more narrow and to reduce human pursuits “into 
their language, to view the larger human world in technological terms” (p. 64).  An EPT starts 
from a set of premises that tends to be favorably disposed to technology as a force of progress, 
development, and advancement.  Problems are generally assessed according to the efficacy of 
technologies. EPTs approach technological problems as problems of fine tuning, integration, or 
design and generally do not question the value of actual technology itself.   
The humanities philosophy of technology (HPT) is “the attempt of religion, poetry, and 
philosophy to bring non- or transtechnological perspectives to bear on interpreting the meaning 
of technology…”(p. 39).   HPT “or what might also be termed hermeneutic philosophy…” seeks,  
insight into the meaning of technology--its relation to the transtechnical: art and 






human world and considers how technology may (or may not) fit in or correspond. (pp. 
62-62) 
HPTs approach technological problems by considering the role of the technology itself in the 
composition of the problem or situation under consideration.  For HPTs, investigating 
technological problems extends beyond just fine tuning or analyzing the direct design effects of 
the technology to a consideration of the impacts, be they overt or covert, as they occur across 
cultural, social, and political dimensions.  HPTs evaluate technology from outside the actual 
technology and do not start from justificatory premises.  HPTs generally ask, What is being 
gained and what is being lost by the adoption of particular technologies?   
EPT and HPT approach similar technological problems from distinctly different 
perspectives, including the term technology itself.  According to Mitcham (1994), EPT has a 
more restrictive conception of “technology,” one that is “reserved for engineers for more direct 
involvement with material construction and the manipulation of artifacts” (p. 147); whereas, an 
HPT’s approach to the term “technology” is “stimulated by recognition of the social significance 
of making activities allied with modern natural science” (p. 150).  
These different orientations play out in other ways as well.  For example, an EPT might 
approach the problems of distinguishing machines, tools, and cybernetics as merely taxonomical, 
whereas an HPT might consider the distinction ontologically.  For instance, in cases of artificial 
intelligence, an EPT might be primarily concerned with developing the software and 
technological context according to which an artificial intelligence might operate; an HPT might 
be more concerned with determining what distinguishes human intelligence from artificial 
intelligence and what are the ethical implications of the distinction.  Another example can be 






inventing, designing, and producing a technological artefact.   An EPT might primarily 
conceptualize the differences methodologically and logistically; whereas an HPT might 
conceptualize the difference according to political, social, and cultural contexts. Ultimately, 
argues Mitcham (1994) the difference “is between different ends or criteria for judgment” (p. 
140).  Two examples from Albert Borgmann (1984) and Don Ihde (1979), both philosophers 
within the field, might help to illustrate this distinction even further.   
Focal Things and Devices 
EPT-Fireplaces and Furnaces. Consider the difference between a fireplace and central 
heating.  Both are forms of technology.  Both, to use Hickman’s (1992) definition of technology, 
“bring tools to bear on raw materials” in the effort to solve the problem of cold (p. 12).  How 
then are we to understand the difference between these two technologies?  An EPT might 
consider the difference from the position that the fireplace distributes heat in a less uniform way 
thus making it less efficient.  It burns wood, rather than natural gas, and the wood to heat ratio 
not only releases more carcinogenic pollutants into the atmosphere, but it also restricts the heat to 
a narrower circumference depending on the specific design, size, and placement of the fireplace 
itself. Central heating, on the other hand, burns natural gas, which is cleaner, and can be 
distributed via ducting throughout the entire house.  It can be modified with greater precision and 
it is can be controlled from a central distribution hub. 
HPT-Fireplaces and Furnaces. An HPT analysis, such as Albert Borgmann’s “device 
theory” (1984), conceptualizes the relationship between a fireplace and furnace quite differently.  
Borgmann (1984) argues that the difference between these two technologies is more than a 
difference between heat distribution, it is also a difference between the social impacts of “focal 






the furnace. Unlike the EPT approach, Borgmann (1984) argues that the fireplace and the furnace 
are much more than just utilitarian instrumentalists of heat dispersal:   
A thing, in the sense in which I want to use the word here, is inseparable from its context, 
namely, its world, and from our commerce with the thing and its world, namely, 
engagement. The experience of a thing is always and also a bodily and social engagement 
with the thing’s world. In calling forth a manifold engagement, a thing necessarily 
provides more than one commodity. Thus a stove is used to furnish more than mere 
warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and leisure of a family 
and gave a house a center. (pp. 41-42) 
Focal things, like a fireplace or wood burning stove, center activity and create an interactive 
point that continually modifies the social context of those using the thing.  Animals, people, and 
processes gather around a fireplace and through those associations contextualize the work that is 
done through and because of the thing itself.   In Borgmann’s (1984) theory, focal things are 
more than what they are functionally designed for, they are also how they shape and are shaped 
by the social environment.  
A device, on the other hand, “makes no demands on our skill, strength, or attention, and it 
is less demanding the less it makes its presence felt” (p. 42). According to Borgmann (1984), 
devices like a furnace, decontextualize heat and  
dissolve the coherent and engaging character of a pretechnological world of things. In a 
device, the relatedness of the world is replaced by a machinery, but the machinery is 
concealed, and the commodities, which are made available by the device, are enjoyed 






In the case of central air, the device “commoditizes” heat and changes the means-end distinction 
by enabling the properties of the device to be removed from the context within which the device 
operates. “The machinery or the means is subservient to and validated by the function or the 
end” (p. 43).  
 Borgmann (1984) argues that the effects of the change from a focal thing to a device is 
more than just a difference in the calculations of engineers. While Borgmann (1984) does have a 
pessimistic view of technological progress, a point Mitcham takes up below, Borgmann’s (1984) 
analysis is helpful when considering the relationships between technological artifacts and the 
user that extend beyond mere utility.   
Embodiment and Hermeneutic Relations 
 Don Ihde (1979) has taken this distinction even further, arguing that there are many other 
phenomenologically interesting ways that we experience technologies.   He has famously argued 
that there are two basic relations between people and technologies: embodiment relations and 
hermeneutic relations (see Figure 1).  
A. Embodiment relations: (Human-machine)àworld 
B. Hermeneutic relations: Humanà(machine-world) 
Figure 1. Idhe's (1979) Embodiment and Hermeneutic Relations. 
“Embodiment relations” occur through the use of a machine.   When I use a piece of 
chalk, or a pen, or drive a car, “The machine is ‘between’ me and what is experienced and is a 
‘means’ of experiencing” (p. 8).  I use a cell phone, and through the use of that cell phone I am 
able to talk to my friend across town. The cooperation between me and the cell phone binds me 
to the instrument as a means of experiencing the world.   “What is important,” argues Ihde 
(1979) “is that the difference between naked perception and machine mediated experience is that 






(Italics Idhe, p. 11). That is, at its most basic, whenever I use a phone there is an empirical 
ambiguity between my experience of the conversation and my experience of the conversation as 
phone-mediated.  
Conversely, hermeneutic relations are those that “move from experiencing through 
machines to experiences of machines” (p. 11).  For instance, the more noticeable a phone is as a 
phone, generally because it is not functioning smoothly (“can you hear me now?”), the more it 
disrupts the mediation it was designed to perform.  It then rises to my cognitive attention as a 
technological object, and the machine itself is brought into stark relief.  This experience of the 
phone as a phone is, according to Idhe (1979), a fundamental change in my relation to the 
device.  
 Idhe (1979) argues that the “qualitative differences between embodiment and 
hermeneutic relations also suggest two quite different trajectories for investigation” (p. 36).  
Embodiment relations focus more on the human-instrument symbiosis because the 
transformation of perception is what is of foremost concern.  For instance, the phone can be 
thought of as a magnification device; it operates by magnifying the power of my hearing to 
traverse distances between me and the other person on the phone. The phone’s success, as a 
device of perception, depends on the seamlessness with which it does its job, to magnify the 
basic perception of hearing.  Therefore, the more it mediates the more transparent the device 
itself becomes. By successfully magnifying a perception it retreats behind its function. However, 
consider the case of the telescope and the microscope. Both amplify sight, but they also reveal 
worlds that are not available to normal perceptions. Like the phone, their mediating value is 
closely aligned with their transparency, but the instrument itself is much more conspicuous 






otherwise.  I can still hear without a phone; I cannot see microscopic organisms without a 
microscope.  
What is more, both embodiment and hermeneutic relations do more than just magnify 
experience, they also transform experience.  For instance, in the case of the telescope, not only 
does it allow us to see the previously unseen, it also “transforms space as distant and makes it 
near…not only is the apparent surface of the moon changed (now filled with valleys and 
mountains) but the apparent position of the observer is changed (now as if flying overhead at a 
certain altitude)” (p. 23).  That is, the telescope fundamentally transforms how we conceptualize 
space and distance. 
This transformation happens through the reductive tendencies of technologies as well.  
Again, consider the telephone.  Idhe argues (1984), “the phone may be called a ‘mono-sensory’ 
device, it reduces the other to a voice” (p. 24).  That is, while the phone shortens distance it also 
changes the nature of the relationship with the other person by amplifying some properties over 
and above others.  Like Borgmann’s (1984) distinction between focal things and devices, the 
magnification/reduction structure of technological artifacts affects the perceptual experiences 
and cognitive framing of those using the devices in contextual and empirical ways.  
Borgmann (1984) and Ihde (1979) demonstrate just two specific ways that HPT’s 
approach technological objects.  Mitcham (1994) argues that the HPT/EPT divisions also occurs 
across a whole range of other dimensions. For instance, philosophers of technology also think 
about the how technologies can be considered as a type of knowledge, as an activity, and as a 
type of volition.  As with Bormann (1984) and Ihde (1979), philosophers think about the 
differences between understanding technologies as objects by investigating the differences 






technologies in relationship to maxims, rules, and theories; as an activity, philosophers think 
about the differences between making, designing, maintaining, and using; and as a type of 
volition philosophers think about whether technologies are active or passive agents.  Across each 
dimension, HPTs and EPTs approach the technological discourse differently but with the same 
level of complexity that Borgmann (1984) and Idhe (1979) approach considerations of 
technological objects.  
Reconciling HPT and EPT via Dewey 
Mitcham clearly prefers the HPT conception, arguing that it is more inclusive of an EPT 
orientation than an EPT orientation is of an HPT.  However, Mitcham (1994) also recognizes 
that much of the HPT literature  
too often seems to be a philosophy of antitechnology and to close itself off in romantic 
subjectivity from technological aspects of the human—aspects that are the fundamental 
constituents of the contemporary techno-lifeworld, if not of the human world at all times 
and places. (p. 64)  
What Mitcham (1994) argues for instead is a mediating framework that can reconcile the 
narrow, reductive tendencies of EPT against the insular luddite-like romanticism of HPT.  
Mitcham (1994) argues that the framework for such a reconciliation exists in the pragmatic 
philosophy of Dewey. “Dewey’s philosophy of technology” Mitcham writes, 
sees technology not as something opposed to value (and hence to democracy, ethics, art, 
etc.), as antitechnology cultural critics would have it, or as neutral with regard to value, 
as scientists and engineers think. It is a value, one that must be integrated with other 
values in culture not by monistic, technocratic management but through “pluralistic 






Mitcham (1994) argues that a possible union of EPT and HPT and the “proper to thinking 
about technology that does not exclude engineering discourse” can and does occur within a 
pragmatic framework (p. 267). Ultimately, he argues, “pragmatic instrumentalism could be 
interpreted as a sophisticated engineering philosophy of technology” (p. 73).   
 I am hesitant to characterize pragmatic instrumentalism in the same way as Mitcham 
simply because one major consistency throughout Dewey’s career is an adamant disavowal of 
dualities.  By calling PI a “sophisticated engineering philosophy of technology” there is a danger 
that Mitcham (1994) is committing Dewey to a narrow practical philosophy that Dewey may not 
entirely approve.  Much depends on Mitcham’s (1994) use of the adjective “sophisticated.” 
While Dewey was no idealist, he argued strongly against any notion that theoretical and practical 
knowledge belonged to different realms.  They are, instead, intertwined and exist along a 
continuum of inquiry.  What is clear, however, is that Mitcham’s (1994) account of the history of 
the philosophy of technology considers Dewey’s pragmatic instrumentalism as a distinct and 
unique framework through which philosophical problems of technology can be considered.  
Autonomy versus Human Control 
Another useful account of the philosophy of technology comes from Andrew Feenberg’s 
(1999) book Questioning Technology.  In it he argues that thinking about technology depends 
heavily on the degree to which philosophers believe technological advancement is ultimately 
autonomous and deterministic or whether technology is or is not under the control of human 
purpose (see Table 1).  In the broadest sense this division falls along a 
deterministic/instrumentalist divide with arguments favoring autonomy following some form of 






Further division occurs across this divide according to whether theorists consider technologies 
inherently value-neutral or inherently value-laden.  
Table 1  
Feenberg's Variety of Theories 
Technology is: Autonomous Humanly Controlled 
Neutral 
(complete separation of means and 
ends) 
Determinism 
(e.g. traditional Marxism) 
Instrumentalism 
(liberal faith in 
progress) 
Value-Laden 
(means form a way of life that 
includes ends) 
Substantivism 
(means and ends linked in 
systems) 
Critical Theory 




According to Feenberg (1999), technological determinism can be defined as the “claims 
that technologies have an autonomous functional logic that can be explained without reference to 
society” (77).  Feenberg (1999) argues that two premises undergird this belief: (1) “technological 
progress appears to follow a unilinear course, a fixed track, from less to more advanced 
configurations”; (2) Technological determinism “affirms that social institutions must adapt to the 
‘imperatives’ of the technological base” (p. 77).  Technological determinists can see these 
premises as either positive or negative.  In a positive sense, technological progress equals social 
progress.  To borrow again from Mitcham (1994), an EPT might argue that technological 
advancement is an overall positive in that it increases the efficiencies and expediencies of social 






Darwin, were early proponents of this idea: “following the then common interpretation of these 
materialist masters, technical progress was believed to ground humanity’s advance toward 
freedom and happiness” (p. 2).  
In some instances, this positive view of technological determinism assumes that 
technologies are value-neutral.  For instance, according to Michael Zimmerman (1990), “for 
Marxists, technology is not in and of itself alienating or destructive, but becomes so under the 
aegis of capitalism” (p. 251). Thus, when Marx argues that “the hand-mill gives you society with 
the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist” he is not arguing that the 
technologies themselves produce the social outcomes, but that the technologies empower specific 
political outcomes (Shaw, 1979, p. 155).  Thus, argues Feenberg (1999), “deterministic theories, 
such as traditional Marxism, minimize our power to control technical development, but consider 
technical means to be neutral insofar as they merely fulfill natural needs” (p. 9).  
Substantivism 
Negative conceptions of determinism take a more pessimistic view of technological 
advancement, arguing that certain value structures are embedded within technologies and that 
these structures inevitably bend social, political, and ethical norms to suit technological values.  
Value-laden deterministic theories, which Feenberg (1999) calls “substantivist,” “share 
deterministic skepticism regarding human agency but den[y] the neutrality thesis” (p. 9).   On 
this account, what is “substantial” about the technologies are the intrinsic values that the 
technologies overtly and covertly spread. Substantivist thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (1977) 
and Jacques Ellul (1964) argue that technological advancement is more negative than positive 






ideologies all their own.  What is more, these imperatives and ideologies are unstoppable 
because we have lost control of technology itself.  According to Hickman (2001), this position  
…can be summarized as follows: technology is ubiquitous and insidious. It is a system 
with its own laws, and it is beyond the control of any human institution or combination of 
them. It allows no standpoint for criticism from the inside. Increased control by human 
beings is no longer possible. (p. 151)  
Instrumentalism 
Other theorists argue that humans do have control of their technologies.  Like their 
deterministic and substantivist peers, humanly controlled theorists argue that technologies are 
either instrumental in a value-neutral way or instrumental in a value-laden way.   
Value-neutral instrumentalists, according to Feenberg (1999), have a “liberal faith in 
progress” (p. 9). They argue that technologies, when employed in a responsible way, can and do 
bring greater equity, social justice, and higher standards of living.  Importantly, this positon does 
not, however, contend that the technologies themselves embody those values, but that 
technologies are simply empty vessels waiting to be put to good use. Winner (1989) describes 
this as the “tool-use idea” in which  
we tend to believe that there is an entirely obvious connection between the thing desired 
and the means to its fulfillment.  One begins with the preconceived end in mind. Then 
one decides upon an appropriate instrument or organization of instruments to achieve that 
end, usually weighing the advantages of two or more alternative methods. Next comes 
the actual use of the instrument in the way established for its successful exercise. Finally, 






Hickman (2001), influenced by Winner (1989), calls this “straight-line” instrumentalism. 
He argues that “straight-line instrumentalism depends upon some sort of scientific or 
metaphysical realism to provide its inflexible goals” (p. 73).  That is, argues Hickman (2001), 
while value-neutral instrumentalism is associated with a humanly controlled “liberal faith in 
progress,” it is also premised on realist fixed-end epistemologies.  I will be returning to this 
characterization in more detail below when I consider Dewey’s possible responses to Feenberg’s 
instrumentalist claims.   
Feenberg (1999) also distinguishes between what he calls primary and secondary 
instrumentalism.   Primary instrumentalism is the “aspect that contains the functional 
constitution of technical objects and subjects;” “secondary instrumentalism is focused on the 
realization of the constituted objects and subjects in actual networks and devices” (p. 202).     
These two aspects of instrumentalism are relational descriptions.  In the primary relation the 
instrumental technological object is decontextualized (a tree becomes lumber), reduced to it most 
useful technical qualities (lumber is hard, solid, capable of holding a screw), automated (the 
worker framing the house gets lumber at a factory), and positioned (lumber can be used for some 
things but not for others).  The primary instrumental relation is thus the process that abstracts the 
object and makes it ready for technical application.   
Secondary instrumentalism is the process whereby the object is “integrated with the 
natural, technical, and social environments that support its functioning” (Feenberg, 1999, p. 205).  
In this relation the object is brought into a system (lumber becomes a frame for a wall), mediated 
(particular lumber may be chosen for its aesthetic quality or for its sustainability), associated 
with a vocation (lumber is typically used by carpenters, laborers, construction workers), and 






with consent, on the worker using it). These processes of secondary instrumentalism make the 
object a concrete reality by integrating it within a system that “assign functions, orient choices 
and insure congruence between technology and society” (Feenberg, 1999, p. 205).   If primary 
instrumentalism is the process of abstracting the object and readying if for technical application, 
secondary instrumentalism is the process of the technical application of the object to a particular 
setting and society.   
Critical Theories 
Unlike the value-neutral theories of instrumentalists, humanly-controlled technological 
theories can also argue from a value-laden perspective. According to Feenberg (1999), this 
perspective is closely associated with or inspired by the critical theorists of The Frankfurt 
School. Theorists such as Marcuse (1964), Habermas (2011), and Foucault (1977) argue, in 
varying degrees of specificity, that technologies “embody a certain type of rationality” that 
reproduce and construct inequities of power and stratified social and political value systems 
(Antonio & Kellner, 1992; Feenberg, 1996, p. 9).  In ways similar to value-neutral determinists, 
critical theorists conceptualize modern technological progress as a system that “…incorporates 
domination in its very structure. Our technical disciplines and designs, especially in relations to 
labor, gender, and nature, are rooted in a hegemonic order” (Feenberg, 1999, p. 178).  Unlike 
determinists and substantivists, however, critical theorists argue that the values of technological 
rationality can be transformed by bringing “…these embodied norms to consciousness where 
they [can] be identified and challenged” (Feenberg, 1999, p. 177).  Critical theorists argue that 
the intrinsic values of technologies are discoverable and ultimately changeable if there is a 
political and social will to change the reward structures that empower technological 






PI as Humanly Controlled and Value-Laden 
 Where exactly Feenberg (1999) positions Dewey’s PI is not made explicit in Questioning 
Technology other than to suggest that Dewey had an “uncritical confidence in science and 
technology” (p. 136).  Again, following Mitcham (1994), I am not sure I agree with Feenberg’s 
assessment that Dewey’s “confidence” was “uncritical.”  Dewey certainly argued that science 
and technology, especially the scientific method, represent the most effective method of 
thinking, but Dewey was not naïve about the social and political consequences of rapid 
industrialization.  Dewey’s faith, instead, relied on a belief in the productive powers of 
intelligence to meet and solve the empirical problems of human existence.   
 I also think Feenberg’s (1999) notions of instrumentalism are too narrowly drawn.  While 
he attempts to conceptualize instrumentalism in a way that allows for social values to affect the 
means and ends, he only does so in so far as it occurs in secondary instrumentalism.  I get the 
sense that although Feenberg (1999) considers both primary and secondary instrumentalism as 
activities of use, there remains a vague notion that abstraction and application occur in 
conceptually separate realms.  This is a distinction I do not think Dewey would abide.  As with 
Mitcham (1994), attempts to delineate theory and practice, or abstraction and application are 
anathema to Dewey’s PI.  “The fact is” Dewey (1912) writes, “that life, the experience 
(including the organic acts of ideas, opinions, judgements, etc.) of ‘individual man’ is already 
saturated, thoroughly interpenetrated, with social inheritances and references” (p. 81).   
Conclusion 
What I hope to have shown through an explication of Mitcham (1994) and Feenberg’s 
(1999) works is a clear overview of the thematically prevalent orientations within the field.  






are some of the specific conclusions reached within one particular orientation.  Across each of 
these accounts my intention has been to expose some of the methods prevalent within the field 
and, by extension, positon Dewey’s PI as a particular orientation within the broader discussion.  
Dewey is not a determinist.  Pragmatic instrumentalism is premised on the beliefs that 
inquiry and knowledge are processes through which mankind manipulates and controls his 
experiences according to a purpose; science and technology are a natural development of this 
process as well as contributors to this process.  
It is also clear that Dewey understood all inquiry, and by extension technology, to be 
value-laden because, as a process and an artefact, it is always contextualized within a particular 
social and cultural setting. Although the world is increasingly technological, it is still an open 
and ever-changing interaction of people and things where the means and ends of inquiry are 
constantly reorganizing the conditions of experience according to the consequences of active 
inquiry itself.  To consider technologies as deterministic and value-neutral is to intellectualize the 
technological process and technological objects as over and above empirical reality.  
While technologies can and do condition experience by limiting or expanding the 
conditions of inquiry, they do not, of themselves, determine the ends of experience because the 
ends, themselves, are not fixed.  Thus, Dewey’s PI is not a technocratic valueless rationality, nor 
a cold utilitarian decision-making process striving to arrive at the best possible outcome; it is an 
interactive social process of adaptation, existing within a particular milieu (increasingly 
technological) whose value is determined by what meanings are chosen in relation to the 
practical consequences of empirical action.  
This is a critical component of PI as a philosophy of knowledge and as a philosophy of 






by so doing it makes the process itself an object of inquiry.  Dewey’s differences with certain 
critical theorists is not a difference in the conclusion that forces (technological or otherwise) 
operating within communal association often affect the nature of the association, it is with the 
belief that these forces are something other than social constructions, and that there is no way to 
modify them.  A PI account of technology argues that by applying technological and scientific 
methods to studying the ends to which specific technologies are directed, the manner in which 
the technologies are directed (thoughtfully or habitually), and the empirical conditions that 
contextualize the interactive situation, humans can intelligently expose and affect the realities of 
the human technological relationship towards ends they desire.    
Dewey was not, however, naïve.  In many ways he accepted the critical arguments about 
the potential of technologies to warp social purposes towards technocratic ends. He certainly 
understood and argued against the tendencies of technologies to exacerbate economic 
stratification, the alienation of labor, and the monotonous regimentation that comes from 
deskilling.  But, as noted above, Dewey did not consider these tendencies deterministic.  Dewey 
doesn’t consider the technology as the problem, but a lack of social and political will to be the 
problem.  Again, however, this doesn’t mean he believes technology is value-neutral; it simply 
means that technologies require human behavioral and intellectual complicity to actually 
condition inquiry. Technologies, for instance, that appear antithetical to the values of democracy 
do so either with our approval or because we are still habituated to old ideas of knowledge. But 
they are choices.  
That we have become aware of the conditioning problems of technologies is validation of 
the process of inquiry itself.  The development of technologies happens within a context of 






capable of intellectually reassessing our situation and making different choices.  Technologies 
both arise out of and assist in this problem solving process.  Again, however, it is important to 
remember that not all experience takes place within the context of inquiry. Most experience is 
pre-conscious or habitual. It is only when experiences, including those intersecting with or 
through technologies, become problematic that the process of inquiry is necessary. All thinking 
begins with a problem.  
Thus, an operational definition of a PI account of technology argues that technologies, as 
thought processes and as tools, can and do help us to observe, plan, and manipulate our 
empirical lives towards ends we find desirable based on the problems we encounter in particular 






Chapter 4 Dewey’s Philosophy of Education 
Dewey’s philosophical interest in education began early in his career and at a time in 
American history when material and demographic pressures were challenging the foundational 
assumptions about the purposes and aims of education.  Progressive political reforms, massive 
surges in immigration, a rise in urbanization, and the rapid material changes of industrialization 
put pressures on the American public schools to reconsider traditional notions of curriculum, 
access to higher education, and the structure and aims of the American high school (Cremin, 
1961; Rury, 2016; Tyack & Cuban, 1995).  While there is debate about how influential Dewey’s 
ideas about education eventually proved to be, it is difficult to dispute that he was a central figure 
in the educational debates of the Progressive Era (Lagemann, 2000).  
Beginning in 1899 with the publication of The School and Society, Dewey’s philosophy 
of education extends across a core group of works: The Child and the Curriculum (1902), How 
We Think (1910), Schools of Tomorrow (1915), Democracy and Education (1916), and 
Experience and Education (1938).  My focus in this chapter is less on presenting a 
comprehensive summary of Dewey’s philosophy of education than it is with explaining how his 
curricular ideas about “education through occupations” help articulate the relationship between 
his ideas on education, knowledge, and technology (DE, p. 309).  Before I can do that, however, 
I must first explain the historical context within which Dewey developed his philosophy of 
education.  I will then argue that Dewey’s ideas about education through occupations brings 
together his philosophy of knowledge, his philosophy of technology, and his philosophy of 
education by making three interrelated sets of arguments: developmental arguments, 
technological arguments, and instrumental arguments.  I will then address some of the common 







Like the broader progressive reform movement inspiring women’s suffrage, worker’s 
rights, and child-labor laws, progressive educational reform  
began as a part of a vast humanitarian effort to apply the promise of American life—the 
ideal of government by, of, and for the people—to the puzzling new urban-industrial 
civilization that came into being during the later half of the nineteenth century. (Cremin, 
1964, p. viii.)   
The puzzle at the root of this reform was the massive demographic and technological shift taking 
place in America, and its effect on the basic organization of American schools.  According to 
Tyack & Cuban (1995),  
By the 1890’s the schools had a new world on their doorstep. America was becoming the 
most powerful industrial nation on earth and aware of its rivalry with the fast-rising 
economy of Germany. Vast corporations were gaining power undreamed of only a 
decade or two earlier. Violent strikes were erupting. The cities were drawing millions of 
new recruits from the farms and immigrants from abroad. Social philosophers were 
wondering if institutions such as the family could continue their traditional functions of 
socializing the young. (p. 49) 
Dewey and other progressives like Jane Addams and Dorothy Day worried about the 
social value of industrial progress, especially industrial practices that appeared to dehumanize 
the individual.  Morton & Saltmarsh (1997) argue that Dewey, Addams, and Day believed that 
industrial change was fomenting a “crisis of community”: 
The general contours of the problems of community are to be found in what Addams, 






combined forces of industrialization, and immigration, and by the increasing 
centralization of political and economic power in the hand of a private industrial elite. 
The immediate symptom of this fragmentation…was a devolution of the ordinary persons 
role as a citizen and the emergence of a new role as an individual consumer of goods and 
services. (p. 139) 
 Many of the progressive concerns over the dehumanizing aspects of rapid industrial 
progress also focused on how industrial and technological forces were affecting the American 
public school system, both administratively and pedagogically.  
The Committee of Ten Report and The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education Report 
In 1893 and again in 1918, the largest education association in America, the National 
Education Association (NEA), published two reports: The Committee of Ten Report (1893) and 
the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education Report (1918).  Each report, in different ways, 
advocated a specific set of reforms meant to help define, shape, and organize the rapidly 
developing American high school, where, between 1890 and 1930, “…a new secondary school 
was established nearly every day” (Rury, 2016, p. 137).   
Both reports provide insights into the prevailing educational debates of the Progressive 
Era because each report takes a different approach concerning the structure and purpose of 
American public schools. A common interpretation of these two reports is that the Committee of 
Ten Report advocated reforming but not eliminating the classical and traditional curriculum, 
while the Cardinal Principles Report advocated a more progressive, differentiated, and “socially 
efficient” curriculum (Kliebard, 2004; Krug, 1964; Ravitch,1983).  Because Dewey was a unique 






these reports persist to this day, it is critical to take the time to elaborate the central tenants of 
each report before examining Dewey’s specific contribution.  
The Committee of Ten Report.  Led by the president of Harvard University Charles 
Eliot, the Committee of Ten Report (1893) was the first major attempt by the NEA to bring some 
sense of order to the rapidly growing and expanding American high school. While the committee 
itself was made of ten principle members--among them the United States Commissioner of 
Education William Torrey Harris and the presidents of the University of Michigan, Vassar, 
University of Colorado, and the University of Missouri-- the Report, according to one member of 
the committee, actually represented the culmination of “the judgement…of some ninety 
educators chosen from all classes of schools and colleges, East, West, and South--venerable 
eastern universities, modern state endowments, great city high schools, historic academies, 
vigorous private schools” (Mackenzie, 1894, p. 148).  
The Report was designed to address the lack of common norms that existed from high 
school to high school.  Highly disparate curricula, schedules, and standards resulted in a high 
variability in the quality of students entering American colleges and universities.  To allay these 
concerns the committee advocated, among other things, that high schools be four years long 
(starting two years sooner than they had previously), and that there be established uniform dates 
for college entrance examinations.  The Report also advocated a series of curricular reforms 
based on two central arguments: all students should be taught the same regardless of their 
intended life trajectories or likelihood of graduation, and there should be a set of core subjects all 







Both for those who are to carry on their education no farther, and for those who are to 
choose a special line of development, it is desirable that a course be planned which shall 
include the essential of all sound education, -language, history, mathematics, natural 
science. The gain to the youth in an acquaintance with the elements of these different 
lines of interest, before his decision [to drop out or not] is made, cannot be overestimated. 
(Taylor, 1894, p.195)  
The Report’s curricular reforms have been widely interpreted as the last gasp of the 
classical tradition because they maintained a relative fidelity to a traditional approach to 
curriculum.  The core subjects, although not strictly classical in a medieval sense, still advocated 
a disciplinary approach to curriculum and harbored, it has been argued, some nascent loyalty to a 
faculty psychology in which certain subjects were preferenced over and above others (Bohan, 
2003; Labaree, 2011; Ravich, 1983). However, while the Report did in a sense cohere around a 
core set of disciplines that many have come to regard as vestiges of a time before industrial 
change, it also sought to modernize the curriculum by, for example, recommending language 
studies move away from the strict formalisms of classical Latin and Greek. Thus, as Kliebard 
(1999) argues:  
Even for Elliot, long a champion of humanist causes and normally sensitive to making 
invidious distinctions among human beings, the new industrial regime required a 
fundamental alteration not only in the education of children, but also in our very image of 
ourselves as Americans in the way democracy itself was conceived. (p. 43)   
 In general, the Report was well received, but not all reformers were on board with the 
recommendations. Almost immediately, some reformers resisted the idea of a core curriculum 






developmental goals. Thinkers like G. Stanley Hall (1901), known for their “child-studies,” were 
early critics of the Committee of Ten.   Much like European reformers Pestalozzi and Froebel 
who were inspired by Rousseau’s child-centered empiricism, Hall (1901) advocated a more 
developmental and psychological approach to teaching and learning that emphasized the child’s 
centrality in the construction and implementation of curriculum (Baker, 1998; Null, 2004).  Hall 
(1901), “proceeded basically from the assumption that the natural order of development in the 
child was the most significant and scientifically defensible basis for determining what should be 
taught” (Kliebard, 2004, p. 11).  In his essay the “Ideal School Based on Child Study,” Hall 
(1901) advocated an outlook towards education that emphasized the innate proclivities of 
children to guide curriculum, rather than norms that insisted curriculum conform to disciplinary 
knowledge:  
The guardians of the young should strive first of all to keep out of nature’s way, and to 
prevent harm, and should merit the title of defenders of the happiness and rights of 
children. They should feel profoundly that childhood, as it comes fresh from the hand of 
God, is not corrupt, but illustrates the survival of the most consummate thing in the 
world; they should be convinced that there is nothing else so worth of love, reverence, 
and service as the body and soul of the growing child. (pp. 24-25) 
Hall (1901) argued, as did others, that basing a curriculum on a static series of subjects was less 
about learning than it was a reflection of the influence colleges and universities had on setting 
the norms for high school: “few institutions of modern civilization so distrust human nature as 






 The truth is that while the Committee of Ten Report was the first major recognition that 
schools needed to reform in the face of cultural and material change, the curricular aims it 
recommended were already changing soon after its release. According to Edwin Dexter (1906),  
The report of the Committee of Ten seems not to have influenced directly to a marked 
degree the curriculum of public high schools. This does not mean that it has not fully 
justified itself through directing thought to the problems of the curriculum and making 
those problems, so to speak, conscious of themselves; but with the shaping of its details it 
has had little to do. In fact, more of the specific recommendations of the committee have 
been violated by the trend of high-school organization, or have proved inert, than have 
been followed. (p. 269) 
The Cardinal Principles Report.  In 1918 the NEA put out another report entitled the 
Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education Report reflecting the influence Hall (1901) and 
others were having on the debate surrounding curriculum.  The Cardinal Principles Report, 
unlike the Committee of Ten Report, expressed a growing belief in the need for a more expansive 
interpretation of the influence schools should have over the future of their students.  According 
to Lagemann (2001), the Cardinal Principles Report argued 
that high schools should direct their efforts towards promoting growth in seven different 
areas: health, command of the fundamental processes (the 3 R’s), worthy home 
membership, vocation, citizenship, worthy use of leisure time, and ethical character. 
Unlike the earlier report of the NEAs Commission on the Secondary School Studies—
commonly known as the Committee of Ten—Cardinal Principles did not recommend an 






different types of subjects, more flexibility in academic requirements, and increased 
student guidance and testing. (p. 101) 
The Cardinal Principles Report was a clear break from the uniform and core curriculum 
recommendations in the Committee of Ten Report.  Although the “3r’s” were included in its list 
of seven principles, the report was philosophically a significant “shift from intellectual to 
behavioral objectives in schooling” (Graves, 2010, p. 99).  What is more, by recommending 
attention be paid to other imperatives such as ethical character and vocational studies, the 
Cardinal Principles Report was attempting to reoriented the center of balance in the curriculum 
away from just mental and intellectual pursuits and towards a curriculum based more on 
psychological and organizational differentiation. In other words, argues Rury (2016), the 
committee “encouraged schools to follow the path of social efficiency” (p. 138).  
Defining social efficiency. The phrase “social efficiency” is frequently associated with 
the Progressive Era of education and with the debates over whether educational aims should 
reflect a more vocational curriculum or a liberal arts curriculum.   However, it is important to 
note that the term “social efficiency” is historically opaque, as there is no one common meaning 
associated with its usage.   “Historically speaking, social efficiency was a widely used, poorly 
defined, highly problematic term that had multiple uses for multiple scholars between the years 
1890s and the 1930s” (Fallace & Fantozzi, 2013, p. 148).  It is therefore important to take a 
moment and consider some of the most common usages of the term.  
According to Krug (1964), the term has two distinct meanings—social efficiency as 
social control and social efficiency as social service: 
The spirit of reform in American society demanded an explicit social mission for the 






doctrines of schooling, reflecting latter-day efforts to resolve the perennial dilemma of 
the individual and the group.  One expression of this quest was expression for social 
control; the other, education for social service. Soon they came together in one slogan, 
education for social efficiency. (p. 249) 
When social efficiency is used to connote social service, the phrase is meant to express an 
approach to curriculum that emphasizes moral and civic duty.  Schools should, it is argued, help 
guide students towards habits and dispositions that help them value morals and character traits 
that support the smooth and cooperative functions of living in associative societies.  As argues 
Knoll (2009), this sense of the term emphasized that “the self-expressive tendencies of the child 
were to be reconciled with the demands of society” (p. 362).   
Krug (1964) and Null (2004) claim that the idea of social efficiency as social service was 
first articulated by William Chandler Bagley, superintendent of the Dillion Montana public 
schools and vice president of Montana State’s Normal School.  Bagley defined “social efficiency 
[as] a moral position about the relationship of the individual to society” (Null, 2004, p. 102).  
Bagley’s early adoption of the term reflected an attitude towards educational reform in which 
schools were seen as unique institutions capable of efficiently promoting character development 
and social service for the good of society:   
Bagley was concerned throughout his life about the extent to which individuals learned of 
channeling their own individual wants, needs, and desires toward the good of society as a 
whole…Bagley wanted students to learn to contribute to social reform or to social 
advancement through their contributions to American culture.  (Null, 2004, pp. 103-104) 
In many ways, Bagley’s understanding of social-efficiency as social service reflected the 






conception was more focused on social and civic outcomes than Hall’s (1901) individual and 
developmental outcomes, a social-service conception of social efficiency still evolved out of a 
basic desire to incorporate social and behavioral ends as central to curricular aims.   
The other interpretation of the phrase, social efficiency as social control, reflected an idea 
of social efficiency in which “the interests of society were to supersede the needs of the child” 
(Knoll, 2009, p. 362).  Callahan (1962) has argued that reformers who understood social 
efficiency as social control were inspired by the scientific management guru Fredrick Winslow 
Taylor (1911) and his book The Principles of Scientific Management.   
The sudden propulsion of scientific management into prominence and the subsequent 
saturation of American society with the idea of efficiency together with the attacks on 
education by the popular journals made it certain that public education would be 
influenced greatly. (Callahan, 1962, p. 52) 
 As a highly-regimented management system, Taylorism, according to Wirth (1974), also 
reflected “the various pressures on schools to introduce offerings to meet complex skill needs of 
an industrial America including phenomenon like manual training, commercial and agriculture 
education, home economics, and trade-training courses” (pp. 169-170). That is, social efficiency 
as social control embraced the idea of organizing schools more efficiently according to principles 
of scientific management and for a conception of schools as efficient mechanisms to prepare 
students for life--specifically, a life of labor.  
Thus, according to Callahan (1962), educationists such as E.L. Thorndike, who argued 
for the belief in “the importance of individual differences based on inherited traits and 
characteristics,” were expressing not just the importance of recognizing psychological 






industrial labor (Lagemann, 2000, p. 58). Educational theorists such Thorndike, Charles Judd, 
Franklin Bobbitt, Charles Prosser, and David Snedden pushed for schools to be increasingly 
conceptualized as institutions for training the young to meet the burgeoning demands of an 
industrial economy (Fallace & Fantozzi, 2013). Snedden, for example, advocated for “an 
extreme form of vocational education tailored to specific job destinations” (Drost, 1977, p. 24). 
Charles Prosser, the Executive Secretary of the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial 
Education, wanted to “reject the impractical manual training of the general education and replace 
it with ‘real vocational education,’ by which he meant training for useful employment” (Wirth, 
1974, p. 173).  Franklin Bobbitt argued “education is primarily for adult life, not for child life. Its 
fundamental responsibility is to prepare for the fifty years of adulthood, not for the twenty years 
of childhood and youth” (qtd. in Kliebold, 1999, p. 53).  
What is important to note about the entire spectrum of meanings associated with “social 
efficiency,” as well as the difference in curricular focus between the Committee of Ten Report 
and the Cardinal Principles Report, is that the Progressive Era did not have one unified and 
cohesive philosophical outlook; rather, it represented an era in American educational history in 
which there was a general acceptance of a need to reform schools in response to the rapidly 
changing technological and demographic changes of the nation but there was a general 
disagreement about what that reform should look like. On the one hand were reformers who 
thought schools should try to preserve the classical curriculum alongside organizational changes; 
on the other hand, were those who thought the curriculum should reflect a more utilitarian 
approach in which the developmental and occupational realities of students and society should 






The two reports provide an interesting contrast, and they have fascinated generations of 
historian. One perspective advocated a largely academic high school, with only minor 
differences between the programs students should take. The other provided for 
considerably more diversity in curricula, but also emphasized the school’s role in 
socializing youth for a democratic society.  In reality, the schools of the time probably 
embraced neither of these ideal types. (p. 139) 
What is clear is that the educational debates existing between roughly 1870 and 1930 
expressed a general sense of urgency towards rethinking and reorganizing the curriculum in 
ways reflecting the actual industrial technologies and industrial norms being invented right 
before educators’ eyes.  David Tyack (1974) has famously divided this debate into pedagogical 
progressives and administrative progressives. Pedagogical progressives, argued for a new 
education that emphasized the freedom of the learner; administrative progressives argued for a 
more centralized, efficient, and bureaucratic system (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). Between both 
groups there existed a general sense that education needed to be organized according to scientific 
principles that were both more humanistic and efficient.  It is out of this context that Dewey’s 
philosophy of education developed. 
Dewey’s Education Through Occupations  
Dewey’s philosophy of education is composed of three sets of interlocking arguments: 
developmental arguments that emphasize the promotion of growth through educative 
experiences, technological arguments that emphasize learning within and through an 
occupational context, and instrumental arguments that emphasize the development of habits of 







The foundation of Dewey’s philosophy of education is to see “…education in terms of 
life-experience” (EE. p. 51). For Dewey, focusing on life-experience means focusing the aims of 
education on the development of individual growth.  As with many of his contemporaries, 
Dewey was concerned that the “traditional curriculum” relied too heavily on antiquated methods 
of instruction and ignored the importance of individual experience in the process of learning. 
"The traditional scheme is, in essence, one of imposition from above and from outside. It 
imposes adult standards, subject-matter, and methods upon those who are only growing slowly 
toward maturity" (EE, pp. 18-19).  Instead, Dewey argued that “the criterion of the value of 
school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies 
means for making the desire effective in fact” (DE, p. 53). 
In Experience and Education Dewey makes a distinction between “educative” and “mis-
educative” experiences.  An educative experience, according to Dewey, is any experience that 
increases the physical, moral, and intellectual growth of a student and makes further educative 
experiences possible; a mis-educative experience is any experience that distorts or retards 
growth: 
The belief that all genuine education comes about through experience does not mean that 
all experiences are genuinely or equally educative. Experience and education cannot be 
directly equated to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. Any experience 
is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting growth of further experience. 
An experience may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack of sensitivity 
and of responsiveness. Then the possibility of having richer experience in the future are 






Like his later theories of inquiry where Dewey rejected the idea that knowledge was set 
“over against” experience, Dewey’s arguments for educative experiences rejected the idea that 
the “curriculum and the child are set over against each other” (CC, p. 201).  Dewey argued 
instead that educational aims should 
1. … be an outgrowth of existing conditions…based upon a consideration of what is 
already going on; upon the resources and difficulties of the situation 
2. …be flexible…be capable of alteration to meet circumstances 
3. … must represent a freeing of activities. (DE, pp. 104-105)   
Unlike traditional curricular approaches that conceptualize subject matter as a fixed entity 
outside and independent of those learning the content, for Dewey the value of education is 
measured according to how well the educative experience promotes growth in the individual 
student.  “There is no such thing” Dewey argues, “in educational value in the abstract” (EE, P. 
46). That is, according to Dewey, the ultimate value of learning anything is determined by the 
effect the subject matter has on an individual learner’s experiences.  According to Rice (1996),  
One aspect of attending to the quality of students’ experiences focuses on the students 
themselves, including their needs, capacities, interests, and purposes. There is no school 
subject or instructional method that is educative in itself; these acquire their educational 
significance only in relation to students. (p. 280) 
For Dewey, educative experiences promote growth because educative experiences are 
ongoing acts of development “effected by the whole situation in which individuals are involved, 
in which they share and of which they are co-operative or interacting parts” (EE. p. 53). 
Therefore, argues Dewey, growth is a process that is bound up with experience and is measured 






and his own needs.   In an educational context, growth is measured according to how well the 
entire experience of learning enriches the physical, moral, and intellectual development of the 
student that is learning.  
Play.  According to Dewey, growth comes from “a personal rather than an objective or 
intellectual” source (SS, p. 140). Growth begins in interest. “To be interested” Dewey argued,  
is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an interest is 
to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive. We say of an interested person both that 
he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself in it. Both terms express 
the engrossment of the self in an object.  (DE, p. 126) 
At a very early age, children are supremely interested in play.  Their interest in play, 
Dewey argued, is not aimless, but generally reflects a high level of concentration and concern for 
the imaginative work undertaken: “No one has ever watched a child intent in his play without 
being made aware of the complete merging of playfulness with seriousness” (AE, p. 291). 
Play, Dewey observed, is the initial stimulus towards educational development.  While play can 
be spontaneous and whimsical, as students mature the same impulses that drive play can also be 
used to drive inquiry.  
The first manifestations of play by a child do not differ much from those of a kitten. But 
as experience matures, activities are more and more regulated by an end to be attained; 
purpose becomes a thread that runs through a succession of acts; it converts them into a 
true series, a course of activity having a steady movement toward a goal. (AE, p. 290)  
What interested Dewey about play was what play revealed about the relationship between 
experience and active intelligence.  In the same way that inquiry arises out of an existential need 






the organic problems that arise in play.  “Play and work” Dewey argues, “correspond, point for 
point, with the traits of the initial stages of knowing” (DE, p. 195).  Play, like inquiry, is an 
active ordering of experience and a purposeful interaction with the materials and conditions of 
experience.   
The point of these remarks is that play has an end in the sense of a directing idea which 
give point to the successive acts. Persons who play are not just doing something (pure 
physical movement); they are trying to do or effect something, an attitude that involves 
anticipatory forecasts which stimulate their present responses. (DE, p. 203)  
According to Dewey, play, in an educational sense, is a natural type of experimentalism; it is an 
active and intelligent interaction between experience, intelligence, and the environment.   
Work. For Dewey, meaningful work--like play--is a similar type of interaction between 
mind and environment and brings together both the empirical and theoretical aspects of thinking 
and learning.  For Dewey, one of the tragedies of the industrial revolution was that work had 
become associated with drudgery.  
Under unfree economic conditions, this state of affairs is bound to exist. Work or industry 
offers little to engage the motions and the imagination; it is a more or less mechanical 
series of strains. Only the hold which the completion of the work has upon a person will 
keep him going. (DE, p. 204) 
In an educational context, Dewey believed that the way to differentiate the meaningful 
work of learning from the drudgery of learning was through an educational approach that 
harnessed the organic interests of play.  According to Dewey, drudgery results from work and 
learning being “subordinated to external result” (DE, p. 204).  Because work and learning are too 






experiences of students, the actual experiences of learning and working lack the personal 
investment and interest commonly found in play.  For Dewey, the only difference that should 
exist between play and work is one of emphasis.  For both to be truly meaningful, both should 
evolve out of and return to a student’s interests and experience.  
It is important not to confuse the psychological distinction between play and work with 
the economic distinction.  Psychologically, the defining characteristic of play is not 
amusement nor aimlessness. It is the fact that the aim is thought of as more activity in the 
same line, without defining continuity of action in reference to results produced. 
Activities as they grow more complicated gain added meaning by greater attention to 
specific results achieved. Thus they pass gradually into work. Both are equally free and 
intrinsically motivated…work which remains permeated with the play attitude is art—in 
quality if not in conventional design. (DE, p. 205-206) 
In an educational setting, the ideal relationship between work and play is one that brings 
meaning to the experiences of the learner so that “each shall have had the education which 
enables him to see within his daily work all there is in it of large and human significance” (SS, p. 
24).  Dewey argued that educators have a responsibility to create a learning environment where 
students can safely explore and inquire across the domains of play and work:  
It is the business of schools to set up the environment in which play and work shall be 
conducted with reference to facilitating desirable mental and moral growth. It is not 
enough to just introduce plays and games, hand work and manual exercises. Everything 
depends on the way in which they are employed. (DE, P. 196)   
Dewey conceptualized the relationship between play and work as a relationship similar to 






through a medium…[through] a prolonged interaction of something issuing from the self with 
objective conditions, a process in which both of them acquire a form and order they did not at 
first possess" (AE, pp. 67-68).  For Dewey, all that differentiates the work of the artist from the 
scientist is that the artist aims for expression while the scientist aims for explanation.  
What is true of an artists is true of any other special calling. There is doubtless--in 
general accord with the principle of habit--a tendency for every distinctive vocation to 
become too dominate, too exclusive and absorbing in its specialized aspect. This means 
emphasis upon skill of technical method at the expense of meaning. Hence it is not the 
business of education to foster this tendency, but rather to safeguard against it, so that the 
scientific inquirer shall not be merely the scientist, the teacher merely the pedagogue, the 
clergyman merely one who wears the cloth, and so on. (DE, p. 308) 
  Freedom and Democracy. Furthermore, because growth also depends on both the 
character and habits of individuals who shape and are shaped by continual social interactions, 
Dewey believed that freedom and democracy are not just educational goals, they are ways of 
being through which educative experiences and growth are manifested.  
It is not too much to say that an educational philosophy that professes to be based on the 
idea of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is 
reacted against. For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon 
critical examination of its own underlying principles. Let us say that the new education 
emphasizes the freedom of the learner. Very well. A problem is now set. What does 







According to Dewey, freedom of the learner, like freedom of inquiry, depends on an 
ability of the individual to purposefully grow. Purposeful growth is the ability of the individual to 
apply her intelligence to observation and experimentation for the solution of problems.  In a 
strictly educational context, purposeful growth is dependent on the free and open relationship 
between the mature, the immature, and the play/work undertaken. The teacher, as the “mature 
guide,” is tasked with helping direct students towards educative experiences (EE, p. 58). Dewey 
also argued that schools, ideally, as institutions devoted to educative growth, were one of the 
main mechanisms whereby democracy itself was renewed.   
Government, business, art, religion all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That 
purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect 
to race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their 
value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his 
possibility. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in 
resolving that supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be 
the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member in society. (PR, p. 
107)  
This renewal, however, was not through the passing down of specific principles of 
democracy, but through the function of the school as a democracy.  That is, by cultivating habits 
and dispositions formed through expression of democratic freedoms, schools reinforced the 
practice of democracy.  “Democracy is expressed in the attitudes of human beings and is 
measured by consequences produced in their lives" (FC, p. 97). As students grow through 
educative experiences, Dewey argued, the habits of inquiry and thinking support the continuation 






Furthermore, the very activity of learning itself depends on a free community of learners, in the 
same way that knowledge depends on a community of inquirers.  
Thus, argued Dewey, in an educational setting it was important that work and play be 
free from the economic pressures found in industrial culture more broadly.  While Dewey put 
great stock in a connection between learning that occurred at home and learning that took place 
in a school, he argued that the effectiveness of the school required a certain protection from the 
economic stratification that accompanied the economic realities of making a living.  Work and 
play could only be “free and intrinsically motivated” if the “false economic conditions which 
tend to make play into idle excitement for the well to do, and work into ungenial labor for the 
poor” were eliminated (DE, pp. 205-206).   The role of the teacher and the curriculum, Dewey 
argued, is to guide the impulsions of play towards growth, towards meaningful work, in a free 
and democratically open environment.  
Technological Arguments 
As discussed in chapter three, Dewey openly acknowledged and embraced the profound 
material progress of the industrial revolution.  He believed that these gains had unleashed a 
torrent of creative energies, leading to huge advances in science, medicine, and better standards 
of living.  However, as mentioned above, Dewey was also a central figure in the debates about 
the material and social costs of industrialization.  
In an educational context, Dewey was concerned with how schools could ideally function 
as institutions capable of reflecting the reality of these industrial changes without devolving into 
a narrow vocationalism (Holt, 1994). “There are three things about the old-fashioned school 






the way the teacher handles it, and third, the way the pupils handle it” (ST, p. 170). Across these 
three criteria, Dewey argued for a curriculum based on “occupations” (SS, p. 134).  
An occupation, according to Dewey, is  
…a concrete term for continuity. It includes the development of artistic capacity of any 
kind, of special scientific ability, of effective citizenship, as well as professional and 
business occupations, to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in gainful 
pursuits. (DE, p. 307) 
Occupations are tasks associated with a specific type of job, as well as activities that “occupy” 
the attention of an individual or a group.  Occupations are both an organizational unity of 
experience to “determine the consequences of associated activity” (PP, p. 44), and a type of 
attention that “puts the maximum of consciousness into whatever is done” (SS, p. 134).  That is, 
whatever one is occupied with is that which captures and focuses one’s attention on a specific 
task and around which habits and inquiry are organized.  
All people at the outset, and the majority of people probably all their lives, attain ordering 
of thought through ordering of action. Adults normally carry on some occupation, 
profession, pursuit; and this furnishes the continuous axis about which their knowledge, 
their beliefs, and their habits of reaching and testing conclusions are organized. (HWT, P. 
41)  
In an educational context, an occupation is “a mode of activity on the part of the child 
which reproduces, or runs parallel to, some form of work carried on in social life” (SS, p. 132). 
In the simplest explanation, occupations are educational projects involving a group of students in 






time these activities were industrial in nature and included work like sewing, cooking, gardening, 
and farming. 
A typical example of an occupational project is one Dewey gives in the Schools of 
Tomorrow.  Dewey explains how this project extends across multiple subjects.  
In the fifth grade, class activities were centered around a bungalow that the children were 
making. The boys in the class made the bungalow in their manual training hours. But 
before they started it every pupil had drawn a plan to scale of the house, and worked out, 
in their arithmetic period, the amount and cost of the lumber they would need, both for 
their own play bungalow and for a full sized one; they had done a large number of 
problems taken from the measurements for the house, such as finding the floor and wall 
areas and air space of each room, etc. 
In English,  
Work centered in much the same way around the building of the bungalow and the life of 
its inhabitants. The spelling lessons came from the words they were using in connection 
with the building, etc. The plans for the completed bungalow, a description of the house 
and the furnishings, or the life of the family that dwelt in it, furnished inexhaustible 
material for compositions and writing lessons. 
And in art,  
The pupils were very anxious that their house should be beautiful, so the color scheme for 
both the inside and outside furnished a number of problems in coloring and arrangement. 
Later they found large opportunities for design, in making wallpaper for the house, 
choosing and then decorating curtains and upholstery. Each pupil made his own design, 






The “bungalow project” engaged and organized the students across an entire range of 
subject matter, from mathematics to art, with the focus of the academic subject matter being 
driven by the problems associated with the building and refinement of the bungalow itself.   
Not only were the children “learning by doing” in the sense that nearly all the school 
work centered around activities which had intrinsic meaning and value to the pupils, but 
most of the initiative for the work came from the children themselves. They made their 
own number problems; suggested the next step in the work on the house; criticized each 
other’s compositions, and worked out their own dramatizations. (ST, p. 77) 
Importantly, Dewey’s example of the bungalow project was not meant to advocate for a 
vocational training curriculum--the students building the bungalow were not learning how to 
build the house because they were eventually going to become construction workers; instead, the 
bungalow project engaged students in a process of inquiry whereby their personal experience 
with the work was organically bound to the purposes of the occupation.   
Occupation as thus conceived must, therefore, be carefully distinguished from work 
which educates primarily for a trade.  It differs because its end is in itself; in the growth 
that comes from the continual interplay of ideas and their embodiment in action, not in 
external utility. (SS, p. 133)   
As such, the project was a vehicle for the discovery of subject matter linking the activities of 
real-world experiences with subject matter that organically arises out of the practices and interest 
of the occupation.   
Instrumental Arguments 
 The Bungalow project also reveals another important aspect of Dewey’s philosophy of 






While it is not the business of education to prove every statement made, any more than to 
teach every possible item of information, it is its business to cultivate deep-seated and 
effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and 
opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for conclusions that 
are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of 
inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves. (HWT, 
p. 28)  
In a strictly instrumental sense, occupations are the organizing activity around which a 
problem is structured.  Occupations are “…the conditions under which observation and inference 
take place”; they frame the set of immediate problems to be solved (HWT, p. 21).  For example, 
if the occupation is cooking, then the immediate set of problems to be solved is what to cook, 
how long to cook it, what ratios to be used, etc.  Occupations are also the foundation on which 
intellectual abstractions can be grounded. Recipes can spark lessons about addition and fractions, 
the choice of ingredients, principles of biology, etc.  
The educative activates of childhood should be so arranged that direct interest in the 
activity and its outcome create a demand for attention to matters that have a more and 
more indirect and remote connection with the original activity. The direct interest in 
carpentering or shop work should yield organically and gradually an interest in geometric 
and mechanical problems. The interest in cooking should grow into an interest in 







With the teacher as guide, Dewey believed that occupations allowed students the freedom to 
explore, play, and experiment with ideas, testing solutions against the realities and demands of 
the occupation itself.  
The problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these activities in such ways that while 
manual skill and technical efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found in the 
work, together with preparation for later usefulness, these things shall be subordinated to 
education--that is, to intellectual results and the forming of socialized disposition. (DE, p. 
197) 
One criteria for “forming a socialized disposition,” argued Dewey, was a student’s ability 
to exercise self-control and mental discipline. By “training the mind” in the habits of active 
inquiry, Dewey believed that students could direct their intelligence towards purposes they freely 
choose. 
Discipline means power at command: mastery of the resources available for carrying 
through the action undertaken. To know what one is to do and to move to do it promptly 
and by used of the requisite means is to be disciplined, whether we are thinking of an 
army or a mind. Discipline is positive. (DE, p. 129) 
Furthermore, because learning through an occupation requires cooperation and collaboration, 
Dewey also argued that students learn that inquiry, conduct, and communication are frequently 
inseparable.  
Schooling is a part of the work of education, but education in its full meaning includes all 
the influences that go to form the attitudes and dispositions (of desire as well as belief), 






  For Dewey, the ability of a student to think beyond the immediacy of the moment and his 
own narrow interests is one of hallmarks of maturity and growth and a necessary step in the 
development of habits of active inquiry: “Only gradually and with a widening of the area of 
vision through a growth of social sympathies does thinking develop to include what lies beyond 
our direct interests: a fact of great significance for education” (DE, p. 148).   
Finally, Dewey argued that as students learn through an occupation, they also learn about 
the occupation.  For instance, when activities such as sewing or cooking are contextualized in an 
occupational learning environment they indirectly represent a long continuum of social and 
intellectual associations common to the needs of society and culture.  
We must conceive of work in wood and metal, of weaving, sewing, and cooking, as 
methods of living and learning, not as distinct studies. We must conceive of them in their 
social significance, as types of the process by which society keeps itself going, as 
agencies for bringing home to the child some of the primal necessities of community life, 
and as ways in which these needs have been met by the growing insight and ingenuity of 
man; in short, as instrumentalities through which the school itself shall be made a 
genuine form of active community life, instead of a place set apart in which to learn 
lessons. (SS, p. 14)  
Through an occupational curriculum, Dewey argued, students are both directly engaged in the 
process of learning, and they are indirectly engaged in a historical and geographical continuity of 
knowledge from which the occupation itself is formed.  
Ultimately, Dewey’s philosophy of education, when considered across his 
developmental, technological, and instrumental arguments, is an approach to learning that is 






Instead, Dewey argued that education, as a form of inquiry, is a process of learning that occurs 
through an ongoing interaction with the world. A curriculum structured around occupations 
supports meaningful learning because it unifies the impulses of play within the context of work 
according to the methods of active inquiry.  “The fundamental point,” argued Dewey, is that 
education through occupations “maintains a balance between the intellectual and the practical 
phases of experience” (SS, p. 133).  Ideally, argued Dewey, the knowledge and habits students 
develop through an occupational curriculum helps students meaningfully grow across a variety 
of real-life empirical contexts.  “With every ability to place our own doings in their time and 
space connections, our doings gain in significant content…our ordinary daily experiences cease 
to be things of the moment and gain enduring substance” (DE, p. 209).  
Criticisms 
The criticisms of Dewey’s growth-centric occupational curriculum resemble many of 
those lodged against his philosophy of knowledge and his philosophy of technology.  On the one 
hand are the arguments that accuse Dewey of undermining the virtues of a traditional curriculum 
in favor of a vague and unarticulated concept of “growth”; on the other hand are the critical 
theorists who argue that Dewey’s curriculum is too narrowly conceived.  
Traditional Arguments 
Detractors arguing from the traditionalist line accuse Dewey, and progressivism more 
generally, of undermining traditional values and watering down the curriculum.  Early on, this 
line of argument was championed by the one-time Chancellor of the University of Chicago, 
Maynard Hutchins (1936), and Mortimer Adler (1940), one of Dewey’s ex-students.  Hutchins 
(1936) and Adler (1940) both openly criticized Dewey across numerous writings, accusing 






Mortimer Adler (1940) went so far as to pejoratively refer to American public schools as being 
“Deweyized” (Shea, 1989, p. 297).  
Hutchins (1936) and Adler (1940) were co-founders of the Great Books of the Western 
World program, which favored a curriculum based on carefully chosen texts meant to evoke and 
preserve the historical virtues of the western world.   
Their vision was a simple prescription for a nation increasingly interested in the role of 
higher and continuing education in a democracy: The best way to gain a liberal education 
in or out of the university, they argued, is to discuss the writings of the world’s great 
thinkers. (“A Brief history”, n.d.)  
This vision, in many ways, echoed some of the same critiques of the realist traditions, arguing 
that “the difficulty with Dewey's position in this matter…is that it leaves one with nothing to 
believe in and live by that is permanent, nothing that one can say ‘true’” (Shea, 1989, p. 303).  
Richard Hofstadter’s (1963) book Anti-intellectualism in American Life is in many ways 
and extension of the Hutchins-Adler critique.  According to Hofstadter (1963), Dewey was one 
of the main progenitors of the “new education” movement and therefore bore much of the 
responsibility for “dissolving the curriculum” and promoting an anti-intellectual agenda in 
education (p. 360). While Hofstadter (1963) is quick to point out that Dewey himself was not an 
anti-intellectual, he argued strongly that the heritage of Dewey’s progressive views, specifically 
his linking of educational ends with growth, lead to a wide spread ethos of educational anti-
authoritarianism in which the intellectual traditions of the past are cavalierly cast aside in favor 
of the developmental priorities of the individual.  
According to Hofstadter (1963), the over-emphasis on growth, alongside vague 






difficult to discover from his major works on education what he thought a good 
curriculum should be, or rather what the various alternative curricula should be, in the 
American school system. This absence of curricular commitments was consistent with his 
proposition that no ends or goals should be formulated for education, since its only 
legitimate end is the capacity for further education. (p. 375)   
Hofstadter (1963) found this later conclusion particularly troubling, not because he objected to 
the idea of growth, but because the “concept of individual growth became hostage in the hands 
of educational thinkers who were obsessed with the child-centered school” (p. 374). That growth 
lacked curricular focus, and that it had become an idea embraced by child-centered advocates, 
led Hofstadter (1963) to believe that “the effect of Dewey’s philosophy on the design of 
curricular systems was devastating” (p. 377).    
The “devastation” Hofstadter (1963) accused Dewey of wreaking was to generate a 
wholesale implosion of the traditional curriculum in favor of crass individualism and a bias for 
social goods over and above intellectual ones.  Ultimately, Hofstadter (1963) argued, Dewey 
helped inspire a tradition in American schooling that denigrated the past as woefully ignorant 
and enslaving.   
Having once put the child so firmly at the center, having defined education as growth 
without end, Dewey had so weighted the discussion of educational goals that a quarter 
century of clarificatory statements did not avail to hold in check the anti-intellectual 
perversions of his theory. (p. 389)  
 Dewey’s response to these traditionalist critiques was to argue that certain curricular 
philosophies (e.g., Hutchins’) were misguided because they smacked of authoritarianism and 






one.  As with his critiques of the Western philosophical tradition, Dewey (1937) suggested that it 
was possible to have curriculum devoted to both streams:  
The cure for surrender of higher learning to immediate and transitory pressures is not 
monastic seclusion. Higher learning can become intellectually vital only by coming to 
that close grip with our contemporary science and contemporary social affairs which 
Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas exemplify in their respective ways. (p. 104)  
Furthermore, argued Dewey (1937), any intimation that he was seeking to replace 
traditional disciplinary knowledge with a narrow vocational or manual training regime was to 
misunderstand his objectives.  As demonstrated above, for Dewey, an occupational curriculum 
was a platform for an endless variety of possible ends and for a deepening of subject matter, not 
a critique of past knowledge or texts.  
Enlargement of intellectual horizon, and awakening to the multitude of interesting 
problems presented by contemporary conditions, are the surest guarantees for good use of 
time with books and magazines. When books are made an end in themselves, only a 
small and highly specialized class will devote themselves to really serviceable books. 
When there is a lively sense of the interest of social affairs, all who possess the sense will 
turn as naturally to the books which foster that interest as to the other things of which 
they feel a need. (ST, p. 244) 
  Dewey’s (1937) response to Hutchins’ specifically, and to traditionalists more generally, 
was that any insistence on a codified curriculum that isolated itself from the concerns of 
contemporary society smacked of foundationalism and assumed an epistemological stance 






There are indications that Mr. Hutchins would not take kindly to labelling the other phase 
of this remedial plan “authoritarian.” But any scheme based on the existence of ultimate 
first principles, with their dependent hierarchy of subsidiary principles, does not escape 
authoritarianism by calling the principles “truths.” I would not intimate that the author 
has any sympathy with fascism. But basically his idea as to the proper course to be taken 
is akin to the distrust of freedom and the consequent appeal to some fixed authority that is 
now overrunning the world. (p.103) 
And while Dewey’s (1937) responses to Hutchins were directed at the curriculum of higher 
education, it is clear across numerous writings that Dewey’s curricular philosophy, regardless of 
academic level or context, was not to be taken as a repudiation of traditional subjects.  Rather, 
Dewey argued that subject matter is meaningful insofar as it is used, not as an end itself.  
Critical Arguments  
 The other line of criticism that is frequently lodged against Dewey is also an indictment 
of Dewey’s open-ended curriculum.  More charitably, these critiques accept the developmental 
approach espoused by Dewey, especially when development is linked to individual and 
collective autonomy, but they charge Dewey’s curricular philosophy with being incapable of 
truly delivering such freedom in the absence of an institutional desire to attain such ends.    
Among Dewey’s contemporaries, George Counts’s (1978) Dare the Schools Build a New 
Social Order is perhaps most representative of these early critical charges.  While Counts (1978) 
had a good deal of sympathy for Dewey’s overall approach, Counts (1978) considered Dewey’s 
industrial and educational liberalism a form of acquiescence to the very institutions that made 






Even a casual examination of the program and philosophy of the progressive schools, 
however, raises many doubts in the mind. To be sure, these schools have a number of 
large achievements to their credit. They have focused attention squarely on the child; they 
have recognized the fundamental importance of the interest of the learner; they have 
defended the thesis that activity lies at the root of all true education; they have conceived 
learning in terms of life situations and growth of character; they have championed the 
rights of the child as a free personality. Most of this is excellent, but in my judgement it is 
not enough. It constitutes too narrow a conception of the meaning of education; it brings 
into the picture but one-half of the landscape. (pp. 5-6)  
What concerned Counts (1978), and other critical theorists since Counts (1978), was 
Dewey’s belief in the power of the education system to promote democratic norms without also 
directing the resources of schools towards a specific critique of the capitalist system.  How, they 
asked “could schools that were an expression of industrial capitalism create an educational 
regime that would radically change and even subvert industrial capitalism?” (Cohen, 1998, p. 
438). Counts (1978) argued that unless schools were purposefully devoted to a critique of the 
status quo, the aims of growth could only support the interests of the powerful.  “My thesis,” 
argues Counts, (1978) “is that complete impartiality is utterly impossible, that the school must 
shape attitude, develop tastes, and even impose ideas” (p.19).   
 The critical call to “build a new social order” via a “critical consciousness” is not entirely 
outside the purview of Dewey’s own curricular goals, but as is true of his response to the 
traditionalist critique, Dewey did not endorse a curriculum whose ends were predetermined 
(Counts, 1978; Freire, 1968).   Dewey did, however, come to recognize that schools alone could 






It is unrealistic, in my opinion, that the schools can be a main agency in producing the 
intellectual and moral changes, the changes in attitudes and disposition of thought and 
purpose which are necessary for the creation of a new social order. Any such view 
ignores the constant operation of powerful forces outside the school which shape mind 
and character. It ignores the fact that school education is but one educational agency out 
of many, and at the best is in some respects a minor educational force. (LW:11, p. 414) 
Yet, while Dewey agreed that schools, alone, could not create a more democratic union, he did 
not lose faith in the power of schools to shape individual judgment.  
Our public school system was founded in the name of equality of opportunity for all, 
independent of birth, economic status, race, creed, or color. The school can not by itself 
alone create or embody this idea. But the least it can do is to create individuals who 
understand the concrete meaning of the idea with their minds, who cherish it warmly in 
their hearts, and who are equipped to battle in its behalf in their actions. (LW:11, p. 416) 
Thus, in so far as Dewey argued for an emancipatory theory of education that relied on 
his pragmatically instrumentalist assumptions about the uses of knowledge and technology in 
education, he and the critical theorists can find some common cause--both argue that free and 
open inquiry is foundational to educational practice.  Where they differ is in their faith in human 
judgment and in human technologies to collectively unchain itself from the institutional, 
political, and economic ideologies that guide educational development.  Critical theorists argue 
that schools should be used to assist in the creation of a more equitable social order through a 
direct response to the ideologies that reproduce sorting and social inequality; Dewey argued that 
educational value is ultimately determined through the habits and dispositions of individuals.  






experience, but each places the power of social change in different locations. For Counts (1932), 
and later critical theorists like Apple (1978) and Giroux (1997), social change requires the 
redirection of institutional goals through a curriculum that challenges the critical consciousness 
of students; for Dewey, such power resides in individual judgment trained according to 
epistemological frames aimed at growth and inquiry.   Dewey believed in the ability of an 
occupational curriculum to cultivate the habits of active inquiry because it required the free and 
collaborative efforts of the entire institution to ensure that inquiry proceeded along instrumental 
lines.  He did not ignore the influence of economics and inequality, but he believed that their 
correction would occur through cultivating the habits and dispositions of open inquiry, not 
through a curriculum devoted specifically to social critique.    
Conclusion 
Dewey’s belief in education through occupations brings together his philosophy of 
knowledge, his philosophy of technology, and his philosophy of education.  Like the process of 
inquiry and the production of knowledge, Dewey’s philosophy of education is not an attempt to 
prescribe an exact end for curriculum, nor does it demand a defined set of standards; it is an 
attempt to construct a curricular framework whereby the moral and intellectual development of 
students is directly linked to real-world experiences. According to Dewey, the foundational aim 
of a curriculum is to promote growth in the learner through educative experiences.  Learning is a 
process through which individuals and communities deepen and enrich their understanding of 
themselves and the world around them through interaction and experimentation in an educational 
setting.  
Like his philosophy of technology, Dewey’s occupational curriculum emphasized the 






purposefully interact with and understand the technological world in which they live.  Education 
through occupations brings together communities of learners to solve problems that emerge from 
the relationship between the learner, the technologies, and the purposes to which the 
technologies are geared. The technologies in this sense are neither determinative of the process 
of inquiry nor are they value-neutral. As students employ and interact within an occupation they 
both employ and reflect on the technology.  Furthermore, as the empirical ground of educative 
experience, students extract meaning across both the immediate experience of using the tools as 
well as through an understanding of the historical, geographical, and sociological lineage of the 
technology itself.  
Like his epistemology, Dewey’s occupational curriculum argued for a continuum 
between the practical and the theoretical.  The function of an occupational curriculum is to 
deepen experience by harnessing the natural interests of immature students within a hands-on 
environment to develop habits of instrumental inquiry. An occupational curriculum is both a 
technological and humanistic curriculum that uses the revelatory power of engineering and 
scientific progress, while also contextualizing that progress within specific human experiences; 
the value of the knowledge gained through the technology is measured against the meaning to 
actual students existing within specific social contexts.  “No other method,” argued Dewey,  
is to be found unless it be constantly borne in mind that the educational center of gravity 
is in the cultural or humane aspects of the subject. From this center, any material 
becomes relevant in so far as it is needed to help appreciate the significance of human 
activities and relations. (DE, p. 212)  
What emerges from Dewey’s occupational curriculum, therefore, is an approach to 






growth. The interaction between the student, the teacher, and the learning environment is one in 
which the technology neither determines nor disappears from the process of growth.  Instead, the 
technologies are understood as helping to organize the conditions of the inquiry and, when 
successful, being fully exposed in doing so.  That is, an occupational curriculum uses technology 
to shape educative experiences while also eliciting an awareness of the role of technology in the 
process of inquiry itself.  
The problem here is then (1) to furnish the child with a sufficiently large amount of 
personal activity with occupations, expression, conversation, construction, and 
experimentation… and (2) so to conduct this more direct experience as to…furnish him 
with motives and make his recourse to them intelligent, an addition to his powers, instead 
of servile dependency. (SS, p. 113) 
The goal, then, of an occupational curriculum is to empower the student to command his 
resources (technological or otherwise), both intellectually and concretely, so that he may freely 
pursue experiences and interactions that deepen and enrich the meaning of his life through 






Chapter 5 PI in Contemporary Contexts 
In this chapter I will argue that the interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatic instrumentalism I 
have presented in the previous three chapters has practical and philosophical significance in 
respect to modern digital technologies in contemporary educational contexts.  By modern digital 
technologies I am referring to those technologies that have evolved out of the recent convergence 
of the computer, mobile devices, and the internet. Henceforth, I will refer to these technologies 
as “information and communication technologies” (ICTs). This chapter will argue that a 
pragmatic instrumentalist approach to ICTs, much like a PI approach to industrial technologies, 
involves reflecting on the relationship between knowledge, technology, and education. 
Ultimately, I will argue that a PI approach to educational technologies challenges educators, 
students, and policy makers to accept responsibility for the use of ICTs as both an object and an 
expression of purposeful inquiry.   
As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this dissertation, Dewey argued across his 
career that the transformative realities of the industrial revolution clearly demonstrated the power 
of the scientific method to solve practical and material problems of living.  Dewey also argued 
that pragmatic instrumentalism could help frame and solve social problems of associative living 
and education by acknowledging and accepting the logic of the scientific method as the basis of 
purposeful intelligence. Thinking, Dewey argued, is a deliberate act of using the material, 
technological and social conditions of the world to enrich human experience.  “The enemy” 
argued Dewey, “is not material commodities, but the lack of will to use them as instruments for 
achieving preferred possibilities” (ION, p. 76).  I am arguing that in the same way Dewey 






world, PI can also be used as a method to frame and explore many of the educational problems 
arising out of the ICT world.  
My argument presupposes that there is a significant and unique change occurring in 
education because of ICTs.  I will argue that one of the central characteristics delineating ICTs 
from their industrial predecessors is the way ICTs are changing the formation and distribution of 
information.  I will then explore what it means, from a PI perspective, for educators, students, 
and policy makers to accept responsibility for the use of ICTs in educational contexts.  
Industrial and Digital Revolutions 
There are many similarities between the modern digital revolution and the industrial 
revolution of Dewey’s time.  According to Isaacson (2014), “just as the industrial revolution was 
driven by combining the steam engine with ingenious machinery, the Digital Revolution has 
been driven by two great innovations: the personal computer and the internet” (par. 1).  
According to Moor (1983), 
The essence of the Computer Revolution is found in the nature of the computer itself.  
What is revolutionary about computers is logical malleability. Computers are logically 
malleable in that they can be shaped and molded to do any activity that can be 
characterized in terms of inputs, outputs, and connecting logical operations…the logic of 
the computer can be massaged and shaped in endless ways through changes in hardware 
and software. Just as the power of the steam engine was a raw resource of the Industrial 
Revolution so the logic of the computer is a raw resource of the Computer Revolution. 
(Italics Moor, p. 269) 
Negroponte (1995) argues that the difference between the Industrial Revolution and the 






The industrial age, very much an age of atoms, gave us the concept of mass production, 
with economies that come from manufacturing with uniform and repetitious methods in 
any one given space and time. The information age, the age of computers, showed us the 
same economies of scale, but with less regard for space and time. The manufacturing of 
bits could happen anywhere, at anytime…. (p. 163) 
A bit, argues Negroponte (1995), “has no color, size, or weight, and it can travel at the 
speed of light. It is the smallest atomic element in the DNA of information. It is in a state of 
being on or off, true or false, up or down, in or out, black or white” (p. 15).  The bit has made 
possible the exponential growth of the internet and mobile technologies, instantaneous visual and 
auditory communication, unlimited access to information, unfathomable processing power of 
vast amounts of data, unlimited recording capacity, and seamless interconnectivity between 
devices.   
ICTs are now almost everywhere.  According to the US Census Bureau (2012), between 
1984 and 2012, the percentage of homes with a computer grew by 70.7%.  Between 1997 and 
2012, the percentage of homes that had internet access grew by 56.8%.  Since 2016, 9 in 10 
Americans are online, 77% own a smart phone, 73% have broadband internet at home, 51% own 
a tablet, and 69% of American adults use social networking sites (Smith, 2017; Perrin, 2015).  
Between 2011-2013, nearly one-third of all Americans used three or more devices to connect to 
the internet (Morris, 2016).  Cisco Systems, the largest provider of IP services in the world, 
predicts that IP internet traffic will triple to 2.3 zetabytes by 2020 (Cisco, 2016).  To put that in 
perspective, 1 zettabyte is equivalent to all the information that can be stored on 250 billion 






Infospheres and Inforgs   
One way to think more deeply about the unique characteristics of the digital revolution is 
through the work of philosopher Luciano Floridi (2015).  Floridi’s (2015) ideas offer a 
contemporary and comprehensive account of how many in philosophy of technology think about 
ICTs.  According to Floridi (2015) what clearly distinguishes ICTs from industrial technologies 
is the way ICTs enable the widespread manipulation and communication of information across 
lexigraphical, visual, and auditory domains.  
In his book The Fourth Revolution, Floridi (2015) argues that we are currently living in 
an age of “hyperhistory” (p. 4). To live hyperhistorically is to live “in societies and environments 
where ICTs and their data-processing capabilities are not just important but essential conditions 
for the maintenance and any further development of societal welfare, personal well-being, and 
overall flourishing” (Floridi, 2015, p. 4).  According to Floridi (2015), “hyperhistory is a new era 
in human development” characterized by the relationship between individuals and the 
“infosphere” (p. 22).  Floridi (2015) defines the infosphere as  
…the whole informational environment constituted by all informational entities, their 
properties, interactions, processes, and mutual relations. It is an environment comparable 
to, but different from, cyberspace, which is only one of its sub-regions, as it were, since 
the infosphere also includes offline and analogue spaces of information. Maximally, the 
infosphere is a concept that can also be used as synonymous with reality, once we 
interpret the latter informationally. In this case, the suggestion is that what is real is 
informational and what is informational is real. (p. 40) 
According to Floridi (2015), the infosphere is comprised of first, second, and third order 






user and nature (see Figure 2). A typical example of a first order technology is an ax, or a knife.  
HumanityßTechnologyàNature 
Figure 2. First-order Technology 
Second-order technologies are those technologies that mediate between the user and other 
technologies (see Figure 3).  For instance, a screw driver mediates between the user and another 
technology, the screw.  
HumanityßTechnologyàTechnology 
Figure 3. Second-order Technology. 
Third order technologies are those technologies that mediate between themselves, with minimal 
or no need of a user (see Figure 4).   
TechnologyßTechnologyàTechnology 
Figure 4. Third-order Technology. 
Sometimes referred to as the “internet of things” third-order technologies,  
are about removing us, the cumbersome human in-betweeners, off the loop. In a 
defragmented and fully integrated infosphere, the invisible coordination between devices 
will be as seamless as the way in which your smartphone interacts with your laptop and 
the latter interacts with the printer.  (Floridi, 2015, p. 30)   
According to Floridi (2015), like the first scientific revolution in which Copernicus 
discovered that the earth was not the center of the universe, the second revolution in which 
Darwin discovered that humans are not separate from the rest of the animal world, and the third 
revolution in which Freud discovered that conscious thought is not the center of human behavior, 
the fourth revolution (via Alan Turning) has demonstrated that we are no longer the center of our 






Turing displaced us from our privileged and unique position in the realm of logical 
reasoning, information processing, and smart behavior. We are no longer the undisputed 
masters of the infosphere. Our digital devices carry out more and more tasks that would 
require some thinking from us if we were in charge. We have been forced to abandon 
once again a position that we thought was “unique.” (p. 92) 
As information organisms (“inforgs”) within an infosphere, Floridi (2015) argues, we are quickly 
becoming organisms for whom life online and life offline will cease to exist (p. 94).  
We will come to recognize no fundamental difference between the infosphere and the 
physical world, only a change in perspective. When the migration is complete, my guess 
is that Generation Z will increasingly feel deprived, excluded, handicapped, or poor to the 
point of paralysis and psychological trauma whenever it is disconnected from the 
infosphere, like fish out of water. One day, being an inforg will be so natural that any 
disruption in our normal flow of information will make us sick. (p. 97) 
Ultimately, argues Floridi (2007), ICT technologies are “re-ontologizing” the world:  
Re-ontologizing is another neologism that I have recently introduced in order to refer to a 
very radical form of re-engineering, one that not only designs, constructs or structures a 
system (e.g. a company, a machine or some artefact) anew, but that fundamentally 
transforms its intrinsic nature. (p. 5) 
One implication of digital re-ontologizing is that “it will become progressively less 
credible to claim ignorance when confronted by easily predictable events” (Floridi, 2007, p. 5).  
That is, to be uninformed will soon be considered, if it is not already, an act of willful disregard 
because “the re-ontologization of the infosphere, will be the disclosure of human agents as 






(Floridi 2015, p. 10). According to Floridi (2015), because interconnectivity will touch on every 
aspect of a person’s life, to be uninformed will be considered an act of irresponsibility not of 
ignorance.   
Digital Natives and Digital Immigrants 
In an educationally specific sense, an extension of Floridi’s (2015) ideas are similarly 
expressed in the ideas of Marc Prensky (2001).   According to Prensky (2001a), people born into 
a fully digital world grow up with a different relationship to ICTs than those born before the 
digital revolution. Those born into a digital world, argues Prensky (2001a), are what he calls 
“digital natives” (p. 2). A digital native is a “native speak[er] of the digital language of 
computers, video games and the Internet” (p. 2).  They are, argues Prensky (2001a),  
…used to receiving information really fast. They like to parallel process and multi-task. 
They prefer their graphics before their text rather than the opposite. They prefer random 
access (like hypertext). They function best when networked. They thrive on instant 
gratification and frequent rewards. They prefer games to ‘serious’ work. (pp. 2-3)  
Conversely, argues Prensky (2001a), those born before the digital revolution are what he calls 
“digital immigrants” (p. 3).   
According to Prensky (2001a) the difference between digital natives (students) and the 
digital immigrants (teachers) is a significant problem in educational contexts. Specifically, 
argues Prensky (2001b), even though digital immigrants have been forced to adapt to the digital 
world they invariably retain some of their “accent” from their native, non-digital land (p. 3):  
The “digital immigrant accent” can be seen in such things as turning to the Internet for 
information second rather than first, or in reading the manual for a program rather than 






“socialized” differently from their kids, and are now in the process of learning a new 
language. And a language learned later in life, scientists tell us, goes into a different part 
of the brain. (p.3) 
Problems arise between digital natives and digital immigrants when the behaviors and thinking 
patterns of the immigrants, who are primarily teachers, use an “outdated language…to teach a 
population that speaks an entirely new language” (p. 3).   
According to Bennett, Matton & Kervin (2008), “the debate over digital natives is thus 
based on two key claims: (1) that a distinct generation of ‘digital natives’ exists; and (2) that 
education must fundamentally change to meet the needs of these ‘digital natives’” (p. 777).   
Like many other cultural, social, and generational differences that affect educational practices, 
Prensky (2001a) is arguing that the ubiquity of digital technologies creates a kind of translation 
problem between natives and immigrants.  As with other translational problems, the immigrant 
(the older generation) is out of touch with the native (the younger generation), and the 
“language” difference creates a problem regarding how effective teachers can be without the 
ability to “talk” the language of the student.   
 Critics of Prensky (2001a) (see Bennett, Matton & Kervin, 2008; Selwyn, 2009; Brown 
& Czerniewicz, 2010) have argued, rightly I think, that the digital native/digital immigrant 
argument is hardly unique to ICTs, and that evidence for the division between immigrants and 
natives is not as acute as Prensky (2001a) argues. There are, for instance, many ways that the 
difference between one social group and another affect the learning process, just as there is a lot 
of variation in ICT use based upon grade-level, socio-economic status, and cultural norms.  For 
these reasons, and more, it is difficult to generalize ICT use.   






consider the impact of ICTs on information gathering and educational practices.  I simply want 
to suggest that both Floridi (2015) and Prensky (2001a) are representative of broader 
epistemological claims that ICTs, like industrial technologies before them, have become so 
ubiquitous and ingrained in contemporary life that it is important to individually and collectively 
reflect on how ICTs are or are not affecting educational practices and aims.   
At a minimum, it is becoming increasingly difficult to dispute that ICTs play a role in the 
way students process and interact with information. For instance, as of 2013, 93% of teens own 
or have access to a computer at home, 78% own a cell phone, and 23% own a tablet computer 
(Madden, et al. 2013).  In 2015, 66% of children ages 3-14 and 85% of young adults ages 15-24 
use the internet (Morris, 2016).  92% percent of teens report going online daily and 56% go 
online several times a day (Madden, et al. 2013).   
In schools the use of ICTs has also increased. For example, between 1999 and 2012 the 
number of computers in schools per square foot grew by 71% (US Energy Information 
Administration, 2016).  77% of all students in America have access to the internet, 28.4% of 
college students have taken at least one online course, 88% of school districts have broadband 
access to the internet, and 83% report having sufficient Wi-Fi (Allen, Seaman, Poulin & Struat, 
2016; EducationSuperHighway, 2016).  In 2013, 46% of district administrators “identified the 
effective implementation of technology tools (such as online learning, digital content and mobile 
devices) as having the greatest potential to impact student outcomes for college and career 
readiness” (Project Tomorrow, 2013, p. 2).  74% of teachers believe mobile devices increase 
student achievement in schools for grades 6-12, 48% of teachers have used online videos, 27% 
have used digital textbooks, 9% have used virtual labs, and 18% have used digital technology to 






As ICT use in schools increases, the learning environment itself is also being restructured 
(O’Rielly, 2005; Kucirkova, 2014).  For example, technologies like cloud computing and what is 
referred to as Web 2.0 (see Figure 5) allows students, teachers, and administrators to upload any 
type of multimedia document to a central hub accessible to anyone on the network at any time, 
from inside the school or out, on any type of device.  Online learning platforms like Blackboard 
and Google Classroom allow students, teachers, and administrators to engage in discussion 
boards, view multimedia materials, and conduct entire classes completely online.  Computer and 
mobile applications (apps) such as Evernote, Duolingo, and Math Game offer an endless variety 
of education specific tools to assist students, teachers, and administrators with everything from 
organizing notes, learning languages, to learning math skills.  
 
Figure 5. A typology of Web 2.0 learning technologies, Bower, M. (2015). 






The circumstances, conditions and the very status of knowledge, learning, teaching and 
researching are currently in a state of profound upheaval under the double impact of rapid 
and far-reaching technological change and the massive assault on longstanding narratives 
of foundation and legitimation. (pp.17-18) 
Accepting Responsibility 
If one accepts that ICTs are becoming a significant factor in the way that individuals and 
students relate to the world, as Floridi (2015) and Prensky (2001a) suggest, then it is important 
from a PI perspective to also consider the implication of how and if ICTs affect the way 
educators, students, and policy makers relate to the aims of education. In Rethinking Education 
in the Age of Technology, Halverson & Smith (2009) argue that there are two general approaches 
regarding how we think about ICTs and educational aims: technological enthusiasm and 
technological skepticism.  Technological enthusiasts argue that educators should embrace 
technology’s “enhanced capabilities” to reshape education because “the world is changing and 
we will need to adapt schooling to prepare for the changing world [students] enter” (p.9).  
Technological skeptics argue that ICTs carry “the risk of either reducing the rich variety of 
classroom teaching and learning to the most predictable forms of rote learning or perverting the 
learning experience in the interests of commercial media” (p.30).  
I would like to suggest that a PI approach to ICTs provides a middle ground between the 
enthusiast and the skeptic.  PI suggests we consider ICTs in education according to two 
interrelated points: one, that the educational aims of technology evolve out of the needs of 
individual and collective inquiry rather than out of a desire to achieve predetermined fixed ends; 
and two, that educators, students, and policy makers are ultimately responsible for how and why 






Technological Skepticism: ICTs, Standards, and Fixed-Ends 
 Technological skeptics argue that ICTs are being used to pressure schools into providing 
a “constant production of ‘evidence’ that people within schools are doing things ‘efficiently’ and 
in the ‘correct’ manner” (Selwyn, 2011, p. 484).  Often, critics argue, “evidence” takes the form 
of data collection and high stakes testing, which according to Nichols & Berliner (2008) “is the 
practice of attaching importance to standardized test scores…[wherein] the promise of rewards 
and the threat of punishment will cause teachers to work more effectively” (p. 672). According 
to Apple (2005), when assisted by developing technology, evidence gathering is one of the 
hallmarks of an “audit culture” in which “the widespread nature of these evaluative and 
measurement pressures, and their ability to become parts of our common sense, crowd out other 
conceptions of effectiveness and democracy” (Apple, 2005, pp. 14-15; Apple, 2007).  Because 
ICTs are able to easily and efficiently process and communicate vast quantities of information 
and data, critics of the standards movement often argue that digital technologies are primarily 
used to support the argument “that the availability of data will inform and initiate improvements 
in educational practice” (Wayman & Stringfield, 2006, p. 549).   For Apple (2005) and other 
critics, the ICTs empowered standards movement represents a commodification of education in 
which the value of educational aims are becoming more and more defined according to economic 
metrics.  
For instance, according to The Partnership for 21st Century Skills (2008), the leading 
advocate for the adoption of 21st Century Skills curriculum in schools, “every aspect of our 
education system—preK-12, post-secondary and adult education, after school and youth 
development, workforce development and training, and teacher preparation programs—must be 






“thinking critically and making judgements,” “solving complex, multidisciplinary, open-ended 
problems,” “making innovative use of knowledge, information and opportunities,” and 
“communicating and collaborating,” are presented as central to success in working with ICT 
technology and ultimately ensuring success in “college, work, and life” (p. 12). Arguing that 
“this is a seminal moment in history for education and competitiveness” where “formalizing the 
connection between education and competitiveness…is the central…challenge of the next 
decade” the Partnership for 21st Century Skills (2008) argues that the measure of educational 
success depends on how well students master technological skills to achieve economic success 
(p. 16).  
Like administrative progressives before them and the debates over social efficiency, 
technological skeptics argue that ICT “technologies for learning” frequently reflect what Selwyn 
(2011) calls “institutional technologies”: 
far from being a source of enabling “bottom-up” change, these institutional technologies 
appear to be entwined in a multiplicity of “top down” relationships related to the 
concerns of school management and administration. It could be argued that the use of 
these systems is shaped more often by concerns of institutional efficiency, modernization 
and rationalization, rather than the individual concerns of learners or teachers. (p. 484) 
According to Diane Ravitch (2009),  
there is nothing new in the proposals of the 21st century skills movement. The same ideas 
were iterated and reiterated by pedagogues across the twentieth century. Their call for 
20th century skills sounds identical to the current effort to promote 21st century skills. 







 Wayne Au (2011) argues that the combination of new technologies with the imperatives 
of the standards movement represents a return to Taylorism: “public school teachers in the US 
are teaching under what might be considered the ‘New Taylorism,’ where the labor is controlled 
vi-a-vis high stakes testing and pre-packaged, corporate curricula aimed specifically at teaching 
to the test” (p. 25).  Much like the “old Taylorism,” the New Taylorism reflects a pervasive 
managerialism (“new managerialism”) in which the auditing powers of ICTs favors centralized 
efficiencies of measurement and standardization (Selwyn, 2011, p. 479).   Apple (2007) contends 
that these technologies have resulted not in “the promised de-centralization that plays such a 
significant role rhetorically in most neo-liberal self-understandings, but what seems to be a 
massive re-centralization and what is best seen as a process of de-democratization” (p. 15).    
As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, Dewey clearly expressed a similar worry 
that technological progress could be used to undermine democracy and educational aims directed 
at growth.  However, what distinguishes a PI approach to technology is that Dewey did not argue 
that the technology itself was to blame. For Dewey, there is nothing inherently wrong with using 
technology to guide or measure achievement. Furthermore, not all technologies for “learning” 
necessarily promote specific fixed standards.  ICTs can be used for a whole assortment of 
institutional reasons that have little or nothing to do with academic or intellectual aims such as 
the organization of grading, class rosters, class schedules, etc.  What a PI approach to learning 
does reject is the idea that meeting abstract and fixed standards is the ultimate measure of 
educational value. 
From a PI perspective, when the learner and the process of learning are conceptualized as 
having separate ends—especially if one end is considered more valuable than another—then a 






division between the meaningful growth of an individual and the content being studied.  “The 
problem of education in a democratic society is to do away with the dualism and to construct a 
course of studies which makes thought a guide of free practice…” (DE, p. 263). For instance, if 
the 21st century skills curriculum is contextualized as a codified curriculum solely devoted to 
teaching exact skills regardless of the context and students to which it is introduced, then it is 
true that in most instances the curriculum could represent a too narrow focus from a PI 
perspective.  But, it is not the curriculum itself that a PI approach would reject; rather, it is that 
the projected ends are considered fixed and totally independent of the needs and interests of 
individual learners.  There is nothing wrong with learning specific skills or directing curriculum 
towards specific ends, as long as the ends themselves are understood as temporary as they relate 
to particular learners. It is learners that ultimately decide and judge what ends are valuable to 
them because those ends bring meaning to their experiences as they exist within a community of 
others.  
The purposeful use of any technology, therefore, in a PI sense, means using the 
technology in a deliberate and intelligent way towards ends that solve problems and bring 
meaning to the lives of learners within a community of learners. As Dewey argues,  
No classification, no selection and arrangement of facts, which is consciously worked out 
for purely abstract ends, can ever compare in solidity or effectiveness with that knit under 
the stress of an occupation; in comparison the former sort is formal, superficial, cold. 
(DE, p. 310)   
In other words, it matters why individual learners pursue specific ends, not that there are specific 






Technological Optimism: Determinism and Hype Cycles.   
There is a related point to be made when further considering the implications of a PI 
approach to ICTs as “tools of learning” (Halverson & Smith, 2009, p. 49). Specifically, PI 
challenges educators, students, and policy makers to consider how the rhetoric of technological 
optimism can often be indistinguishable from arguments for technological determinism. A good 
example of this blurred line is illustrated in the rise and fall of MOOCs.  
MOOCs, or Massive Open Online Classes, began in 2011 when Stanford Professor 
Sebastian Thrun and computer scientists David Stavens and Michael Sokolsky started the online 
learning company Udacity.  Inspired by the popularity of Thrune’s online artificial intelligence 
course at Stanford, Udacity sought to revolutionize the world of higher education by offering 
access to university classes completely online and, often, for free.  Not long after Udacity started, 
similar companies like Coursera and EdX, a non-profit online partnership between Harvard and 
MIT, began offering Ivy league classes online for credit.  In 2012, EdX enrolled over 370,000 
students in one of its first online courses.  In Coursera’s first five months, they enrolled 1.3 
million students (Empson, 2013; Head, 2012).    
Writing in Forbes magazine, Susan Adams (2012) asked “could Coursera and its ilk 
replace a $250,000 college degree and decimate the world of brick-and-mortar colleges and 
universities?” (par. 2).  “Suddenly” she argued,  
the world of elite higher education is opening up to the masses. Students at lesser colleges 
may become able to augment their course offerings with top instruction from great 
professors at prestigious universities. They may gradually learn that they can learn online 







At the time (2012-2013) it was not uncommon to hear MOOCs frequently described as the “end 
of the university” (Harden, 2012). The New York Times called 2012 “The Year of the MOOC” 
(Pappano, 2012).  In The American Interest, Nathan Harden (2012) proclaimed,  
In fifty years, if not much sooner, half of the roughly 4,500 colleges and universities now 
operating in the United States will have ceased to exist. The technology driving this 
change is already at work, and nothing can stop it. The future looks like this: Access to 
college-level education will be free for everyone; the residential college campus will 
become largely obsolete; tens of thousands of professors will lose their jobs; the 
bachelor’s degree will become increasingly irrelevant; and ten years from now Harvard 
will enroll ten million students. (par. 1) 
By 2015, however, many universities were moving away from MOOCs because many of 
the promises of MOOCs never materialized.  For example, Jordan (2014) found that, on average, 
only 6.5% of students enrolled in a MOOC ever actually finished a course.   In 2015, the 
University of California system ended its “Digital Campus” initiative when they discovered that 
“from spring 2012 through spring 2014, only 250 non-UC students finished a [online] class” 
(Derousseau, 2015, par. 5).  San Jose State decided to “pause” its partnership with Udacity when 
it became clear that students taking the online classes scored worse than those taking face to face 
classes (Rivard, 2013a, par. 1).  “According to the preliminary presentation, 74 percent or more 
of the students in traditional classes passed, while no more than 51 percent of Udacity students 
passed any of the three courses” (Rivard, 2013a, par. 19).  Even Sebastian Thrune, the 
“Godfather” of the MOOCs and CEO of Udacity, who imagined in 2012 “that in 10 years, job 
applicants will tout their Udacity degrees…in 50 years…there will be only 10 institutions in the 






system and focus instead on corporate training (Leckart, 2012, n.p.; Schuman, 2013; Chafkin, 
2013).  
Cuban (2012) argues that the MOOC phenomenon is a perfect example of a “hype 
cycle”: 
Right before our eyes we are experiencing the very beginning of the hype cycle. For 
many academic entrepreneurs deeply dissatisfied with the cost of higher education and 
the traditional teaching that occurs, the onset of MOOCs is exhilarating. It is an 
unexplored frontier where plunging into the unknown and taking risks could lead to 
exciting returns. The promise of a college education taught by stellar teachers delivered 
free to anyone in the world who has the smarts and grit drives higher education 
reformers.  In 2012. MOOCs are at the very beginning of the Hype Cycle. (emphasis 
Cuban, par. 3) 
A hype cycle “characterizes the typical progression of an emerging technology from user 
and media overenthusiasm through a period of disillusionment to an eventual understanding of 
the technology's relevance and role in a market or domain” (Linden & Finn, 2003, p. 4).  The 
cycle is composed of five elements: the technology trigger, the peak of inflated expectations, the 
trough of disillusionment, slope of enlightenment, and the plateau of productivity (see Figure 6).  
 






According to Linden and Finn (2003),  
At the beginning of the cycle, enterprises know nothing about a technology and cannot 
make informed judgements about its costs and benefits. Therefore, the risk is high. At the 
end of the cycle, enterprises know more about the technology; thus, they can make 
informed decisions about when and where to apply it. (p. 6)   
I believe the hype cycle is one way to describe how inflated optimism about certain 
technologies often conceals a belief in the inevitably of technologies to trend in particular 
directions and assure specific ends.  In the case of the MOOC, as online technologies began to 
spread and the possibilities of transmitting larger and larger quantities of information, video, and 
sound became easier, many educational reformers assumed that the technology itself would 
inevitably drive the reconstruction of the university structure towards all online platforms.  
Instead, the MOOC has virtually disappeared and the proclaimed demise of the brick and mortar 
university has not come to pass.   
While the hype cycle is primarily meant to describe an overzealousness in the faith of 
new technologies, the broader implications of such enthusiasms has real effects on how we 
conceptualize the nature of technology in educational contexts.  As ICT technologies have 
developed, many institutions have adopted technologies based primarily on the promise of the 
technology itself.   
Larry Cuban (2001) argues that the use of educational technologies has been historically 
driven by three goals:  
Goal 1: Make schools more efficient and productive than they currently are. 
Goal 2: Transform teaching and learning into an engaging and active process connected 






Goal 3: Prepare the current generation of young people for the future workplace.  (pp. 13-
15) 
But, often, as Cuban (2001) has shown in Oversold and Underused, simply because a technology 
can do something doesn’t mean the intended result is inevitable nor, in many instances, is it even 
desirable.  For instance, according to Cuban (2001), many of the promises of the computer 
revolution in education have actually led to unexpected outcomes: 
• Unexpected outcome: In the schools we studied, we found no clear and substantial 
evidence of students increasing their academic achievement as a result of using 
information technologies. 
• Unexpected outcome: The overwhelming majority of teachers employed the technology 
to sustain existing patterns of teaching, rather than to innovate.  
• Unexpected outcome: Only a tiny percentage of high school and university teachers 
used the new technologies to accelerate student-centered and project-based teaching 
practices. (Most preschool and kindergarten teachers already used such practices.). (pp. 
183-184) 
What is clear from Cuban’s (2001) research is that the aims of ICT use in classrooms do 
not always match the reality of ICT use in classrooms.  Again, consider the MOOC.  
Interestingly, rather than a complete destruction of the university, many of the functions of 
MOOCs have been adapted to suit different learning structures, such as the rise of online 
learning in the form of “blended” “flipped” and “distance education” (Horn & Staker, 2011).   
Blended learning refers to the use of ICT technology to deliver the bulk of a lesson (e.g., 
lectures, movies, PowerPoints, etc.) online while leaving classroom time for face-to-face 






offers the best of both worlds: a highly personalized and flexible learning environment along 
with the one to one guidance of a teacher to assist in one’s studies.  Students can view and 
interact with the main content of the lesson at their own leisure, while classroom time is spent 
deepening and clarifying difficult or unclear skills or topics.  
[Blended-learning programs] can let students learn at their own pace, use preferred 
learning modalities, and receive frequent and timely feedback on their performance for a  
far higher quality learning experience…[and] schools can leverage technology to create 
radically different staffing structures that increase school-wide student-teacher ratios, 
even as students experience more personalized learning from more effective teachers. 
(Horn & Staker, 2011, p. 6)  
The argument I am making here is not to advocate for blended learning, but to illustrate 
how blended learning is another example of the logical malleability of ICTs. I am arguing that 
the fate of MOOCS and the rise of blended learning suggest a confirmation of the philosophical 
premise on which much of a PI approach to educational technology is built—technology, itself, 
is not determinative of specific ends. Instead, ICTs, like knowledge itself, are endlessly 
adaptable to address individual needs and problems regardless of the original intent of their 
design. When considering ICTs as tools for learning a PI approach challenges educators to 
consider ICTs, like all other educational technologies, as tools evolving out of the needs of 
learners (individually and collectively) to solve problems related to experience.  Technologies, 
no matter how novel or advanced, come into existence for human purposes and human needs.  A 
PI approach argues that there is no inevitable path technology must follow because, especially in 
an educational setting, technologies are a result of the processes of inquiry; their effectiveness 






technology may be originally intended for a specific outcome, there is no guarantee that the 
technology itself will produce that outcome, nor be exclusively used for such an outcome, 
because empirical circumstances and human purposes are constantly changing.    
Personalization and Constructionism 
Blended learning also highlights another commonly claimed advantage of using ICTs in 
education: ICTs allow educators and students to personalize their learning. 
In contrast to the traditional one-size-fits-all education dictated by externally prescribed 
curricula, we could imagine education as a personalized experience that supports the 
development of interests and strengths of each child. What is worth learning is 
determined by the child rather than by external bodies. It is whatever provides the best 
opportunity for individual students to pursue their passions and enhance their strengths. 
(Zhao, Zhang, Kei, & Qiu, 2015, p. 116) 
Buckingham (2007) argues that ICTs  
can enable learners to access information and guidance – and hence to make informed 
choices – about where, how and what to learn. It can assist learners in “co-designing” 
their learning, recognizing their diverse skills and knowledge, and giving them greater 
control over the content, pace and process of learning. It can help to create more diverse 
learning environments, not just by “extending” schools but also by providing “anytime, 
anywhere opportunities for collaborative learning”, for example through mobile 
technology…and it can assist in developing “learner-focused” assessment and feedback, 
for example through the use of e-portfolios. (Kindle Locations, pp. 666-670) 
McLoughlin & Lee (2008) consider personalization as one of the “3 P’s” of ICT technology 






(podcasts, web logs, wikis, mashups, etc.) signal changes in the learning landscape, where 
learners are active participants, creators of knowledge, and seekers of engaging, personal 
experiences” (p.11). According to Collins & Halverson (2009) ICTs allows students to 
“customize” their learning: “Customization refers to providing people the knowledge they want 
when they want it and to supporting and guiding them as they learn” (p. 8).   
One early advocate of computer personalization was Seymour Papert (1993). As the 
onetime director of MIT’s artificial intelligence lab, Papert (1993) was one of the first 
technologists to promote and experiment with the educational use of computers.  In Mindstorms: 
Children, Computers and Powerful Ideas (1980) and The Children’s Machine: Rethinking school 
in the Age of the Computer (1993), Papert (1991) developed an approach to educational 
technology he called constructionism.  
Constructionism--the N word as opposed to the V word--shares constructivism's 
connotation of learning as “building knowledge structures” irrespective of the 
circumstances of the learning. It then adds the idea that this happens especially 
felicitously in a context where the learner is consciously engaged in constructing a public 
entity, whether it's a sand castle on the beach or a theory of the universe. (p.1) 
 I have intentionally avoided use of the term constructivism up to this point because the 
term means different things to different people. It does not have an essential meaning. However, 
because Papert (1993) is careful to distinguish his ideas from constructivist ideas, and because 
Dewey is often considered a sort of proto-constructivist along with Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and G. 
Stanley Hall, it is important to take a moment to specify in what ways Dewey’s PI might be 
considered constructivist and it what ways it may not (Ackerman, 2001; Vanderstraeten, 2002). 






of both “good” and “bad” assertions:  
the good [of constructivism]…is the emphasis that various constructivist sects place on 
the necessity for active participation by the learner, together with the recognition (by 
most of them) of the social nature of learning; it seems clear that, with respect to their 
stance on education, most types of constructivism are modern forms of progressivism… 
The bad…is the tendency within many forms of constructivist epistemology (despite 
occasional protestations to the contrary) towards relativism, or towards treating the 
justification of our knowledge as being entirely a matter of sociopolitical processes or 
consensus, or toward the jettisoning of any substantial rational justification. (Italics 
Phillips, p. 11) 
While it is true that a PI account of knowledge resembles some constructivist claims that 
knowledge is a social construction, PI clearly avoids any arguments that conceptualize 
knowledge as entirely a reflection of the material world (materialism) or entirely a product of 
individual mental processes (subjectivism). If constructivism is only understood as a learning 
theory based on subjectivist accounts of knowledge, then a PI account of learning cannot and 
should not be considered constructivist.  If, on the other hand, constructivism is understood as a 
theory of learning in which the experiences and needs of the individual learner influence the 
outcome and purpose of learning, then a PI approach to learning does align with aspects of the 
constructivist framework.  In this sense Dewey and Papert (1993) share some constructivist 
sensibilities because of their common belief that learning is a social activity.  
There is a family resemblance (and I shall accept the word progressive to name it) 
between the vision of learning I am presenting here and certain philosophical principles 






open or child-centered or constructivist or radical education. I certainly share with this 
broad movement the criticism of the School as casting the child in the role of passive 
recipient. (Papert, 1993, p. 14) 
Papert’s (1993) argument for constructionism draws on the influence constructivism had 
on his thinking combined with a Deweyan belief in the socially interactive nature of learning.  
Papert (1993) argued that the computer, practically and philosophically, was a unique tool that 
could help transform education along constructionist lines.  It could empower students and make 
real many of the same goals Dewey argued for in his education through occupations. “With 
much more persuasive power than the philosophy of even so radical a thinker as Dewey” Papert 
(1993) wrote, “the computer, in all its various manifestations is offering…new opportunities to 
craft alternatives” (p. 6).  Like Dewey, Papert (1993) was concerned that “a prevailing tendency 
to overvalue abstract reasoning is a major obstacle to progress in education” (p. 135).  According 
to Ackerman (2001), 
Papert’s constructionism…focuses more on the art of learning, or “learning to learn”, and 
on the significance of making things in learning.  Papert is interested in how learners 
engage in a conversation with [their own or other people’s] artifacts, and how these 
conversations boost self-directed learning, and ultimately facilitate the construction of 
new knowledge. (p. 1) 
An example of Papert’s (1993) constructionist approach was his development of a 
curriculum that brought together the Logo computer coding language and Lego robots.  In this 
project, students learned how to code by programing tiny robotic Legos, using Logo, to solve 
problems related to the movements of their Lego robot.  For instance, in one case a student, 






robot to “walk” with the vibrational movements of the engine.  Ricky discovered that if he gave 
his Lego legs, in a particular spot, he could harness the vibrations.  
He did not follow an exact plan. Although he did have a goal and was committed to 
realizing it; his goal was allowed to evolve as it worked. He did not build a robot by 
drawing on methods or materials made for that purpose; he used what he found at hand, 
even taking pleasure in using something made for a different purpose. (p. 131) 
Ricky was engaging in what Papert (1993) called bricolage.  
Bricolage is a metaphor for the ways of the old-fashioned traveling tinker, the jack-of-all-
trades who knocks on the door offering to fix what is broken. Faced with a job, the tinker 
rummages in his bag of assorted tools to find one that will fit the problem at hand and, if 
one tool does not work for the job, simply tries another without ever being upset in the 
slightest by the lack of generality. (p. 144)  
Much like Dewey’s experimentalism, bricolage is the process of experimenting and adapting to 
circumstance by “improving the skill of making—and fixing and making—mental constructions” 
based on the real-world consequences of one’s actions (Papert, 1993, p.144).  For Dewey,  
The method of intelligence manifested in the experimental method demands keeping 
track of ideas, activities, and observed consequences. Keeping track is a matter of 
reflective review and summarizing, in which there is both discrimination and record of 
the significant features of a developing experience. To reflect is to look back over what 
has been done to extract the net meanings which are the capital stock for intelligent 
dealing with further experiences. (EE, p. 87) 
In much the same way Dewey conceptualized education through occupations, Papert 






experiment in environments (“microworlds”) that were safe.  
The microworld is created and designed as a safe place for exploring. You can try all 
sorts of things. You will never get into trouble. You will never feel “stupid”…you will be 
totally safe in this little world. And yet while being safe, it is also designed to be 
discovery-rich in the sense that little nuggets of knowledge have been scattered around in 
it for you to find. (Papert, 1987, p. 80) 
In a more contemporary context, some argue that virtual worlds, specifically virtual 
games, can also be “discovery-rich” and used to cultivate purposeful inquiry.  For instance, one 
example is the popular on-line game Minecraft. Minecraft belongs to class of games called 
MMPORGs or Massive Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Games and allows users to manipulate 
and construct digital blocks to create any type of virtual world they can imagine.  Players of 
Minecraft interact with the game as a character, build digital worlds, and play with other users 
from all around the world.  According to Cunningham (2009), “the engaging, lifelike quality of 
these games, and their capacity to foster social knowledge construction, especially those relying 
on cooperation with others to achieve goals have led more and more people to realize that these 
games aren’t just recreational, but potentially educational as well” (p. 52).   
Waddington (2015), argues that games like Minecraft offer the possibility that “certain 
types of video games may offer us a way to get around some of the most significant obstacles 
that caused education through occupations to fail the first time around” (p. 7).  For instance, 
Short (2012) demonstrates multiple ways science teachers can use Minecraft to engage students 
in science specific lessons that would be difficult and costly if done in a non-digital environment.  
For example, when studying chemistry, Short (2012) demonstrates how Minecraft easily allows 






understanding of chemistry.  
Smelting of iron and gold ore using a furnace produces the pure metal. Sand may be 
heated in order to make glass or turned into sandstone. Cakes may be crafted from wheat, 
eggs, milk and sugar. Explosives (TNT) may be crafted from gunpowder and sand unlike 
its real world multistep preparation. (p. 57) 
The virtue of smelting iron digitally, of course, is that the dangers and costs of doing so are 
greatly reduced in an all digital environment, while the skills and chemical knowledge required 
ostensibly remain. Furthermore, because these activities can involve entire classrooms spread 
across different continents, it is argued, these games,  
…can recreate complex and pivotal social systems in such a way that children and adults 
can experiment with and learn about them at a profound level. Anyone who is 
sympathetic to Deweyan educational principles should be excited about these 
possibilities. (Waddington, 2015, p. 20) 
It is important to note, however, that ICT enabled personalization can be both a means 
towards creating “complex social systems” as well as a means towards creating restrictive and  
isolating social systems.  For instance, there is growing evidence that online search engines and 
social media like Google and Twitter are increasingly creating what Pariser (2011) calls 
personalized “filter bubbles”: “personalization filters serve up a kind of invisible 
autopropaganda, indoctrinating us with our own ideas, amplifying our desire for things that are 
familiar and leaving us oblivious to the dangers lurking in the dark territory of the unknown” (p. 
15).   While online algorithm filters help organize and control the vast amount of data streaming 
through the internet every day, these filters have become increasingly more focused on 






tracking software can trace every purchase, click, and glance—down to how long users hover 
over certain bits of content—whenever users visit a web site.  This information is then shared 
and sold to marketers who use that information to attract users to particular web sites and 
content.  Users that routinely click on particular sites, shop for particular types of products, or 
fall within certain demographics are frequently and unknowingly provided with content that 
exploits their preferences in an effort to spur users to purchase more, browse a particular way, or 
to visit certain platforms.  “Ultimately” argues Pariser (2011),  
the proponents of personalization offer a vision of a custom tailored-world, every facet of 
which fits us perfectly. It’s a cozy place, populated by our favorite people and things and 
ideas. If we never want to hear about reality TV (or a more serious issue like gun 
violence) again, we don’t have to…. (p. 12)   
In Alone Together, Sherry Turkle (2011) demonstrates how ICTs and “social networks” 
can also contribute to social isolation.  While on-line networks appear to connect us in ever 
expanding ways, Turkle (2011) argues, “the ties we form through the Internet are not, in the end, 
the ties that bind. But they are the ties that preoccupy” (p. 280).  She continues, “We go online 
because we are busy but end up spending more time with technology and less with each other. 
We defend connectivity as a way to be close, even as we effectively hide from each other” (p. 
281).  Ironically, Turkle (2011) argues, because ICTs enable constant connectivity with others 
ICTs are also extremely intrusive:  
We fill our days with ongoing connection, denying ourselves time to think and dream. 
Busy to the point of depletion, we make a new Faustian bargain. It goes something like 
this: if we are left alone when we make contact, we can handle being together. (p. 203)  






direction is that individual learners may be cut off from a broader ecosystem of differing 
opinions or contradictory information.  The internet, rather than being a wide-open forum of 
communication challenging users to confront diverse opinions and information, becomes a 
device to channel and reinforce habits of attention and opinion that go unchallenged.   As 
discussed in chapter two, Dewey argued that when habits constrain inquiry and reinforce dogma 
they no longer function as efficient tools of growth.  In such cases, habits become like stubborn 
ideologies that no longer comport to the realities of empirical consequences.  
While Papert (1993) and Dewey both argue that the interest and attention of the student 
are important to the process of learning, both also contextualize interest and attention as 
functions of broader social interactions in which collaboration and cooperation with others shape 
responsible inquiry.  “[In] the new schools, the primary source of control resides in the very 
nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to 
contribute and to which all feel a responsibility” (EE, p. 56). As I argued in chapter two, Dewey 
argued that freedom of inquiry was necessary to the preservation and maintenance of a 
democratic way of associative living because such freedom empowered the sharing and 
collaborative strengths of inquiry itself.  
Responsibility for the conduct of society and government rests on every member of 
society. Therefore, everyone must receive a training that will enable him to meet this 
responsibility, giving him just ideas of the condition and needs of the people collectively, 
and developing those qualities which will insure his doing a fair share of the work of 
government. If we train our children to take orders, to do things simply because they are 






almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of overcoming the present defects of our 
system and of establishing the truth of democratic ideals. (ST, p. 304) 
Like Dewey, Papert (1993) also believed that computer technologies, when used 
educationally and constructionally, could be more than just tools for individual growth (although 
they are that as well), they could also be tools for the growth a community of inquirers.    
[Papert’s] contribution is to remind us that intelligence should be defined and studied in-
situ; alas, that being intelligent means being situated, connected, and sensitive to 
variations in the environment…Papert draws our attention to the fact that “diving into” 
situations rather than looking at them from a distance, that connectedness rather than 
separation, are powerful means of gaining understanding. Becoming one with the 
phenomenon under study is, in his view, a key to learning. (Ackerman, 2001, p. 8) 
The point I am making here is that Dewey’s philosophy of education through 
occupations, like Papert’s (1993) constructionism, is an argument that educational technologies 
promote growth when the technologies empower students to want to learn because the use of the 
computer is part of a larger act of inquiry in a community of inquiry; it is an act of ownership 
and extension of personal desire, of play, and effects certain habits of active investigation.  In 
other words, both education through occupations and constructionism provide the conditions 
whereby students want to reflect on what they are doing because reflecting is central to the 
success of the process itself: 
The essentials of method are therefore identical with the essentials of reflection. They are 
first that the pupil have a genuine situation of experience--that there be a continuous 
activity in which he is interested for its own sake; secondly, that a genuine problem 






information and make the observations needed to deal with it; fourth, that suggested 
solutions occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly way; 
fifth, that he have opportunity and occasion to test his ideas by application, to make their 
meaning clear and to discover for himself their validity. (DE, p. 163) 
 Of equal importance, both outlooks also argue that that individual interest emerges from a 
larger community of interests.  As I noted in chapter four, Dewey’s education through 
occupations stresses collaboration among students.  The direct goal of the collaboration was to 
solve a common problem while indirectly promoting habits of active inquiry to enrich the 
experiences of the individual and the group.  The occupational projects students undertook 
merely set the conditions through which interest, content, and social association were ideally 
interwoven.  
The essence of the demand of freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an 
individual to make his own special contribution to the group interest, and to partake of its 
activities in such ways that social guidance shall be a matter of his own mental attitude, 
and not a mere authoritative dictation of his acts. (DE, p. 301)   
Thus, in a PI sense, the use of ICTs in education should ideally engage students’ interests 
by empowering them to accept responsibility for their learning within a community of learners 
by inspiring them to be aware of the effects of the tools and methods on the process of inquiry 
itself.  
Technological Transparency  
Papert’s (1993) constructionism and Dewey’s education through occupations also 
challenge educators, students, and policy-makers to accept responsibility for the use of 






than 100 years ago, Dewey noted that, in order for students to become critical consumers of 
knowledge and effective actors in social contexts, they needed to understand how technological 
processes function” (Shaikh, et al. 2011, p. 90).  Through occupations, for instance, students 
learned about how an engine worked by rebuilding an engine, and how to farm by actually 
farming.  David Waddington (2010) calls the exposure of technological processes “technological 
transparency” (p. 621).  According to Shaikh et al. (2012), technological transparency is “the 
idea of understanding how systems, processes, and related mechanisms within society work 
[and] can help individuals progress beyond the mere use of technologies towards developing 
critical perspectives” (p. 87). Technological transparency is the idea “that making production 
processes open and transparent [is] critical to helping citizens become more effective learners 
and agents” (Shaikh, et al., 2012, p. 94).  According to Shaikh et al., (2012) “when individuals 
understand the processes at work behind knowledge production, it can have a profound effect in 
inspiring them to modify or create knowledge of their own” (p. 95).  
Transparency also involves understanding and reflecting on the historical and social 
contexts from which the technologies have evolved.  PI argues that the values technologies 
express are the result of the social and historical circumstances and people for whom the 
technology was designed.  A PI approach argues that as technologies evolve, they do so based on 
the needs and values of those using the technology.  
An education which acknowledges the full intellectual and social meanings of a vocation 
would include instruction in the historic background of present conditions; training in 
science to give intelligence and initiative in dealing with material and agencies of 
production; the study of economics, civics, and politics, to bring the future worker into 






all, it would train power of readaptation to changing conditions so that future workers 
would not become blindly subject to fate imposed on them. (DE, p. 319) 
In an educational context, therefore, accepting responsibility for the uses of ICTs 
involves observing and reflecting on the inner workings of technology itself to understand how 
ICTs are designed, how hardware and software work, the basics of computer coding and HTML 
languages, and how networks interact.  Socio-historically, exposing the inner workings of 
technology also means reflecting on the social and historical contexts from which the technology 
arises. 
TPACK 
Koehler & Mishra’s (2009) “technological pedagogical content knowledge” (TPACK) 
framework suggests another way to think about how educators can accept responsibility for ICTs 
(p. 60).  As a pedagogical framework, TPACK is meant to help teachers conceptualize how 
technological knowledge can be integrated with pedagogical and content knowledge. The 
framework suggests that  
the basis of effective teaching with technology, require[s] an understanding of the 
representation of concepts using technologies; pedagogical techniques that use 
technologies in constructive ways to teach content; knowledge of what makes concepts 
difficult or easy to learn and how technology can help redress some of the problems that 
students face; knowledge of students’ prior knowledge and theories of epistemology; and 
knowledge of how technologies can be used to build on existing knowledge to develop 
new epistemologies or strengthen old ones. (p. 66) 
What makes the TPACK model attractive from a PI perspective is the recognition that teaching 






epistemological domains—specifically content and pedagogy (see Figure 7).   
 
Figure 7. The TPACK framework and its knowledge components. 
Although Koehler & Mishra (2009) initially conceived of this framework in relation to 
teaching, it can also be more broadly applied to learning as well.  Specifically, when Koehler & 
Mishra (2009) consider the role of technological content knowledge to be “an understanding of 
the manner in which technology and content influence and constrain one another” they are 
suggesting a program of attention equally applicable to students engaged in the process of 
inquiry (p. 65).  
[students] must also have a deep understanding of the manner in which the subject matter 
(or the kinds of representations that can be constructed) can be changed by the 
application of particular technologies. [Students] need to understand which specific 
technologies are best suited for addressing subject-matter learning in their domains and 






 The arguments for technological transparency, TPACK, and PI all assert that knowing 
how to use ICT technology in a purposeful and educative way requires more than just knowledge 
about what the technologies can do; it also requires an understanding of the technology itself.  
Obviously, not every student or teacher can become an expert in every facet of new technology, 
nor is that what is recommended, but a PI approach to ICTs does suggest that a basic “literacy” 
in the mechanics of digital technology is an important element in the responsible and deliberate 
use of the technology.   
It is a question of acknowledgment on the part of scientific inquirers of intellectual 
responsibility; of admitting into their consciousness a perception of what science has 
actually done, through its counterpart technologies, in making the world and life what 
they are. (ION, pp. 66-67) 
If students remain ignorant of the processes underpinning computers, for instance, their 
capacity to use the technology is limited to the parameters of the designer and engineer. From a 
PI standpoint, such limitation dramatically restricts the ability to participate in the production of 
knowledge: “Intelligence becomes ours” argues Dewey, “in the degree in which we use it and 
accept responsibility for consequences” (HNC, p. 314).  As students increasingly inhabit an ICT-
mediated world and develop greater skill at using technologies to navigate the conditions and 
phenomenon they identify as problems, a PI approach to education merely seeks to make that 
navigational process known through “reflective attention”: 
A person who has gained the power of reflective attention, the power to hold problems, 
questions, before the mind, is in so far, intellectually speaking, educated. He has mental 
discipline--power of the mind and for the mind. Without this the mind remains at the 






In a PI sense, to fully accept responsibility for the aims and uses of ICTs in education is 
to approach ICTs as highly malleable tools arising out of and assisting in the process of inquiry 
and growth.  Through continual observation, experimentation, and reflection on how ICTs solve 
problems—both as the tools learners use to solve problems and as the process through which 
students inquire— a PI approach challenges educators, students, and policy makers to recognize 
that they assign value to ICTs in relation to educational aims and practices, not the technology 
itself. According to Hickman (1992), “where technology fails to be responsible, it is not because 
technology as method has failed, but because inquiry and testing have been misdirected, 
subsumed to nontechnical ends, or aborted” (p. 202).   
Ultimately, the educational value of technology, Dewey argues, is determined through the 
judgment of individual students.  While the context within which a student forms judgement 
about meaning is frequently influenced by social, political, and economic conditions, the final 
value of any inquiry is determined according to the consequences the inquiry has on the 
experiences of the student himself.   
We are given to thinking of society in large and vague ways. We should forget “society” 
and think of law, industry, religion, medicine, politics, art, education, philosophy—and 
think of them in the plural. For points of contact are not the same for any two persons, 
and hence the question which the interests and occupations pose are never quite the 
same…. There is no society at large, no business in general. Harmony with conditions is 
not a single and monotonous uniformity, but a diversified affair requiring individual 
attack. (ION, p. 80) 
To accept responsibility for ICTs, therefore, is to recognize that when, how, and why 






learning process itself.  Furthermore, because learning is an open-ended process, ever developing 
within the social contexts of individual experience, cultivating habits that expose the technology 
as an object and element of thinking empowers individuals to discern the meaning of the 
technologies as it relates to the purposes they determine.    
Conclusion 
  In this chapter I have argued that there are many similarities between the industrial and 
digital revolutions.  Both have dramatically reshaped the material, social, and cultural conditions 
of daily life.  Furthermore, I have also argued that many of the contemporary debates regarding 
the educational aims and purposes of modern ICTs both grow out of and directly challenge many 
of the educational aims and norms first established in the industrial era.    
Like many of the stated advantages of industrial technologies, ICTs are frequently 
thought of as efficient and inexpensive means to fixed-ends.  The ability of digital technology to 
quickly gather, transmit, and record infinite layers of lexigraphical, auditory, and visual 
information is unparalleled in human history.  For some, this ability suggests that educational 
institutions use the technology to efficiently deliver, measure, and monitor educational 
achievement.  Given the power of digital technology to transcend the problems of time, space, 
and accessibility, the only curricular question remaining, they argue, is how to engineer the 
system to ensure students develop the skills necessary for working and living in the 21st century. 
For others, ICTs offer the tantalizing possibility that every student will soon be able to learn 
according to his or her own needs at his or her own speed.  Rather than a one size fits all 
approach, ICTs enable a highly customizable curriculum in which everyone can learn according 
to the specific developmental needs and interests of the student. At the farthest extreme, the 






innate curiosities to learn the material they find most compelling at speeds and in locations that 
are most amenable to their own personalities and wants.  
On both sides of the spectrum, be it the promise of ICT-enabled curriculum that 
emphasizes the attainment of predetermined standards, or the individualized curriculum of 
personalized learning, the technology is often cast as a force unto itself that is either devoid of 
values or deterministically complicit in bending educational norms to innate technocratic ends. 
Furthermore, whether one is a technological enthusiast or a technological skeptic frequently 
depends on whether one approaches technology from an engineering philosophy of technology 
or a humanities philosophy of technology.  
What I have attempted to show throughout this dissertation is that Dewey’s PI is an 
approach to knowledge, technology, and education that “evades” many of these problematic 
dualisms (West, 1989, p. 5).  For Dewey, the conditions of living always involve other people 
and things; the development and growth of the individual is embedded in the social realities of 
associative living.  Education, as a social activity, is an aspect of living whereby we learn how to 
apply our intelligence to problems that arise from our interactions with the world. Learning how 
to purposefully apply our intelligence involves exposing the process of thinking itself through a 
reflective attention to how we think.  By exposing the process of thinking itself, we become 
aware of what we are about and we use that awareness to judge what we consider meaningful.  
From a PI perspective, therefore, when knowledge is understood as an adaptive function of 
human existence, arising out of the act of inquiry and for the purposes of solving problems, 
technology is a part of the inquiring process, both as an object and as a method of inquiry.  To 
think is to solve problems that arise out of the conditions of living, and technologies arise from 






the product of thinking itself.  To view technologies from pragmatically instrumental perspective 
is to be fully aware of our responsibility in determining the values and uses of the technology 
itself.   
I also hope to have shown throughout this dissertation that Dewey’s PI remains a 
philosophically significant approach to education more broadly, and to a consideration of ICT 
educational technologies more specifically.  Dewey embraces technology as an invention of the 
human mind, for the purposes of the human mind, to solve problems of human existence.  By 
exploring how Dewey understood the relationship between knowledge, technology, and 
education I hope to have shown that Dewey’s approach to educational technology offers a 
pragmatic middle ground between the technological enthusiast and the technological skeptic, 
between the engineering philosophy of technology and the humanities philosophy of technology.  
Through Dewey’s PI one can maintain a faith in the ability of the human mind to deliberately 
chose educational aims for the promotion of meaningful growth and be wary of the power of 
technology to impose technocratic values on human concerns.  Dewey’s insight is to argue that 
in both instances, be it faith in deliberative intelligence or a concern over technological 
determinism, the values expressed in and through technology reflect how humans relate to the 
world.  Humans relate to the world through a thinking process that is manifested in habits of 
mind that utilize the power of observation, experimentation, and reflection.  By exposing how we 
think, through and with technologies, we reveal how thinking itself is a value-laden instrumental 
process.  
Finally, the rise of ICTs in education is an opportunity to consider anew how Dewey 






itself is the foundation upon which all educational aims ultimately derive.  If nothing else, I hope 
to have demonstrated, as argues Blacker (1993) that the  
…most salutary outcome of the debate concerning the proper use of educational 
technologies may well be the re-opening of a sorely-needed dialogue concerning the 
grand aims of education itself. Dewey at his most inspired helps remind us of how 
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